













# STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

*By*

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## PREFACE

Twelve out of the fifteen papers appearing in the present volume have been published elsewhere. The papers which are being published here for the first time are "Negation", "Theories of False Appearance in Indian Philosophy : A Critical Study"—II and "Schools of Vedanta Philosophy". Of the papers previously published, the majority are being reprinted here with little or no change. There is however one exception, viz, the first paper on "The Theories of False Appearance" which appeared in the January number of "The Calcutta Review", 1935. As the *Anyathakhyati* view treated in the said paper was in some respects defective, the article has been revised and substantially modified and deficiencies of the earlier presentation have been removed as far as possible.

Most of the topics treated in the volume are of a technical nature and are not likely to be understood by the general reader not specially acquainted with philosophy. There are some articles however such as "Capital Punishment", "Religion and Magic", "Religion of Ancient Egypt", etc, that are easier reading and will repay study even by the ordinary reader not specially equipped in philosophy.

As a collection of papers written at various times, the work lacks the unity or cohesion to be expected from a systematic treatise on philosophy. But the attentive reader who goes carefully through the various article will not fail to discover an underlying bond of unity. The Author is an Idealist who yet does not subscribe to the Hegelian notion of a coherent whole of experience except as a wishful thought or a necessary make-believe. He has therefore throughout endeavoured to make out the objective forms as the self-alienation of the free subject. It hardly needs be said that as an out-and-out Sankarite the author does not believe in any compromise

with objectivism either of the idealistic, or of the realistic brand. The author has explained his own position both in the first article entitled "Spiritual Life" and in the second paper on "Theories of False Appearance" which is a critical estimate of the theories from the Sankarite standpoint.

The paper on "Sankhya Realism" is, in reality, a summary of the longer paper "Sankhya Theory of Knowledge", but as it is very lucid in spite of its brevity and also contains some fresh matter it has been included in the collected papers along with the longer article dealing with the same topic in a more elaborate manner.

The author expresses his thanks to the management of "The Calcutta Review". "The Philosophical Quarterly" "The S. C. College Magazine", etc., for permission to publish the articles which appeared in these journals.

## Preface to the Second Edition

Besides the fifteen papers of the first edition with minor changes here and there, there are three more papers in the second edition, entitled (1) "Degrees of Goodness and Badness", (2) "The Bhāgavat and the Pañcarātra and (3) "The Philosophy of Śuddhādvaita". The total number of papers in the second edition is thus eighteen.

28-12-55.

Susil Kumar Maitra.

*TO THE SACRED MEMORY*  
*of*  
***Sir Asutosh Mookerjee***



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## **THE SPIRITUAL LIFE AND ITS REALISATION**

That science delivers truth while religion is a pleasing self-deception may be one of the Freudian idiosyncrasies with which western thought on the whole may not agree, but in respect of its objective emphasis it does represent, and is so far typical of, that objectivistic, externalistic view of the spiritual life which marks out the western outlook as radically distinct from that of the east. Freud's speciality may be his insistence on an objective science as distinguished from a religion that is subjective and wish-motivated, but the belief in an objective salvation of the spirit is common both to the Freudian who believes in a scientific liberation and his theological antagonist who looks forward to a religious deliverance from isolation and subjectivity. Common ground between the Freudian and his devout opponents is the belief that the spirit realises itself in trans-subjectivity and self-transcendence, that it is in the object and the right seeking of it through knowing, feeling and willing that the spirit's true fruition lies. What in the Freudian view is to come through an objective science and its empirical methods is, according to religious belief, a matter of trans-empirical realisation in a supra-scientific objectivity.

attaining and self-fulfilment in the consciousness of its objectivity. The eternal reality mediates itself through itself in the consciousness of the finite—its outgoing as objectified reality is also an incoming or returning into itself as concrete self-conscious spirit. Art, religion and philosophy represent the successive stages of this self-mediation through self-objectification. Art is the absolute mediating itself in the consciousness of the finite as objective sensuous image : it is the self-concretion of the absolute as the form of the artistic object, the absolute objectifying itself to sense as symmetry or harmony of sensible form. But art necessarily falls short of the spiritual content it represents : the absolute content as spiritual necessarily transcends the sensuous limitations of artistic representation. The religious consciousness represents an advance on the artistic in this respect : it is the experience of the absolute content as a personal self-communication of the absolute to the finite spirit, a dual reciprocal objectivity of the absolute to the finite and of the finite to the absolute, the self-communication of God to man and man's spiritual unity with God through prayer, devotion and love. Here the form being better suited to the nature of the content, the religious plane represents a higher level of absolute consciousness than does artistic representation in symmetry and beauty of sensuous form. But even religion does not take one into the heart of spiritual reality. It presents the absolute content as felt experience, *i.e.*, as feeling or subjective certitude. Thus the

absolute of religion lacks objective necessity, i.e., falls short of its character as self-justifying reality. And so as art is superseded by religion, religion in its turn merges into philosophic realisation. Philosophy is the realisation of the absolute as self-necessitating objectified experience. Philosophy thus represents the highest stage, the fruition and fulfilment of the absolute consciousness. What religion presents as a subjective necessity of feeling, philosophy realises as an objective necessity of thought. The triad of art, religion and philosophy are thus the three ascending stages of the absolute consciousness realising itself as objective and objectified experience.

From the foregoing it is sufficiently clear that Hegel is no exception to the general run of western thinkers in the objective view of the spirit and its realisation. For Hegel as for western thinkers generally there is no self-realisation except through self-objectification, the absolute, in Hegel's view, being real as the objectified absolute content of the different forms of absolute consciousness. Thus Kant's lesson of the first Critique is simply brushed aside and his conception of the subjective, functionistic *apriori* is twisted into that of the self-objectifying absolute mediating itself through itself in the consciousness of the finite. And so in the place of the autonomous subject as the unobjective constitutive principle of objectivity we are offered the objectified subject as the true fruition and fulfilment of the spiritual reality. Nor is this all. For the sake of the symmetrical rigidity of the triadic spiritual

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movement, art is affiliated to religion, and religion to philosophy, and the three together made to constitute the three ascending stages of the self-objectifying absolute consciousness. That art is expression of inner emotion and as such the spirit's self-objectification in individual image is undeniably true. But this is very different from saying that art is the realisation of the absolute in sensuous form. Any emotion, we hold with Croce, may be matter for artistic expression, and art is art as successful expression of the inner emotion. Art may be described as the self-intuiting of the soul in an individual image, the concrete image-expression of the inner sentimental tumult. The absolute may be matter for artistic expression in this way quite as much as the relative and the finite, what is necessary for the expression being an inner emotion or a stirring of the soul within. Hegel's restriction of art to the absolute content is thus an artificial and arbitrary narrowing of its sphere not warranted by the facts of experience. Nor is Hegel's view of art as *realisation* altogether free from confusion. Croce is unquestionably right in denying the consciousness of reality in art, art, according to him, being distinguished from logic by the absence of reality-consciousness. Hegel's view of art as *realisation* thus betrays an obvious confusion of expression and realisation. To express is not necessarily to realise. That art is conscious self-expression is undeniable, but it is sheer confusion to mistake the enjoyment of the expressed emotion for the consciousness of its reality. Art, we hold,

is both enjoyment and free contemplation, enjoyed objectivity as well as detached contemplation of it. Art, in this respect, may be regarded as a kind of spiritual self-emancipation, the spirit's self-freeing from its conscious objectivity. It is emancipation however not as realisation in a sensuous objectivity as Hegel says, it is emancipation rather as transcendence of the enjoyed self-objectivity. It is, in short, a kind of free subjectivity contemplating its own objectivity with detachment. We may say that art is a preparation in this respect for the higher freedom of pure subjectivity which Indians call *svarūpā-vasthiti*. *Svarūpāvasthiti* is the spirit's rest in itself, spiritual self-repose, the freedom of unadulterated spirituality emptied of all objectivity. Art is a preparation for this higher subjectivity as the detached contemplation of an enjoyed self-objectivity.

Our discussion of Hegel's philosophy, we hope, has sufficed to bring out the predominant objectivity of its spiritual outlook. We may add that a similar objectivity is the characteristic note of Neo-Hegelian idealism. Consider, *e.g.*, Green's view of the spiritual life as spirit's self-finding in nature. Here also we have the same objective view of the spirit as realising itself as the objectified system of phenomena. And this holds of spirit both as theoretical and practical consciousness, *i. e.*, as the theoretical comprehension of the given reality and the practical remoulding of it in the life of will and conduct. Thus what is nature as the unalterable system of phenomena is, according to Green, intelligible only as



the self-objectification of spirit as nature's necessary presupposition. And the moral life is only a carrying further of the work of theoretical consciousness in this respect: it is the progressive realisation of an ideal which is suggested by, though not discovered as actual, in the given objectivity. And as the spirit is thus doomed to an endless progression to an ideal that never is, we are asked to put our faith in God as the completed objectivity we are reproducing in our finite lives. Thus the rational life resolves itself, according to Green, into living objectively, both as intellect and will, after the pattern of the realised objectivity of the absolute spirit. A similar objectivity of outlook also distinguishes Bradley's absolutism though here, we must add, there is the further suggestion of a supra-objective reality which is both the negation and the transmuted reaffirmation of the empirical objectivity. Bradley's absolute, in short, is object-transcending only as object-reaffirming in a supra-logical whole of trans-empirical objectivity.

The Neo-Idealism of Croce is also no exception to the general rule. Here also we have the selfsame objectivistic view of the spiritual life as objective self-fulfilment through objectified self expression. The life of the spirit, according to Croce, is unceasing self-objectification as intuition-expression of the spirit's inner "sentimental tumult": it is the spirit's *a priori* aesthetic synthesis of feeling and imagination, the intuition or objectified expression of its inner stirrings. But intuition is only the first stage of

spiritual fruition: the satisfaction which it brings is that of successful expression. Side by side with this satisfaction however appears a new dissatisfaction of the intellect to know, *i. e.*, to sort and classify the image-expression as reality. Thus intuition passes over into perception, *i. e.* into the knowledge of reality. In this way the *apriori aesthetic synthesis* becomes a new synthesis, *i. e.*, an *apriori logical synthesis* of representation and category, of subject and predicate, which is the knowledge of a fact as the particularisation of an universal, the perception of the image as reality. Even logical synthesis however does not represent the last stage: with the satisfaction of knowledge appears a new dissatisfaction the dissatisfaction of the desire for action. With the appearance of knowledge, in short, appears also the consciousness of value, every new reality known generating a new ideal possibility and a new sense of value, with new concomitant aspirations, desires and longings of the soul. And so the logical synthesis prepares the way to a *practical apriori synthesis* which as a new desiring and a new feeling is a new passionateness of the spirit that craves for appropriate expression. And thus the spirit moves on spirally from expression, through logic and practical synthesis, to renewed expression at a higher level, this circular movement being repeated at higher and higher stages as spiritual life advances. Thus in Croce's Neo-Idealism we have once more a repetition of the objective view of the spirit as necessary circular movement from objectified expression, through reality

and ideal aspiration, to objectivity again, the process dragging on without end being the endless progression of the spiritual life. In short, what is a temporal recapitulation of a completed and finished self-objectivity according to Hegelians, is the spirit's endless self-objectifying in a progression *ad infinitum* according to Croce and the Neo-Idealist.

We have so far discussed western Idealism and have refrained from discussing western Realism. Any detailed examination of realism is however unnecessary as the objective outlook in realism is too obvious to require any special investigation. We shall therefore refer only to Hartmann's "Ethical Realism" as substantiating our contention in the main. The spiritual life, according to Hartmann, realises itself through emergent objective values which have *apriori* objectivity independently of the subject. Thus in place of Kant's *apriori* as a subjective function Hartmann will have the objective *apriori* of axiological determinations. Values, according to Hartmann, get inserted into the ontological system through the instrumentality of the conscious subject and the subject as actualising principle of the ideal objectivity thereby becomes a moral subject and the seat of moral attributes. The conscious subject is, in other words, the connecting link between the axiological and the ontological objective: it is through the subject's consciousness of the axiological objective and his consequent effort of will that the non-actual, axiological value gets inserted into the order of ontological reality. And the actualising

of the axiological value is itself an occasion for the emergence of a new axiological determination, *vis.*, the subject's moral value as a value-actualising agent. Thus moral value presupposes non-moral; it is the value of the subject realising extra-moral values. But value both moral and non-moral is an objective axiological determination, and is neither the subject's self-projection or function, nor its self-assertion against a disappointing and unsatisfactory objectivity. The emergence of value is not inconsistent with its objectivity, though actuality is not a necessary implication of it.

The above brief summary of Hartmann's philosophy is hardly sufficient to do justice to the profound richness of his many-sided thought. It however does bring out the unmistakable objectivity of his general position. The *apriori* which for Kant is a subjective function is made into an objective *apriori* which the subject recognises but does not constitute. And spiritual fruition is conceived as consisting in the subject's acquisition of objective moral value through the actualisation of extra-moral axiological values. And thus an objective salvation of the spirit is chalked out as consisting in the spirit's insertion of the axiological objective into the ontological system.

The above will suffice as illustration of the general trend of western thought which, as we have pointed out, is predominantly objectivistic and is incapable, it seems, of the conception of a de-objectified spirituality emptied of all objective determination. To Indians, however, this is an inherently false view

of the spirit, an objective fulfilment being, according to the Indian view, the spirit's self-alienation and complete negation of its intrinsic self-autonomy. Even the Buddhist, *e. g.*, who avoids a positive definition of the spiritual life, is one with orthodox Hinduism in repudiating the object-lust as a mistaken and illusory phantom-chase. And the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas who consider the self to be a knowable or *padārtha* and therefore an object among other objects yet repudiate an objective self-fulfilment as the spirit's highest end or goal. Thus the self's *mokṣa* or freedom is, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, its emancipation from all relation to the not-self, a condition of pure, detached selfhood wherein all experience and therefore all conscious relation of self to the other ceases. But in Sāṅkhya and Vedānta the concept of the unobjective self is carried, one may say, to logical perfection and completeness. Thus Vedānta and Sāṅkhya not merely repudiate an objective fulfilment of the spirit as do the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, they also reject the objectivity of the spirit itself which neither Naiyāyikas nor Vaiśeṣikas altogether discard. Thus while according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas the self is a substance and consciousness is its quality and both therefore are knowables or objects, according to Sāṅkhya and Vedānta the self is pure consciousness as the unobjective light that illuminates all objective contents. Hence the self is the self-luminous intelligence that reveals contents without being itself a content. Contents are the other of self, the objectivity which the self posits and makes

significant. The self is the unobjective negation of the objectivity it posits, the self-certifying reality that is at once the affirmation and cancellation of all objectivity.

The self thus being both the position and negation of all objectivity the so-called objective movement of experience must be read as a process of progressive disillusionment rather than as objective self-fulfilment. There is progress in the moral life no doubt, but the progress is not a forward movement from a less to a more satisfactory objectivity as the west conceives it. It is rather a negative movement towards spiritual emancipation and liberation from the objective obsession. The higher stage is higher as transcending grosser and commoner illusions, but is not itself anything better than a subtler and more refined illusion to be superseded in its turn. Hence the so-called forward movement is a progress towards de-objectification and self-emptying—a progressive emancipation from the spirit's objective thralldom. It is not, as the west conceives it, a movement towards a fuller objectivity or a more completely filled life. It is a progressive self-purifying through self-stripping, the successive casting off of the spirit's objective garments.

The west conceives the intellectual life as a forward movement of the spirit consisting in a progressive rationalisation of the brute matter of experience into a coherent, intelligible whole or unity. That the process never reaches completion being doomed to an endless progression from a lesser to a greater intelli-

gibility is sought to be made good by the hypothesis of a completely intelligible whole of experience which is being reproduced piecemeal in the life of the finite intelligence. But the fact that the unity that is aimed at is of contents that are logically repellent ought to have suggested the impossibility of a completed unity which is proposed as a supplement to the incompleteness and failure of the objective effort of the finite intelligence. The lesson which was thus thrown away on the objective west has, however, borne fruit in subjective India in the concept of the autonomous self as the presupposition as well as negation of all objectivity.

Western moral theories exhibit the same objectivity of outlook as do its logic and its theories of the intellectual life. Thus the spiritual life in its practical aspect is conceived as a progressive objectification of the spirit, first as a coherent individual life, next as a wider and more coherent whole comprising the individual in relation to other individuals in society, and lastly as the moral life which is that of the good citizen in a well-organised state as the society of all societies. It is taken for granted that a perfect ordering of life, individually in respect of the self's desires and inclinations and socially in respect of the individual's relations to other individuals in society, is not merely a desirable but also a practically possible consummation and is conducive to true self-fulfilment and self-realisation. But none of these assumptions, we contend, will bear examination in the light of actual experience. No life, we hold,

is a positively coherent life in the strict sense, the so-called good life being good not as being more coherent and self-satisfying than the life of the incoherent, bad will but merely as cathartic self-release, *i.e.*, as a present escape from an unsatisfactory instability which, however does not itself bring either the coherence or the satisfaction it promises. The best-organised life in this respect is as far from being a self-satisfying stable life as the so-called unorganised, unstable life of the bad man. And this holds of the personal life both as an individually ordered whole of feelings and inclinations and as the socially organised unity of the individual life in relation to other individuals in society. In society no less than in the relatively isolated life of an individual considered in abstraction from the social whole, there is neither that perfect ordering which is conducive to true self-fulfilment nor any real identity of interests miscalled a general will. Outside the small family-group consisting of parents and children, there is no natural society in the strict sense nor any real common interest equally shared by the constituent units. All associations larger than the family are artificial compositions that have originated in, and are maintained into being by, the sanction of superior brute force. To say that in organising individual life in relation to the social whole the individual realises his permanent as distinct from his passing interest of the moment seems to us to be a wilful perversion of the real truth in the interest of the powers that be. We may as well say that the caged



bird that loses the use of its wings through long imprisonment realises itself in so far as it sings to its master and ministers to his self-gratification and delight. Nor should we overlook the obvious fact that the state is no more a society of all societies than is any particular religion the religion of all peoples. The state is only one closed group amongst other groups with nothing but irrepressible hostility towards all similarly organised groups which even the fear of war does not always suffice to keep down. Nor does the state in practice represent internally that general or common will of all which in theory is usually attributed to it. The empirical state in actual practice is nothing but an instrument of coercion controlled by a powerful minority for the exploitation of the majority—a minority who manipulate its executive, its judiciary, its laws and even its constitution and its methods of franchise to their own special ends. To say then that the best life is that of the good citizen in the state seems to us to be a hypocritical misrepresentation of the real facts in the interest of an exploiting minority who represent none but themselves. That the good citizen of a state may be a very bad citizen of the world is also only too obvious to be obscured even by the interested sophistry of a so-called disinterested moral theory. Nor does the life of the good citizen (or of any good member of any society for that matter) represent that self-fulfilment and fruition of the spirit which according to the objectivistic view, ought to constitute the test and the criterion of the morally good

life. For, if the truth is to be told, the good life in this sense is more often a perpetual self-frustration and self-negation by an unscrupulous minority who monopolise the social power than one of expansive self-fulfilment and self-realisation. It is besides an inherently false view of the moral life that makes it consist in the simple discharge of the appointed duties of one's station in life. Morality has neither a fixed station nor any predetermined code of duties. The moral life, we hold, is a perpetual unrest—an unceasing progression from one dissatisfaction to another. There is no satisfaction in the moral life. Satisfaction is rest, quiescence of soul, but rest and quiescence are the negation of morality. Satisfaction and contentment are, no doubt, desirable qualities of the soul, and the satisfied, contented man is a very lovable companion in social life. But he is as far from being a morally good man as is an useful machine in good, working order. To be moral is to be dissatisfied, to be in unceasing conflict with the actual, to be always stretching forward to an ideal that never is, but always to be. To find morality in one's fixed station and its duties is to mistake both one's moral station and the duties it entails.

We are told however that the incompleteness of the moral life is rectified in religion as the experience of a realised ideal which in mere morality remains a subjective aspiration to be realised. It is further suggested that religion as transcending the limitations of the empirical state enables the pious man to live as the citizen of a perfect state as the incarnation

of the divine spirit eternally realising itself in the society of finite spirits. Thus what the visible state fails to achieve through the egoism of politicians and the larger egoism of an exclusive nationalism, the pious man realises in the higher religious consciousness of the divine life as realising itself in the lives of finite creatures. By living up to this higher consciousness, man lifts himself above the narrowness of a political morality and the illusoriness and unreality that characterise the merely moral standpoint. Thus morality without religion may be an illusory phantom-chase void of purpose and meaning, but morality transformed and transfigured in the fervour of religious emotion is neither an unmeaning pursuit of an ever-elusive phantom nor the seeking of an egoistic political end subserving the interest of a powerful minority.

All this, we content, is true, but not strictly relevant to the issue. Before the point of the argument may be conceded, the preliminary issue to be decided is whether a religious extension of the moral consciousness can be justified in the light of actual experience or whether it has to be taken on trust and accepted as a matter of faith. The fact must not be overlooked that the religious content being not translatable into actual vision (we are discounting mystical realisation) has much greater need of an empirical justification than any ordinary belief easily convertible into its cash-value in experience. The lesson of the moral life, it should be noted, is decidedly against any such objective satisfaction of the spirit

as is usually held out by religion to be the spirit's ultimate end or goal. If morality teaches anything it is the futility of the objective effort, the illusoriness and unreality of the object-hunger as capable either of fulfilment or satiety. Nor does the progress of the intellectual life presage that objective unity or wholeness of the spirit which religion assumes as the reality we reproduce piecemeal in our finite lives. For the unity uniting one fact to another is unity only as the annulment of their empirical diversity and is thus the negation of their respective individuality. The ideal unity of the intellectual life is thus the negation and cancellation of all empirical objectivity, the de-objectified unity of the subject affirming itself as the negation of the objective. That the intellect fails to achieve what it aims at arises from its aiming at the impossible, *i. e.*, at an unity that will be the resolution as well as conservation of all empirical differences. Hence the evidence both of the theoretical and the practical consciousness is against the reality of the religious content, *i. e.*, of an objective consummation of the spirit as a coherent whole of experience. Where vision fails, faith is a legitimate supplement, but a faith which is not merely trans-empirical but also contra-empirical a faith, in other words which is a direct negation of experience and its express teachings, is nothing but a pleasing illusion and a wilful self-deceiving.

Religion as personal communion with an objectified absolute spirit we hold, then, to be an illusion which we deliberately nurse and foster with the

object of strengthening the illusory object-chase of our intellectual and moral life. It is needless to say that here we are in agreement with Freud's estimate<sup>1</sup> of religion as a pleasing self-hypnotism and an unconscious self-deception. But we also differ from Freud in so far as we repudiate Freud's view of science as the panacea that will cure the spirit's object-longing. We hold that science, morality and religion (as ordinarily conceived) sail here in the same boat, that all alike are illustrations of an illusory object-lust, that never will be satisfied, but that while science and morality have this advantage that they are also an education in disillusionment through the experience of futility and failure, religion as a soaring into the trans-empirical void lacks a corresponding corrective in experience.

Mysticism is in no way better situated in this respect than ordinary religion. What is a matter of faith for ordinary religion and justified by faith alone is for the mystic a matter of immediate vision, an object of mystical realisation in a supra-rational experience of the unitive life. Thus what ordinary religion is unable to defend except on grounds of a faith not translatable into experience, mysticism claims as a matter of immediate realisation in the personal experience of the mystic. The fact must not be overlooked however that mystics very rarely agree amongst themselves as regards the content of their mystical experiences. If the mystical content

1. Cf. "The Future of an Illusion" by S. Freud.

were an over-individual objective filling of the individual life as the mystics claim it to be, it would hardly admit of that wide diversity and variety which characterise the mystics' descriptions of their respective experiences. The widely divergent and sometimes conflicting accounts of mystical deliverances thus create a just suspicion of a subjective touch in mystical realisation which therefore cannot be taken as an unmediated revelation of an objective content. We conclude then that mysticism is in no way better off than ordinary religion and that common piety and mystical realisation are alike illustrations of a self-fostered illusion which thrives for want of an empirical corrective.

Some remarks on Bergson's view of a dynamic religion as distinguished from static will not be out of place in this connection. Static religion, according to Bergson, is the creative life-impulse arrested in its onward march; it is the life-impulse confined within the specialised type of particular society. It is thus the religion of closed societies, the circular movement of the life-impulse round about a fixed form. It is repetitive rather than creative, a stabilising force that conserves the realised form through myth-made tribal deities. As distinguished from this static religion which aims at the preservation of a fixed type, dynamic religion appears as unrestricted creative life-impulse, *i. e.*, as transcendence of all fixed forms and types. Thus while static religion is tribal and confined to closed society, dynamic religion is universal and embraces the whole

of humanity. Dynamic religion is the creative life-impulse focussing itself as the intuition of the religious mystic.

All this, we hold, does not touch the essentials of the problem of spiritual life. Neither static religion as a force of conservation nor dynamic religion as a power of creation offer anything but an objective fulfilment and the question which Bergson neither tackles nor solves is whether an objectified fruition can ever satisfy the autonomous subject. Dynamic religion may be of value as installing spirit into the very heart of the objective progression, but it does not cure the soul's unrest nor bring the wished-for peace and spiritual self-repose. Bergson's own view of dynamic religion as intuition of unceasing creative impulse is an indirect avowal of its spiritual bankruptcy as endless creativity that knows no rest nor satisfaction. We hold, then, that a dynamic religion as the intuition of a self-objectifying life-impulse is as far from being an effective healer of the troubled spirit as is ordinary religion with its illusory divine guarantor of the ultimate triumph of our object-longings.

Art, we hold, stands higher in this respect than both mystical and ordinary religion. Art is the spirit contemplating its own objectification with detachment. It is not mere intuition as individualised expression of inner tumult, as Croce says ; it is also the unruffled and so far the disinterested and detached contemplation of the objectified self-expression. This is true both of art as creation and art as appreciation, both being at once the objectification of

the spirit and its detached, and so far free, contemplation and enjoyment. Art is an advance on the logical consciousness in this respect, being conscious freedom from the obsession of a limiting reality. The object which to logic is part of a reality that circumscribes and limits is to art a logically neutral entity that is matter only for contemplation and enjoyment. Art is thus the subject's emancipation from a reality that engrosses and so far restricts the free spirit.

Art however represents only the first stage of spiritual emancipation from the objective thralldom. What is only negatively foreshadowed in the intellectual and the practical life as an inherently futile object-seeking is first of all adumbrated in art as the positive freedom of spiritual detachment, *i. e.*, as the unruffled contemplation of the self-objectivity. Art is thus both self-objectification and its transcendence at the same time, enjoyed objectivity as well as conscious self-freeing as the witnessing of the enjoyed self-objectivity.<sup>1</sup> The absence of reality-consciousness is only a reflex of this witnessing consciousness: as detached witnessing art is also freedom from the reality of the enjoyed objectivity. A higher level of spiritual freedom is reached when the disappearance of the reality-consciousness goes with the ap-

1. The distinction may be illustrated by the case of the jaundiced man seeing yellow. One may see yellow without knowing that the internal jaundice is the cause of the seeing. One may again see yellow and at the same time realise that the internal disorder is the cause of the seeing. In the latter case, the seeing is also a seeing through and so far self-freeing from the object seen.



pearance of an unreality-consciousness in its place. Here the spirit contemplates its objectification not as a neutral objectivity but as unreal appearance. This is the penultimate stage of Vedantic intuition, the realisation of spirit as the unrealisation of the objective appearance, spirit's self-affirmation as the eternal negation of the objective unreality. This however falls short of the complete subjectivity of *svarūpāvasthiti*, the pure self-rest of spirit, for it entails at least a negative relation to the falsified objective appearance. The highest stage is thus that of *asamprajñātasamāhi*, of pure self-centred subjectivity wherein the negative relation to the object vanishes as a mere semblance of a relation. This is the Brahmahood of the spirit (corresponding to the *Ātmasākṣātkāra* of Sāṅkhya), the rest of the spirit in itself which is free even from a negative relation to the non-spirit.

In the above we have elaborated the Yoga and the Vedanta view of the self-realisation of spirit as spirit's self-finding as the unobjective light that illuminates all objectivity. We have thereby rejected the western conception of the spiritual life as the spirit's self-concretion and objectification. It may however be urged against our view that it reduces the objective movement of the spirit as a purposeless self-deceiving that explains away instead of explaining the positive values of life. We confess to the force of the objection, but we contend that it is the very nature of spirit as the self-certifying absolute which amuses itself as it were in this per-

petual undoing of its own doing. We may call it *hla* or sport but it is the sport of the absolute as spirit which philosophy can neither make nor unmake but simply recognise and analyse. Elsewhere<sup>1</sup> we have defined religion as "an experience of recovered unity with reality after one of estrangement or alienation" and our definition aimed at a sufficiently comprehensive concept that will embrace all religions instead of applying only to any particular type of it. We claim that Vedantic self-realisation is religion in our sense, being spirit's unity with reality through the cancellation of an illusory objectivity.

We have described the general trend of western thought as objectivistic and have endeavoured to substantiate our contention by reference to important western philosophers. We may qualify our statement however by one reservation. We hold that Kant is an exception to the general run of western thinkers in this respect. He appears to us to be the only western philosopher who has not surrendered to the objective obsession. With a sure intuition which is almost oriental, Kant repudiates the objectivity of the spirit both as intelligence and will. That the intellect objectifies without being itself objective, that the spirit knows without being a known content is the conclusion he arrives at as the result of his critical enquiry into the theoretical consciousness. The same view he reaffirms in the second Critique in his concept of the moral will as a will that wills

1. Cf. writer's paper on "Religion and Magic, etc.:" Calcutta University Journal of the Department of Letters, Vol. XXVII.

itself. Criticisms of Kantian ethics show a perverse misunderstanding of Kant's real views in this respect. Kant's pure will is the subject affirming its self-autonomy as the denial of the sensuous objectivity. Hence the moral life is an unceasing struggle against the life of inclinations : it is the spirit realising itself as the subject emptied of all objective determination, an unceasing self-emancipation from the heteronomous objectivity. The Kantian ethics thus show a truer hold on the essentials of the spiritual life than do the Hegelian reconstructions of it on objective lines. The flaw in the Kantian view is not in the concept of a moral will that wills itself, but in that of spirit realising itself as will. Even this however is hardly a just criticism of Kant as the objection is forestalled by Kant himself in the conception of the moral consciousness as law-revealing rather than law-making. It is in the self-alienated empirical subject that the pure spirit is an imperative to be accomplished : the realisation is the empirical subject's de-objectification in time, the casting off of its objective vestments that the spirit in its purity may declare itself.

## **RELIGION AND MAGIC : BEING AN EXAMINATION OF THE VIEWS OF FRAZER, MARETT. LEUBA AND SWANTON**

Though the close association of religious ceremonies with magical rites and practices may be one of the established facts of anthropology, yet there are many who will not allow that religion has anything to do with magic in the strict sense, or that the magical as such ought to rank as religion properly speaking. According to some (*e.g.*, Frazer), magic and religion are mutually exclusive and incompatible, so that the magical is devoid of strict religious significance and meaning, while the religious in the strict sense has nothing magical about it. There are others, however, who while distinguishing between religion and magic in their developed forms, will yet acknowledge a certain distant relationship between them : according to them, both religion and magic spring from a common root or source, but the common ancestry does not prove a common or identical nature in their developed and fully evolved forms (*cf.* Marett). There are others again who will recognise magic as an element within a primary religious complex of many factors, the different forms of religion, animistic, polytheistic, etc., being, according to them, differentiations out of the primary complex through shifting emphasis and specification (*cf.* Swanton).

It will be our task in the present paper to examine some of these more important positions with a view to arrive, through constructive criticism, at a fresh conclusion such as will be relevant to the facts and agree with the available evidence regarding religion and magic.

## I

In Chapter IV of Vol. I of the first part of the "Golden Bough" (Third Edition), Sir J. G. Frazer, discussing the question of Magic and Religion, observes that while magic is "next of kin to science," religion is antagonistic to magic as well as science. There might be, Frazer admits, cases of magic in which "the operation of spirits is assumed," but these, he adds, "are only exceptional," being cases of "magic tinged and alloyed with religion." The fundamental conception underlying both magic and modern science, Frazer observes, is "a faith, implicit but real and firm, in the order and uniformity of nature. The magician does not doubt that the same causes will produce the same results," that his magical act "will be attended inevitably by the desired results." The magician, he adds, "supplicates no higher power," and "yet his power, great as he believes to be, is by no means arbitrary. He can wield it only as he strictly conforms to the rules." But "the fatal flaw of magic lies," according to Frazer, "in its total misconception of the particular laws which govern the sequence" (of events), in other words, in "mistaken applications of one or another of two great laws

of thought, *viz.*, the association of ideas by similarity and the association of ideas by contiguity in space and time." The laws of association, legitimately applied, "yield science ; illegitimately applied, they yield magic, the bastard sister of science."

If magic is thus "next of kin to science," it is differentiated from religion in that the latter involves "a belief in powers higher than man and an attempt to propitiate or please them." Hence, according to Frazer, while religion consists in the theoretical belief in higher supernatural beings and the practical effort to win their favour through propitiation and worship and thus "clearly assumes that the course of nature is to some extent elastic and variable," both magic and science, on the contrary, rest on the belief in a rigidly fixed constitution of the universe which admits of no modification of its inherent laws. Hence religion is "directly opposed to the principles of magic as well as science."

Though religion is thus antagonistic to magic as well as science, yet, Frazer adds, "this antagonism seems to have made its appearance comparatively late so that it is legitimate to suppose an earlier stage" in which "the functions of the priest and the sorcerer were often combined." It however by no means follows that this fusion is quite primitive. "The conception of personal agents" being "more complex than a simple recognition of the association of ideas," we may reasonably suppose an Age of Magic everywhere preceding the appearance of religion proper. Lastly, Frazer suggests that when magical methods

proved abortive, men resorted to religion and its methods of propitiation.

With reference to Frazer's views we must observe, in the first place, that the so-called antagonism of religion and magic is an unproved assertion without foundation in reason or experience. As a matter of fact, even supplication is not without belief in laws and in a fixed constitution in the beings whose favour is sought. Without such belief, and without real faith in the effectiveness of one's appeals, the very motive to prayers and supplications would cease to exist. This is clearly proved by the insistence on rituals and ceremonies which is a special characteristic of almost every religion. Such insistence is nothing but a demand to abide by the rules, *i. e.*, to proceed on right lines instead of the devious and uncertain paths that lead nowhere. Even the courtier and the sycophant have to abide by the rules: they can please their patrons only by a careful observation of their patrons' moods and humours and making the best of every suitable opportunity that offers itself. It is the same with the gods as with their human ectypes who are held to be made in the gods' images: the gods are not arbitrary, lawless beings any more than are their human imitations, and the votaries in approaching them with their petitions and prayers must choose the most favourable opportunity and the really effective and suitable methods for the purpose. As a matter of fact, even advanced religions like Christianity do not always conceive of the Divine Personality as an arbitrary will that is above all laws. If we turn to the

controversies of the mediæval theologians we shall find that one of the principal questions at issue between the Thomists and the Scotists is that of the relation between the Divine Reason and the Divine Will. The Thomists, we know, repudiate the Scotistic view of an arbitrary Divine Will and insist on the inherent rationality of the Divine personality which even the Divine Omnipotence cannot overpass.

Secondly, the view that religion is always some kind of prayer to a higher being hardly bears examination in the light of the empirical evidence. Prayer is a two-term relation ; it involves a being who prays and a being who is prayed to. But religion is not necessarily a two-term relation in every case. It may be a one-term relation, *i. e.*, a relation of self to self such as we have in Buddhism, Jainism and Śaṅkarism ; it may again be a two-term relation such as we have in Christianity, Islamism and other forms of monotheism ; and it may also be a many-term relation such as we have in the different forms of polytheism, Indian, Egyptian and Græco-Roman.<sup>1</sup> To say that religion must always be a relation between a finite being and some higher being or beings is to deny

1. A critic has taken exception to my use of the term 'one-term relation.' My reply is, I am only describing a certain type of religious experience, and not philosophically justifying it. The use of the term 'one-term relation' makes the view easily intelligible and any philosophical objection that may be raised to such a view of relation will equally apply to the incontestable fact of 'self-consciousness' however we describe it. Nor is 'one-term relation' a paradox of my invention. Every student of Indian philosophy, with some idea of the *svaraṭiparāmbandha* of the Naiyāyika will readily understand what I mean.



that Buddhism Jainism and Śaṅkarism are religions. It has no doubt been contended ( by Father Schmidt, e.g. )<sup>1</sup> that Buddhism, at least in its earliest form, is philosophy rather than religion strictly speaking, but this is a view so manifestly at variance with the historical evidence that it hardly requires special refutation.

Thirdly, we must observe that religion is not invariably a form of praying or beseeching ; as a matter of fact, it may be quite as much a form of compelling or coercing the gods as a form of worshipping or praying to them for favours. This is virtually confessed by Frazer himself as he proceeds to illustrate what he calls the "confusion" or "fusion" of religion and magic in primitive and advanced religion, past and present. The Vedic religion, we know, was not merely hymn-singing but also sacrificial and coercitive, and the religion of the Brāhmanas was almost wholly a form of compulsion through sacrifices and incantations. This also holds good of the Egyptian and the Babylonian religions and it is worth nothing that the passage which Frazer himself quotes from Professor Weidemann in this connection itself testifies to the magical character of these religions in unmistakable terms. "The whole doctrine of magic," says Professor Weidemann, "formed in the valley of Nile, not a part of superstition but an essential element of religious faith, which to a great extent rested directly on magic, and always remained

1. Cf. "The Origin and Growth of Religion," by W. Schmidt (Methuen & Co.), p. 2.

closely connected with it." To say that in all this we have nothing but a confusion of the religious with the magical is to prejudge the question in accordance with one's private beliefs rather than to solve it in the light of the actual evidence of experience. The problem at issue is whether magical rites can, in certain circumstances, acquire also a religious significance and value, and it is hardly a proper way of dealing with it to say that religion and magic being negatively related, all cases of the one being taken as the other must be regarded as cases of confusion and false identification rather than of real identity or essential kinship. We may as well define man as a two-legged being of erect posture and of brown, yellow or white colour and so deny humanity to the blacks as failing to come up to the requirements of our definition. Frazer's mistake lies in supposing that religion must necessarily be some kind of propitiation of a higher being—a view neither self-evident nor empirically proved any more than the view that humanity must necessarily show itself in one or other of three different colours and in no other.

Fourthly, Frazer's suggestion that religion must have arisen through the failure of an earlier magical method of dealing with nature is also a mere assumption without foundation in fact. A necessary corollary of Frazer's view will be the disappearance of magic with the appearance of the gods, or at least a gradual decline of magic with the progress of religious consciousness and belief. But this is very far from being the actual case. As Andrew Lang points

out, if we take the case of civilized Japan, we find that side by side with an increasing belief in magic we have also intense religious faith and belief in gods. Further, as both Leuba and Marett point out, Frazer's theory credits the savage mind with far greater intelligence than it actually possesses and does not sufficiently recognise the strength of an inherent will-to-believe inspite of actual evidence to the contrary. Even the civilized modern man with all the advantages of a good education and an accurate knowledge of the scientific laws is not altogether devoid of belief in the magical and the miraculous. Moreover Frazer does not show why the failure of magic should not facilitate the discovery of true scientific laws through a more careful observation of nature and its behaviour. The method of prayer and supplication is not the only alternative to the magical method of compelling nature. The scientific control of nature through a correct knowledge of its laws is another alternative which was equally open to the savage to exploit when his magical methods proved unavailing. Frazer gives hardly any reason for an original partiality for religion when the more closely allied method of science was equally at the disposal of the primitive magician. As a matter of fact, if Frazer's theory is to be credited, there is far greater likelihood of ineffective magic developing into science and the scientific methods of effective control than into the uncertain, and perhaps also in the majority of cases, no less ineffective, methods of religious propitiation and prayer.

## II

While, according to Frazer, magic is "next of kin" to science, and religion is antagonistic to both magic and science, according to Dr. Marett, magic and religion are blood-relations being two different but allied forms of supernaturalism. Science, however, is different both from magic and religion, being positivistic and naturalistic. "Magic and religion," says Dr. Marett, "belong to the same department of human experience. Together they belong to the supernatural world the x-region of experience, the region of mental twilight" ("Anthropology," p. 209, Home Univ. Lib.) At the same time, there is according to Dr. Marett, a great difference between magic proper and religion. Magic, according to his view, includes "all bad ways, and religion all good ways of dealing with the supernormal—bad and good, of course, not as we may happen to judge them, but as the society concerned judges them" ("Anthropology," pp. 209-11).

According to Dr. Marett, therefore, there are two kinds of magic, white and black, and while white magic is indistinguishable from the religion of the primitive savages, black magic is distinct from religion and is marked off as magic proper. "Sometimes indeed the people themselves do not know where to draw the line between them," but there is nevertheless a clear recognition even by savages that witchcraft is bad and that in so far as it "consists in leaguering oneself with the powers of evil in order to effect

selfish and anti-social ends," it is not religion but black magic. Religion, in other words, is a salutary way of dealing with supernormal powers, while witchcraft which is magic proper uses supernormal powers for achieving antisocial and individualistic ends.

While religion and magic are thus allied in so far as they both deal with the supernormal, science is different form both in that it deals wholly with "the work-a-day world, the region of normal, commonplace, calculable happenings" ("Anthropology," pp. 210-11). The gulf between religion and magic is, therefore, not so wide as that between science on the one hand and religion and magic on the other. The development of religion from magic, in other words, is a continuous and unbroken process, but there is nothing to prove a similar evolution of science from magic as Frazer's theory would postulate. "There was no sensible breach of continuity" says Dr. Marett, "between the godless kind of wonder-working rite...and the kind in which the intermeditation of gods is involved" ("Faith, Hope and Charity in Primitive Religion," p. 134), and the term religion may very well be extended so as "to cover both stages of an organic development" (*ibid*).

According to Dr. Marett, therefore religion and magic presuppose an earlier magico-religious prius out of which both have emerged in their developed forms. Secondly, primitive magic (of the white type) as a salutary way of dealing with supernormal powers for achieving beneficial, tribal ends is indistinguishable from religion, while magic proper is magic direct-

ed towards individualistic and antisocial ends. Thirdly, the magico-religious way is distinguished from the scientific in that it deals with the supernatural as distinguished from the natural world with which science deals. Fourthly, Dr. Marett contends, the so-called arrogance of magic as distinguished from the submissiveness of religion is a mere appearance, the dramatic enactment of rituals being responsible, according to him, for the impression of self-sufficiency and arrogance. If however we probe into the inner feelings of the actors, a dictatorial mood by no means becomes obvious.

We confess we cannot agree with Marett's view that religion must needs be supernaturalistic in every case. It may be that most religions have the supernatural rather than the natural sphere of experience in view. But this is hardly a sufficient ground for generalising it into a principal and making it the differentiating character of religion. As a matter of fact, there are naturalistic positivistic religions just as there are religions of the supernatural. Not to mention Comte's positivistic Religion of Humanity, the religion of the modern scientist is in many cases a rationalistic naturalism without even a shadow of the supernatural or the mystical. It is possible that mystery plays a more important part in primitive religion than it does in religion in its advanced forms. But primitive religion is not the only religion in the world, and it is hardly sound logic to define religion in terms of what is at best true only of its early phases.

Secondly, to credit the savage mind with a comprehension of the supernatural or supernormal is more than what the facts of the case really warrant. As Durkheim rightly points out, some idea of nature as a system is a necessary presupposition of the comprehension of the supernatural. The savage may have a keen vision and in many respects a much finer sense-perception than we have. But this by itself proves no idea of nature as a system anymore than the long-range vision of the eagle or the kite, or the extraordinary sagacity of dogs proves that these creatures have a consciousness of nature as an ordered whole. An instinctive, infra-logical sense of the natural is hardly what we mean by the consciousness of a natural order, and if the savage religion is to be described as the opposite of the naturalistic scientific consciousness, we should call it infra-naturalistic and infra-logical rather than super-naturalistic or supra-logical.

Thirdly, Dr. Marett's views about the two kinds of magic, salutary and the opposite, also show some confusion of the religious and the tribal or social. Magic directed to tribal or social good, Dr. Marett tells us, is religion with the primitive savage. Magic for antisocial ends, on the contrary, is not religion but witchcraft. The evident suggestion here is that the social character of the magic in the former case makes it religion, while the lack of it in the latter deprives it of religious character or value. But this, we hold, is to confound the religious with the social and moral. The tribal magic is religious not because it is tribal

or social : it is religious because it produces a sense of harmony with the powers that count, with reality, in short. The reason why tribal magic alone is valued is that the savage has hardly any self other than the tribal self. His tribal magic reconciles his tribal self with reality and so becomes religion (that binds). It is not the tribality of the magic in question that makes it religion ; it is rather the unity with reality that it effects, the sense of restored harmony with the universe. Through this consciousness of recovered unity the savage feels one with reality through his tribe. The universe is on the side of his tribe, and therefore he as one with his tribe is no longer an isolated, solitary individual with nothing but his own individual resources to draw upon. He can now count on the whole universe, on reality itself with which he has made peace through his tribe. If he cannot look upon the individualistic magician with equal approval or esteem, it is because he is not accustomed to thinking of himself or of any one else as an atomistic, private individual. He is therefore disposed to think of the individualistic magician as a dangerous abnormality, as a lunatic in short, who is lost both to himself and his tribe. He is, in the primitive estimation, a tribicide as well as a suicide and his activities certainly call for public disapproval, if not also forcible restraint.

Fourthly, Dr. Marett's view of an undeveloped magico-religious stage as prior to religion proper carries with it the implied suggestion that developed religion is altogether different from magical compul-



sion though both religion and magic might have emerged out of an undifferentiated common source. In his "Faith, Hope and Charity," he declares it to be "a common place of anthropology to contrast the religious man who has learnt to say 'Thy will be done' with the magician who says 'My will be done,' and he tries to make out the case for the religious character of primitive tribal magic by observing that its arrogance is a mere appearance, the real attitude being one of submission rather than of self-sufficiency. This, we must say, is to save the magical character of primitive religion by taking away everything that is magical about it. Dr. Marett is evidently anxious to make out that primitive magic is a dramatic form of propitiation which is mistaken by the superficial observer as a form of compelling. In other words, he subscribes to the anthropological commonplace as he calls it that religion must necessarily be some kind of propitiation of a personal being so that primitive magic is religion only as a subtle form of propitiation through dramatic enactments. But this, we must say, is an anthropological superstition no less than an anthropological commonplace, and if we be permitted to use Dr. Marett's phraseology we should call it "a questionable piece of history" as well that will not bear a moment's examination in the light of the historical evidence. We have already referred to the Egyptian and the Babylonian religions and we have also noted the magical character of the Vedic religion and the religion of the Brāhmaṇas. It may no doubt suit certain preconceived views to deny the religious

character of these historical religions but it is neither sound logic nor good history. As we have already pointed out, religion may be not merely a blend of magic and prayer, it may also be almost wholly one or other of these, or again something which is neither prayer nor magic but an experience altogether different from both. Just as life manifests itself in a wide variety of forms ranging from the invertebrate to the vertebrate, and from anthropoid apes to men and the different races and subraces of men, so religion may realise itself in an indefinite variety of forms without either exhausting or completely losing itself in any single type or form. We may have religions of compulsion and religions of propitiation as also religions of contemplation and religions of mystical absorption just as we may have life in the insects and life in lower animals and life in men and perhaps also life in superhuman beings to be.

One last criticism we must make before we leave Dr. Marett and discuss other views. Notwithstanding what he says in various places about an undeveloped prayer-magic complex as a rudimentary religion, Dr. Marett definitely votes for the propitiation-conciliation view of religion in its developed and advanced forms. But this, we contend, is not only to deny the religious character of Buddhism, Jainism and Śāṅkarism which are not praying religions but also to differentiate religion from magical compulsion in a way not borne out by the actual facts. Prayer, no doubt, involves a submissive beseeching attitude of self-abasement in the majority of cases, but prayer

may also pass over into a form of forceful spiritual appeal which is hardly distinguishable from compulsion. In other words, just as spell may through a series of intermediate stages transform itself into the begging, beseeching attitude of prayer and supplication, so also may prayer through a graded series of intermediate forms pass over into the compelling dictatorial attitude. An invitation, we know, is a shade more insistent than a mere request, and some invitations are hardly distinguishable from commands that must be obeyed. The 'must' of magic thus does not generically differ from the 'may' of prayer. Religious legends, we all know, abound in stories of earnest prayers that have at last compelled the attention of the gods and forced them to intervene for their votaries' sake. It hardly stands to reason to argue that such legends were mere imaginary constructions without a basis in actual experience. We should rather say that the so-called opposition of magic to religion is itself an anthropological superstition that is manifestly at variance with the facts of experience. When *e.g.*, Durkheim tells us that "the marked repugnance of religion for magic" and "the hostility of the second towards the first" are sufficient reasons for drawing a clear line of demarcation between magic and religion, he is only repeating the pet phrases of orthodox anthropology forgetting that he himself stressed the magical character of the Vedic sacrificial religion in an earlier part of his important work (*cf.* "Elementary forms of Religious Life," pp. 34-35). What religion has opposed is not magic as such, but only such

magic as it does not sanction or recognise as spiritually effective for its purposes.

### III

In some respects similar to Dr. Marett's, but also differing from it in many essentials is the view of religion and magic expounded by Mr. J. H. Leuba in his "Psychological Origin and Nature of Religion." Leuba, like Marett, holds that the scientific-mechanical attitude is a great deal farther removed from the magical and the religious than these latter are from each other. Unlike Marett, however, who makes religion consist in an emotion which he describes in Freudian phraseology as being essentially ambivalent in character, Leuba makes it consist mainly in a form of behaving or responding to a specific object. According to Leuba, in other words, religion is more than mere belief being essentially a specific practical reaction to the believed object. Hence the differentia of religion ought to be sought in the type of practical reaction it evokes rather than in the oretical belief which evokes the reaction in question. Now, according to Leuba, we may distinguish three different types of behaviour or practical reaction towards experience. These are :—(1) the mechanical, (2) the coercitive or magical, and (3) the anthropopathic. Of these mechanical behaviour, the real precursor of science, is distinguished from the anthropopathic by the absence of any reference to personal beings. Moreover, it involves the practical recognition of a fairly definite quantitative relation between cause and

effect. Magic is distinguished (a) from mechanical behaviour by the absence of any recognition of quantitative relations, and (b) from anthropopathic behaviour by the absence of the use of personal means. The anthropopathic type of activity is characteristic of men's dealings with men and other sentient beings and also of men's dealings with the gods. It is this type of activity that distinguishes the religious attitude. When anthropopathic behaviour is directed not to the secular relations of men with their fellow-beings but to the relations of men with the gods we have religion.

Even animals, according to Leuba, are capable of the mechanical and the anthropopathic types of activity. A dog does not behave to a man and a piece of bone in the same way. Also animals show some sense of the quantitative relations of cause and effect. When a monkey jumps from one branch of a tree to another it shows some instinctive sense of the distance to be cleared and the amount of energy to be put forth for the purpose. Animals however are incapable of magical behaviour and also of the religious type of anthropopathic activity. Both magic and religion involve a capacity for reacting to absent and unperceived objects. Moreover, in both religion and magic the results may be deferred without impairing in any way the activities which are directed towards the achievement of the results. Generations after generations of men, for example, will go through time-wasting magical and religious rites even in the absence of the expected or desired results. It is

otherwise, however, with the mechanical type of activity, at least such mechanical activity as animals are also capable of. Such activity is sustained by the results, and the failure of the results has the effect of gradually weakening and finally eliminating the activity itself. Besides, animal behaviour, whether mechanical or anthropopathic, has reference to the present and the actually perceived, animals being incapable of reacting mechanically or anthropopathically to absent and unperceived objects.

As regards the question of relative priority Leuba agrees with Frazer in supposing a phase of magic as the precursor of religion proper. He, however, rejects Frazer's explanation of the priority as being due to the comparative simplicity of the associative process underlying magic. Magic, Leuba contends, involves not merely associated ideas but also the reflective consciousness of the associated ideas as causally related to one another. Magic, though preceding religion does not, however, disappear with the appearance of religion. On the contrary, when religion arises, it combines with it and thereby adds to its complexity. But the combination never becomes a complete fusion: "Magic and Religion combine, but never fuse."

Hence, according to Leuba, there is no undifferentiated magico-religious prius of religion proper as Dr. Marett thinks. On the contrary there is according to him, as according to Frazer, a phase of pure magic as the forerunner of religion as anthropopathic dealing with the gods or higher beings. At the same

time, magic is more closely allied to religion than to science. The latter is a form of mechanical-quantitative reaction which has reference only to present objects and depends on verification in experience. Both magic and religion, on the contrary, refer to absent and unperceived objects and are independent of verification in experience.

In criticism of Leuba's views we must observe, in the first place, that the distinction he draws between religion and magic is unhistorical and arbitrary. Religion is not necessarily anthropopathic, though it may be so in the majority of cases. Not to mention mystical religion and the historical religions of the Buddhists and the Jains, we have religion without theistic beliefs amongst many of the present-day scientists. That belief in a personal being is a necessary element of religion in every case is an anthropological superstition which even Leuba's acute psychological mind is not able to get over. Nor is there any such gulf between Religion and Magic as Leuba's qualifying observation that they "combine, but never fuse" would appear to suggest. That magic may not only combine with religion but also become an integral part of it is abundantly proved by the historical religions of the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas as also by the numerous magico-religious practices which still survive even in advanced monotheistic religions of the present day. Nor is magic always either black or profane magic as Leuba's remarks about a combination without fusion would appear to imply. The Egyptian and the Babylonian religions

in their vital part are nothing but magical control of the deities : propitiation is only the outer husk, the inner core of these cults being magical coercion of the gods who may even be magically chastised in case of rank disobedience. Magic as such need not be the essence of a religious experience, nevertheless it may yet be the only form in which religion manifests itself at certain levels of civilization and culture. Religion, in its inner character, is neither supernaturalism nor naturalism, neither magic nor science, though it may take one, or other, or some, or all of these forms. Religion, in fact, is an experience of reconciliation or restoration—an experience of recovered unity or harmony after one of estrangement or separation. Whatever effects this is religiously effective and deserves to be recognised as religion. If magic effects it, it is religion, just as propitiation, when it achieves the same end, is also religion. Even naturalistic, positivistic science may be religion in this sense, if it succeeds in removing the sense of estrangement from reality and restoring the disturbed harmony. Magic may no doubt be profane or secular in certain cases. For example, when it is directed towards the achievement of relative ends irrespective of their ultimate reality-value, we have profane or secular magic. When, however, magic is used for the higher end of restoring harmony with reality when it reconciles the individual or the clan or the tribe with a wrathful and alienated universe, when, in other words, it restores the group or the individual to its lost status, it is religion and nothing else.<sup>1</sup>

1. The question has been raised whether a state of pure consciousness such as the Sankarites postulate can be called an experience of reconciliation. The objection has been anticipated and answered by the 'Vedāntaparibhāṣā'. We are told that in this case the reconciliation is only reaffirmation through the cancellation of an illusory alienation. We have an analogous case in the correction of an illusion. The rejection of the snake is negation of what itself is not, and the affir-



## IV

A fourth view, and in many respects widely differing from the above three, is the theory of religion and magic as expounded in his article on "Primitive Religion" by Mr. J. R. Swanton in the "American Anthropologist," 1924. "The writer's experience with primitive religion," says Swanton, "would indicate that it cannot be attached to a few objects, phenomena or emotions. Death, dreams, a thunderstorm, an eclipse, the sun, the grizzly bear may excite peculiar religious interest, specialised as it were out of a general religious attitude, but it cannot, therefore be concluded that any one, or a few, of them were points of departure for the religious attitude as a whole. The religious attitude itself is evidently one of those primary human factors which cannot be tied down to an origin as specific as even the common experience of death and dreams." The attempt to do so, according to Swanton, is an example of the particularistic error. The same error vitiates the attempts of anthropologists to derive the religious

mation of the rope is only rediscovery or reaffirmation of what always is. So is it with the realisation of pure consciousness. Another objection that has been raised is that reconciliation entails a difference of value, *i.e.*, a lower uniting itself to a higher. The answer is, this is not at all necessary. We may have reconciliation of equals as well. Nor is the value concept essential to the idea of reconciliation. In monistic systems separation can never be real or existential. Hence reconciliation is self-affirmation through negation of an illusory alienation. The alienated self is simply unreal and cannot be described as a positive *lower* self. But in theistic systems like Christianity, the alienation can be a real separation on fall and reconciliation will be restoration or reinstatement through the overcoming of the real separation.

forms or types in a fixed order of succession from a supposed original fundamental form or type. "It has been a favourite occupation of theorists," says Swanton, "to arrange" the different types "in a time sequence, under the assumption that they were introduced into the religious complex successively." As a result of this we have Tylor's Animism, Spencer's Ancestor-Worship Theory, Frazer's Magic Theory, Andrew Lang's All Father Theory, Durkheim's Social Ceremony Theory, etc., "each of which may be supported by evidence from some tribes—and confuted by evidence from others." With a theory to establish, one can easily select such of the tribes as most primitive as corroborate and support one's case, and then it is easy matter to find only survivals of it in other parts of the world. But the real fact is that we nowhere find *only* animism, or *only* ancestor-worship, or *only* magic, or *only* ceremonies. Rather we find everywhere traces of all these with greater emphasis on some and a lesser emphasis on others. Hence "instead of viewing the religious complex as constructed of parts successively introduced, we might rather consider them as simultaneous manifestations of the religious sentiment, showing greater differentiation here and more specialisation there, but properly a unit." Selecting a few only of the objective beliefs out of the numberless concepts and emotional attitudes entering into religion we may imagine, according to Swanton, a religious complex like the following :—

1. Belief in magic (mana, orenda, etc).

2. Belief in anthropomorphic beings who never lived as men (gods, nature-spirits, etc.)

3. Belief in a hierarchy of these beings according to the gradation of their powers culminating in the conception of a supreme deity (germinal monotheism).

4. Belief in beings of human origin with supernatural powers (demi-gods, saints).

5. Belief in disincarnate souls of the dead (ancestor-worship).

6. Belief in embodied souls specially gifted with reference to things supernatural (priests, prophets, shamans).

7. Belief in souls embodied in human beings generally.

In so far as one or other of these is specially stressed and the rest are overlooked, we get manism, polytheism, animism, monotheism, saint-worship, ancestor-worship, sacerdotalism, etc. But closer examination will always reveal traces of the other elements in every case. This is true both of primitive and advanced religions. In monotheistic Christianity *e.g.*, we have the polytheism of the trinity besides the angels as the mediators between God and men. Moreover, Christianity does not ban homage to the saints and it positively prescribes belief in dead souls. If it does not expressly sanction magic, it recognises a special sanctity as attaching to the material remains of devout and holy people. In the same way Islamism in spite of its uncompromising monotheism allows beliefs in spirits or jinns, a profound reverence for Mahomet and the saints, and the use of magic. In

China, again, a relatively lofty worship of Heaven exists side by side with spiritism and ancestor-worship. Hindu religions likewise are a blend of worship and magic, of belief in a supreme deity and beliefs in lesser deities. Lastly, the primitive cults also show the idea of a supreme deity as a sky-god or sun-god along with belief in numerous animistic beings, in shamans, in magic, etc.

Swanton concludes with a protest against the indefinite use of the term 'animism,' Marett's term 'animatism' being, in his opinion, in no way an improvement. According to him, the objects which evoke religious emotion in primitive man "always contain a human element." Therefore the terms 'animism', 'animatism', etc., are not sufficiently specific. For the same reason the magical object is also not strictly a religious object. The true religious object is a being of human mentality, but the magical object is worked like a machine and is not endowed with human mentality. There is no doubt that primitive savages worship animals and plants and not merely human beings, but even when animals and plants are worshipped they are worshipped only as incarnations of human minds in plant or animal forms. *Thus the principle holds good that nothing can be a religious object which is not endowed with human mentality.* Swanton closes his article with the observation that "aside from pure magic, the religious attitude towards natural phenomenon consists in the ascription of a human element to them."

As regards Swanton's views we must admit that

they are an advance on the other three we have considered, being more comprehensive and more in keeping with the actual facts of religion and magic. But we must also say that these intrinsic merits of his position are to a great extent diminished by internal contradictions and other deficiencies of a grave character. Swanton, *e.g.*, contradicts himself in so far as he recognises magic as an element of the religious complex while denying to it all religious significance as he does in his closing remarks. On page 361 he tells us that "primitive religion includes numerous factors such as magic, supernatural beings... a world occupied by the souls of the dead," etc., but on page 365 he tells us that "aside from pure magic, the religious attitude towards natural phenomena consists in the ascription of a human element to them." As a matter of fact, "Belief in magic (mana, orenda, etc.)" occupies the first place amongst the elements he enumerates as constituting the religious complex (p. 362), and yet he categorically excludes all magical objects from religion as lacking in human mentality (p. 364). Thus he makes religion both inclusive and exclusive of the magical art.

Besides, Swanton's insistence on the presence of human mentality in the religious object is a gratuitous assumption not called for by the actual facts. There is nothing to prove that the object of religion must necessarily be a being endowed with human mentality in every case. The religion of the Brāhmaṇas is a religion of sacrificial acts and there is hardly any ground for the assumption that the sacrifices have

reference to a personal being, not to speak of beings of human mentality. The impersonalism of the Śāṅkarite religion is also a religion of pure consciousness without reference to any higher personality with a human mentality. The same holds good of Buddhism and Jainism which deprecate all appeals to higher persons and gods. Lastly, many mystics, ancient and modern, will repudiate every interpretation of their superconscious experiences as communion with a higher person or persons.<sup>1</sup>

What is true in Swanton's view is that religion is not restricted to any single form or type of manifestation. Swanton's mistake however arises from the confusion that the religious experience must presuppose some sort of *complex* or intermixture of different elements. The real fact is, all religious experience is one of peace and restored harmony—harmony recovered after a state of temporary alienation and isolation. This experience may be achieved in various ways and through a wide variety of means. Whatever achieves it, whatever realises the end of harmony or unity with the ultimate reality is religion and nothing short of religion. This does not mean that there must be in every case a religious complex of the different ways and methods of realising religious experience as Swanton would appear to suggest. It is quite possible that an undifferentiated confused

1. According to the author of the article on Mysticism (Buddhist) in the "Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics," mysticism may be personal (as in Christian, Muhammadan and Bhāgavat mysticism) or impersonal (as in Neo-Platonism and Vedānta).

blend of different elements might have preceded the differentiation in *some* cases. But it is not at all necessary that this should be so in every case. The really important factor in religion is the religious end, *i.e.*, the experience of reconciliation or restoration, and the different ways of realising this end might have defined themselves with the progress of human intelligence and experience. What therefore would be an effective way or method at one stage might prove ineffective and crude at higher and more advanced stage. If magic should achieve the religious purpose at a certain level of civilization, it does not follow that it should be considered sufficient or effective at higher levels. Thus instead of supposing an original blend or confusion of the different ways, we must rather assume the gradual emergence of new and unexplored ways, the opening up of paths and bye-paths along with the progress of human knowledge and experience. Hence we see no inherent opposition between religion and magic as most anthropologists do. We hold, on the contrary, that magic not only may be religion in some cases, but may also be the only form in which religion manifests itself in certain levels of the human intelligence. All that we deny is that magic can suffice for the religious purpose at all stages and levels of evolution and progress. As a matter of fact, we not only find magical religion superseded in course of time by other forms conformably to the growth of the human intelligence, we also observe the same process of supersession and displacement in every form and

variety of religion, Christianity not exempted. Looking back to the past, *e.g.*, we find that just as ghost-and-ancestor-worship has gradually usurped the functions of the still earlier religions of magical coercion or compulsion, and just as the ancestors themselves have given way in course of time to heroes, demi-gods and even nature-spirits, so has an emergent polytheism been itself submerged in the higher Tritheism of Christianity and the stricter monotheism of Islam. Nor has transcendent theism been the last and final phase. We have not merely mystical religions at the present day but also naturalistic religions of pure science without the theistic belief in a transcendent Deity—faith in the universe itself as the immanent deity beyond which there is nothing but pure nothingness. These are some of the modern substitutes of Christianity, and it is nothing short of a wilful disregard of the facts to say that they are not considered to be effective for man's religious needs conformably to the present state of his knowledge. A necessary corollary of our view, therefore, is that neither magic, nor animism, nor theism represent the last or final phase, that any one or more of these might be the only religion for particular levels of human culture, but that no one, not even the so-called highest religion represents the goal or the highest phase any more than the actual present achievements of science represent the last and the final phase of advancing scientific knowledge. What is permanent and enduring in religion through all the different stages of evolution is the experience of



recovered unity or harmony, but the concrete from which this experience takes in different times and circumstances varies with varying human capacity and the state of actual human knowledge.<sup>1</sup> It follows also from our view that there are no true and false religions in an absolute sense, that every religion is true relatively to its proper time and circumstances and that a true religion becomes false when called upon to fulfil the religious need at a level to which it is intrinsically unsuited. In this sense we may speak both of a magical religion and a magical superstition—of the former in so far as it serves the religious need at a comparatively low level of culture, and of the latter in so far as it survives at higher and more advanced cultural planes. But this is true not merely of magic but also of higher and more developed forms of religious experience. No religion in fact, not even the naturalistic religion of the modern scientist, such as is professed by Julian Huxley, the biologist, can be the highest and the final phase. As a matter of fact even scientists themselves are now coming to recognise the inadequacy of the so-called religion of pure science. Eddington, Arthur Thomson

1. It has been urged against the above view that it does not apply to nihilistic Buddhism and its conception of *nirvāṇa* or annihilation as the essence of religious experience. But *nirvāṇa* as a religious concept means the negation of empirical being. Empirical being is restless becoming and therefore unceasing conflict and pain. Negation of this conflict is peace, *i.e.*, quiescence, and so answers to the religious concept of harmony. As Sākyamuni declines to make any further positive statement, it is impossible to say whether the negation involves also any positive realisation. Later interpretations however conceive it as a positive, happy state, *i.e.*, as one of unity with reality.

and many other modern scientists frankly confess to the fragmentary and symbolic character of the scientific world as necessarily pointing to a reality beyond science. Religion according to them, is not science and scientific symbolism but a mystical over-science that reaches beyond all symbolism.<sup>1</sup>

Before we bring this somewhat long survey to a close, it is essential that we define our views as regards the concept of *mana* and its relation to magic and religion. We must say at the outset that we find ourselves unable to accept Dr. Marett's view of *mana* as he explains it in the chapter on "Spell to prayer" in his monumental work, "The Threshold of Religion." It would appear from Dr. Marett's analysis of the question that "developed magic" always involves an element of projectiveness as distinguished from "rudimentary magic" which is not projective strictly speaking. Developed magic, in other words, involves not merely the conscious sundering of the symbol from reality but also a make-believe or a projective will-to-believe that the symbol, is the reality it symbolises. The magician's projective will, in short, builds a bridge from symbol to reality. That faith here is sustained inspite of obvious conflict with experience is explained by the fact that it brings

1. The constituents of experience according to Eddington, are :—

(a) *Mental images*. These are in our minds, and not in the external world. (b) *The counter-part of our sense-experience*. It is in the external world and is inscrutable. (c) *Pointer-readings* which science connects with other pointer-readings. (a) is *constructed* out of (b), and (c) is *abstracted* from (b). (b) is given in mystical religious experience. Thus science completes itself in religion.

relief by providing outlet for surcharged emotion. The projective belief, in other words, is cathartic as compared with unbelief which brings no relief, and this is the secret of its self-maintenance inspite of the delusiveness and unreality attaching to it. But there is, Dr. Marett adds, more than a subjective 'faking' in some cases, especially in magic practised by one person on another. The symbol here acts suggestively on the victim and so effects the reality which it symbolises. The wish-fulfilment, in other words, passes over into a real fulfilment and so gathers support through objective confirmation. "Developed magic" is therefore "a more or less clearly recognised pretending which at the same time is believed to project itself into an ulterior effect," and Dr. Marett adds, "magic practised by man on man...may very well have been the earliest form of developed magic." Further, Dr. Marett rejects Frazer's view that "magic is the savage equivalent of our natural science." If magic should be called science at all, it should be called 'occult,' and not natural science. For the imperative 'must' of magic, Dr. Marett contends, connotes something altogether different from natural necessity : it signifies the authority of a projective act of will as distinguished from the necessity of causally linked facts, the force, in other words, of a "spiritual projectile" that acts non-naturally as distinguished from the natural power of a physical cause. Moreover, since the consciousness of this supernatural power comes through the exercise of a projective will, it is only natural for the savage to construe it on the

analogy of his own suggestive will as a sort of will-force or psychic energy that acts non-naturally. Thus the savage comes to regard magical power or *mana* as the equivalent of his own will-power, *i.e.*, as the psychic force of an authoritative suggestion. This becomes evident when we consider the fact that developed magic usually takes the form of spells and incantations. Words have influence only on conscious personal beings and if spells and incantations are the usual forms of developed magic, the energy which they are supposed to release must be the force of an authoritative suggestive will believed to act coercively on another. The power which effects the magical end is thus a reflex of the magician's own projective will, the psychic force of an authoritative suggestion that paralyses and completely subjugates the victim's will. It is through spell as active will dominating and compelling a passive will that magic, through a gradation of stages, passes over into prayer.

Now while the brilliant suggestiveness of the above analysis is certainly beyond question, the same, we contend, cannot be said of the veridical quality of the psychological construction which has been based on it. It may no doubt be true that in the majority of cases magic takes the form of spells and incantations and it is also possible that in some cases where magic takes the form of spells and incantations there is some idea of an active will suggestively coercing a passive will. It is far from being the case however that this is invariably so in cases where spells and incantations are used. The mere use of the impera-

tive 'must,' we contend, no more proves a dual personal relation than the use of it by a medical man with reference to his curative drugs proves that he takes them for conscious beings under an obligation to carry out his orders. The oral 'must,' we hold, does not necessarily imply any responsive will acting obediently to a suggestive will that controls and regulates it. The use of the imperative 'must' in many cases means nothing else than that the right instrument has been selected and that having regard to the rightness of the selection or choice the happening of a certain result is inevitable under the circumstances. It is not at all necessary that the selected instrument should also be conceived as a personal will-force like the agent who makes the selection any more than it is necessary for the physician to assume that his selected drugs must also possess responsive will-to-cure conformably to his own insistent wish for the recovery of his patient. The 'must' of a spell thus may mean nothing more than that the right thing has been done and that therefore a certain result is bound to follow. It does not as a rule imply that the selected means is a psychic will-force or conscious energy that effects or realises the result like a human being consciously realising a purpose. It is no doubt possible that spell in some cases may also take the form of a dual personal relation between a will that controls and a will that is controlled or coerced, but it need not be so in every case as Dr. Marett would have us believe. Sure, Dr. Marett qualifies his statements later on by

the tentative suggestion that magic need not always take the form of an active will dictating to a passive will, but the suggestion comes rather late after a complete theory of prayer developing from pure magic through its primary form of spell as practised by man on man. As a matter of fact, Dr. Marett's mistake arises from his confusion of two different ways of tackling supernatural agencies both of which are common amongst primitive savages. He fails, in short, to distinguish between the magical manipulation of an impersonal supernatural energy and the invocation of spirits and spiritistic agencies where the appeal is to conscious will-force or psychic energy. The latter alone involves a dual personal relation while the former which is magic proper as distinguished from spiritism or occultism involves no such dual relation. The failure to distinguish between these two radically distinct attitudes towards the supernatural is, we hold, responsible for the conception of *mana* or magical power as a psychic energy or conscious will-force. As there is nothing in the *mana*-idea to necessitate the conception of a dual personal relation except in the special case when ends are sought to be realised through spiritistic agencies we see no reason for subscribing to the personalistic view of it as a conscious will-force responsively correlated to the force of the magician's will. As we have said, *mana* is not necessarily a conscious energy, not even when supernatural power is resorted to for coercing spiritistic agencies and ensuring their obedience to the magician's desires. When the spirits are approa-

ched by methods other than those of compulsion or dictation, we have no doubt something analogous to prayer. But when the spirits are sought to be coerced or forced, we may suppose either the direct action of an active will influencing a passive will, or a coercion of the latter through the intermediation of a released impersonal energy of the non-natural sort. That the released supernatural energy should be conceived as a sort of conscious will-force in every case is a gratuitous assumption which Dr. Marett's examples do not bear out. Mana or magical power, we contend, may very well be an impersonal energy without prejudice to its function of a supernatural agency, though in special cases it may also take the form of "a spiritual projectile" or released will-force. The only essential element in the mana-concept is that of an energy that acts non-naturally and effects results in a mysterious way contrary to the methods of natural causes. It is not at all necessary that this energy should also be conceived analogically to our will-power as a sort of supernatural psychic energy or force. It has no doubt been argued that the conception of an impersonal unconscious force acting supernaturally is beyond the capacity of the primitive savage and that if the savage mind should be conceived on the analogy of that of the civilized child, it should be credited with an original bias towards personification rather than with any idea of an unconscious force controlling things. Our reply to such arguments is that since even animals hardly fail to evince a sense of the difference between the

inanimate and the living, it is far from improper to assume a somewhat clearer perception of the difference in the case of human beings at the pre-civilization stage. Nor should we forget that personification involves some idea of a person and therefore by implication involves also the correlative idea of the impersonal or unconscious. Therefore, the personifying capacity in the savage no less than in the civilized child necessarily involves a correlative depersonifying, dehumanising capacity entailing the ideas of the unconscious and the impersonal. It may be said, however, that the primitive mind answers more nearly to the infantile consciousness of civilized peoples than to the comparatively advanced and differentiated experience of a child that has outgrown the infantile stage. Even, then, we contend, there is no ground for supposing a *mana* as the savage equivalent of an authoritative will-force that acts non-naturally. If the savage mind is to be regarded as the prototype of our undifferentiated infantile consciousness, it must be as little capable of a clear idea of personal will-force as of an unconscious, impersonal energy. Analogically, therefore, to the undistinguished ideas of our infantile consciousness the savage idea of *mana* will be nothing else than that of an undifferentiated cosmic energy which is below all distinctions of the personal and the impersonal. This, we hold, is nearer the truth and more nearly answers to the real situation than the conception of *mana* as conscious will-force or as unconscious physical energy. *Mana*, in short, stands, in our view,



for that undifferentiated cosmic energy which is the primary source of all ideas of force as physical, psychic or moral. The authority of a moral imperative no less than the force of will-suggestion and the compulsion or causal efficiency of mechanical energy are differentiations of the primitive idea of *mana* or magical power as an efficient neutral energy that may be controlled through appropriate means.<sup>1</sup>

1. The Mimāṃsaka views of *Apurva* as the connecting link between present sacrifices and their future results reflect the same process of development and differentiation. *Apurva* literally means without a *purva* or antecedent in experience. Hence it is a non-natural or supernatural power or agency which operates towards the bringing about of the sacrificial result. The Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsakas conceive it as a supernatural energy released by the sacrifice. The Prābhākaraś give a different interpretation, *Apurva*, according to Prābhākaraś, is the inherent authority of a sacrifice as morally obligatory. As the authority is independent of its actual accomplishment in experience, it is *apurva*, i. e. without its precedent in experience. Thus within the Mimāṃsakas themselves we have a transition from the magical view of *Apurva* as supernatural energy to the moral view of it as the intrinsic validity or authority of a sacrificial imperative.

## **WORLDLINESS, UNWORLDLINESS AND OTHER-WORLDLINESS.**

Worldliness, unworldliness and other-worldliness are three different attitudes towards life and they imply distinct metaphysical and ethical theories as their background which I propose to discuss in the present paper.

By the worldly man we ordinarily mean the prudential man, the man who understands his own interests best and pursues them without regard for others' interests. According to the popular view, then, worldliness is synonymous with prudence and the worldly outlook is the outlook of the selfish man. Though this cannot be held to be an altogether wrong definition of worldliness, yet it fails to bring out the full significance of the worldly attitude, for, as the term 'worldliness' itself shows, it implies a definite attitude towards the world which the definition fails to bring out. Secondly, as no man ever acts against his own interests, the definition fails to distinguish clearly the worldly attitude proper from the contrary attitude of unworldliness.

I shall therefore try another definition which appears to me to express the sense better. I shall define the worldly attitude as a certain exclusive interest in the given or the immediately presented

facts of experience, an interest in the given without sufficient recognition of the non-given pre-suppositions of the given. The worldly man, according to this view, is the man who occupies himself with the immediate as distinct from the mediate and the remote, the particular as distinct from its universal implications, with the sensuous and the empirical as distinct from the rational and supersensible. The prudential outlook is the worldly man's outlook in this sense, because it is a denial of the whole in the interest of the particular advantage of the prudential man, the negation of the social organisation within which alone is the pursuit of any particular interest possible. The social whole, the order or organisation of society, it will be noted, is not given in sense in the same way as the individual units composing the order are sense-given, and the man of prudence who is centred in himself is interested in the given, in the immediately presented fact of his own isolated self to the prejudice of the supersensible whole which makes his own existence as an individual possible. He is more occupied with the temporal than with the eternal, with the immediate particular than with its universal presupposition, with the given matter of experience than with its rational foundation.

But it may be said, there is nothing strictly eternal in any social arrangement or order, that every organisation or system is as much liable to decay as the units that compose the organisation or system, and there is no more of sanctity or immutability in any supersensible form than in the sensible facts themselves which

it is supposed to make significant or intelligible. I admit the force of this objection and yet I submit that in one respect it misses the real point at issue. It is no doubt true that there is no finality in any particular arrangement or order and it is also no doubt the case that an overthrow of the order that exists is sometimes an imperative duty in the best interests of the constituent units, as the histories of the world's reformers and martyrs abundantly prove. And yet it may none the less be true that considering all the circumstances of a given situation, the order is much more essential than the units that are arranged in the order, and that the universal form has in a certain sense a non-temporal value and significance comparatively with the shifting matter of sense which it rationalises and makes intelligible. And even when an order is such that its overthrow is the only clear duty of the constituent units, it is not because as order it has ceased to be of significance or value for the constituents, but because it has lost its character and function as order, i. e., as the order or arrangement that is required under the changed circumstances. In this sense then, we may say that every existing order, till a better seems possible, has a non-temporal value as compared with the temporal constituents, and that the worldly man who pursues his own interests in isolation is worldly in so far as he sacrifices the non-temporal to the temporal, the social order or whole to a constituent unit of the order, viz., his own isolated self. In other words, his isolated self-seeking is a denial of the social order itself, i. e., it is a crime

not so much against other individuals who may suffer in any way by his actions as against the social whole, or order, within which alone is the pursuit of every individual interest possible.

I have tried to give you a philosophical definition of worldliness as an attitude towards life. I shall now try to define what I may call the opposite attitude of *unworldliness*. It is well however to note at the outset that the term *unworldliness* may itself be used in two different senses which, while agreeing in that they are both denials of the worldly attitude proper, have yet hardly anything else in common and thus may be regarded as contradictorily related. Thus *unworldliness* may mean the denial of the worldly in its immediacy, the denial of the given as incoherent, irrational and contradictory, but not denial unqualified and absolute, denial without the promise of a higher restoration. In this qualified sense, unworldliness is the denial of the temporal in itself, but not of the temporal as an incarnation of the eternal; of the irrational particular in its isolation and independence, but not of the particular as a concrete embodiment of its universal, suprasensible form or essence. But unworldliness may also be used to mean sheer denial without the promise of a reaffirmation, absolute, unqualified rejection without restoration in a better arrangement or order. Unworldliness in this extreme sense means the denial of the temporal *in toto*, the rejection of the brute fact as inherently irrational and false.

Unworldliness, in the first and the qualified sense

of the term, we may call *otherworldliness* so as to distinguish it from the unqualified and extreme sense of the term which alone is *unworldliness* proper. Otherworldliness, it will be noted, involves denial, but it is denial with a complementary positive attitude towards experience. In other words, it is the denial of the actual because of an ideal, rational universe, the rejection of the incoherent given fact because of one's faith in a rational coherent order where the irrational given attains consistency and truth. It is thus disbelief with a saving belief, the negation of the world as given because of one's faith in a better world a better or more perfect arrangement of the universe which rationalises and restores the given facts. Other-worldliness is thus grounded in the belief in the rationality of the real, in the reality of a completely rational order of the universe either as an order to be or as an everpresent accomplished truth that makes every other truth and fact of experience significant. Hence it is a positive, and not a merely negative attitude, implying as it does belief in a completely rational universe in which all discord has vanished and the values of experience are conserved and restored, though transformed and transmuted in their new arrangement.

It is however possible to hold that the faith in a completely rational universe is an aspiration never to be realised in fact, an ideal which must always fall short of actual accomplishment. It may be held, in other words, that experience is inherently irrational and contradictory, that the immediate facts of sense

are an irreducible surd that must always resist absorption in a coherent, logical whole, and that mutually repellent particulars will not admit of reconciliation in any conceivable rational arrangement or order. And even if this should entail scepticism and despair as regards the worldly matter of sense, it promises it may be held, a higher faith in a transcendent, unmundane reality and truth which is free from the contradictions of given experience. For the brute fact, it may be argued, is just one of those tough entities that will not yield to a strictly logical resolution, and the belief which arms itself with the hope of a completely rational universe to be may be a useful pragmatic fiction, but as a consistent, logically intelligible account of experience is a wilful perversion of the actual facts. The correct attitude, therefore, we may be told, is the negative attitude, the attitude of sheer denial which rejects the world *in toto* as inherently false and irrational. This, we may be assured, is not disbelief without belief, but disbelief only in the rationality of the phenomenal, disbelief in the possibility of a rational universe which will be commensurate with the empirically given world of experience. But it is disbelief that springs from a higher belief or faith, from faith in a higher transcendent reason and truth which is discontinuous with the given and exposes the irrationality and unreality of the latter. Thus while other-worldliness is belief in a better world than this—in a world which is however a continuation of the given world and somehow conserves and restores its values, unworldliness is belief in a trans-

cent reality and truth which is incommensurate with the given and thus constitutes its sheer negation or denial.

I shall now conclude with a brief reference to some of the important exponents of these attitudes amongst ancient, modern and Indian Philosophers. It is not necessary to deal with philosophers of the worldly attitude proper. The avowed champions of this attitude, viz., the materialists, the empiricists and the hedonists are familiar names that do not require special mention. I shall therefore deal only with the exponents of the other two attitudes, i.e., the unworldly and the otherworldly views of experience.

Amongst the ancient Greek philosophers we have in Plato one of the greatest exponents of unworldliness and of the unworldly metaphysics of experience. Plato rejects the particulars of sense as false appearances or reflections in matter of transcendent logical essences which constitute the reality beyond these appearances. Thus Plato distinguishes between reality and appearances, i.e., between reality as a coherent whole or unity of logical essences or universals, and appearance as the incoherent, irrational imitations or reflections of the coherent reality in the medium of *hyle* or matter. The latter, Plato holds, constitute our world of sense, the world of jarring particulars which do not admit of logical resolution into a harmonious whole of reality. Thus Plato confesses despair in a completely rationalised world of experience and avows faith in a transcendent



rational reality beyond sense and beyond the given world. It is worth while remarking that while Plato attaches himself to the unworldly attitude proper and presents us with a transcendent reality beyond experience and beyond the given facts of sense, his successor Aristotle favours the more positive attitude of other-worldliness and belief in the rationality of the given. Thus Aristotle's conception of the imperfect world as moving towards the divine perfection as the imperfect strives after the perfection of the perfect is a repudiation of the Platonic doctrine of transcendence in favour of the conception of a rational universe to be which will be the realisation of divine perfection in experience.

Turning now to modern philosophy we find that in Kant's dualism of phenomena and noumena we have once more a negative philosophy of experience implying a reality completely sundered from its empirical appearances. Thus Kant's things-in-themselves constitute a transcendent, unknowable reality which, though supplying the material of experience, is yet completely detached from the thought-moulded objects which the understanding makes out of the given matter of sense. Hence the world of experience is only an unreal appearance of the transcendent reality ; it is reality as forced into a logical order or arrangement to which its intrinsic nature is opposed. And this is why the phenomenal world is shaky and unstable and cannot hold together as a solid structure completely one with itself. The contradictions and antinomies of experience are inevitable in so far as

experience results from the endeavour to effect the miracle of a complete fusion of thought and reality. Reality is not only the other of thought, it transcends thought altogether and will not admit of any reduction to the unity of thought without violence to its intrinsic nature. Hence experience is necessarily unreal and false : it is a mutilation of the transcendent reality as implying logical construction and ordering as its necessary presupposition. Thus while for Plato experience is<sup>1</sup> unreal as incapable of fully expressing the unity of a transcendent reality which is completely rational or logical, for Kant experience is false as being an unsuccessful endeavour to rationalise a reality which is intrinsically irrational and alogical.

It is difficult to classify Bradley either as an exponent of the positive or of the negative attitude towards experience, but having regard to the general trend of his thought it will not be far wide of the mark to say that he is much more disposed towards the attitude of negation and world-denial than the positive attitude of world-affirmation. For though Bradley will not allow anything to fall outside the absolute reality, and though he will not admit any appearance, which is also not the appearance *of* Reality, he also condemns the objective appearances of the absolute as the work of relational thought, and so falling short of the non-relational immediacy and unity of the absolute experience. All objects therefore are appearances that fail to express the unity of the absolute reality, and as every object is a thought-

light of consciousness. Hence reality being the un-objective light of consciousness which reveals objects, objects, phenomenal as well as apparent, are the other of reality as consciousness and therefore unreal and false. All objects are thus false appearances, entitative unrealities, which, though positive contents of consciousness, yet lack essential truth and reality. They are floating appearances, contents that are manifested in consciousness but are no real qualifications thereof. They are appearances in reality but not appearances of it.

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## **CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN RELATION TO THEORY OF STATE.**

It is proposed in the present paper to consider the justice or otherwise of capital punishment as a penalty for certain forms of crime entailing danger to society or otherwise impairing its life and impeding its progress. The question will be considered in its relation to the idea of the state as the dispenser of the penalty and the problem which will be discussed is whether the right which the state generally exercises at present to impose the extreme penalty under certain circumstances is implied in its sovereignty and belongs to the idea of a state as such. It is not intended to go here into the vexed question of the psychological responsibility of the criminal which will be taken for granted for the purposes of the discussion. The question therefore to be considered is granting that a crime is a freely-willed act entailing personal responsibility of the criminal, is society as represented in its organisation called the State justified in any circumstances in inflicting the extreme penalty? As capital punishment has to be considered in its relation to the concept of punishment in general, the question has to be discussed in its bearing on the ethical theories of punishment, but since the State in this case is the only accredited authority on which vests the power to inflict this particular form of punishment, these theories have all to be considered

in their relation to the idea of a State as the source of penal authority. The questions which we shall consider therefore are : does the sovereignty of the State imply such authority on the lives of its citizens that it is entitled to impose even the extreme penalty under certain circumstances ? and further, does the idea of crime and its punishment require that the criminal should be made under certain circumstances, to forfeit even his life as a just retribution for the act or acts for which he might be held responsible ? As the argument of exceptional and desperate cases is likely to figure rather prominently in controversies of this kind, we propose to consider our question in relation to these exceptional and extreme cases.

Let us therefore consider an extreme case—a case of premeditated, cold-blooded murder for mere gain without any extenuating circumstances mitigating the heinousness or dire cruelty of the act. Here, we shall be told, is a clear case for the extreme penalty. For is it not a case of conscious and deliberate destruction of life by one who knew he could never himself give it back ? Where then is the inequity in making him pay for life by life ? If he believes he is justified in taking away a life he can never restore, society is equally justified in claiming his life as a compensation. This is the argument of the *lex talionis* and leads to what is called the retributive theory. The plausibility of the argument is however more apparent than real and it seems an irony of fate that it should be canonised by Christian peoples above all whose scripture would condemn it in no uncertain

terms. For certainly one evil does not justify another and the transgression of legitimate rights by an individual does not legitimize a retaliatory transgression by society against the individual. Nor can the individual culprit's life be considered an equivalent of the life of his victim by any logical feat so that society may be said to be justified in claiming the culprit's life as a reparation of the loss.

The view of punishment as a retaliation has gained added prestige since Hegel gave it the stamp of authority as the necessary and inevitable outcome of an original, irrational will. Hegel's view of punishment may be gathered from the following extracts. "Since violence or force in its very conception destroys itself, its principle is that it must be cancelled by force," says Hegel in the "Philosophy of Right." "Hence it is not only right but necessary that a second exercise of force should annul and supersede the first." "The criminal act is a negation, and punishment is the negation of a negation." "Injury exists only as the particular will of the criminal, and to injure this will in its concrete existence is to supersede the crime and to restore right." "The conception of punishment implies of necessity the judgment that crime, as the product of a negative will, carries with it its own negation or punishment." "Punishment expresses the criminal's own inherent will, is a visible proof of his freedom, and is his right." "Punishment is only the manifestation of crime, the second half, which is necessarily presupposed in the first." "Retribution is the turning back of crime

against itself. The criminal's own deed judges itself." "A criminal is honoured as rational in the infliction of punishment. The conception and measure of his punishment is deduced from his very act."

Punishment, then, according to Hegel, is a restoration, through retribution, of that abstract right which has been violated by the criminal by an irrational and arbitrary exercise of freedom. The gravity, the enormity of the crime determines in each case the kind and manner of the punishment, and in this respect the punishment may be preventive, deterrent or of some other shape according to the special circumstances of each individual case, but punishment in its conception is essentially of the nature of retribution, of negation of a negative or irrational act through which the culprit is restored to his lost status in the organised community of free rational beings enjoying rights and respecting one another's rights. Hence it is crime retaliating itself on itself, the logical development of the irrational criminal will whereby it destroys itself. It is assumed by Hegel that a violent disturbance of the rational order can be counteracted only by an opposite violence, that violence alone can cancel violence and that reason realises itself through annulment of unreason by unreason. Secondly, it is assumed that the order which actually obtains is the most rational order possible under the circumstances and that crime consists in the disturbance of the order that prevails at the time. Lastly, it is assumed that crime in its real nature does not lie between the criminal and

his victim but between the individual injurer and his abstract right as a member of the rational order—the right which he has wantonly violated and which can be restored only by the self-annulment of crime through punishment. None of these assumptions, we contend, will bear strict examination. That unreason must annul itself through an opposite unreason seems to us to be a gratuitous assumption that is neither required by facts nor necessitated by strict logic. On the contrary, if experience testifies to anything it is to an inherent power of self-generation in all forms of violence and wrong, whether public or private, to which the proper counteractive has yet to be discovered. Secondly, if the relation between the individual and his social order be that intimate and organic relation that Hegel claims it to be, it is difficult to see how the State can be divested of responsibility for the crimes committed by its citizens. An organic whole is not truly organic if its members are not completely organised or socialised, and the bare presence of centrifugal forces is a sufficient condemnation not merely of the particular disruptive tendencies but also of the whole or system that makes for internal dissolution and disintegration. All is certainly not right with the State where crimes are rampant and passions run high, and there is perhaps much greater need of the reform of a system that will not hold together than the mere restraint of the individual forces that are only symptoms on the surface.

Before therefore we grant the prerogative of the



State to impose even the extreme penalty we had better ask ourselves whether we shall be justified in conceding a right to the State which we are not prepared to recognise in respect of any other association such as the family, the community or the church. It is no answer to our question to say that the right to impose the extreme penalty can belong only to the State as the supreme association to which all other associations are subordinate. The State is neither a superassociation in the strict sense nor the only coercive authority as it is claimed to be. As a matter of fact coercive authority belongs not merely to the State but also to all sorts of subordinate and co-ordinate associations inside and outside the State. For example, a religious community or a church is free to coerce its members when it chooses, *i.e.*, to punish recalcitrant members by excommunication and other methods. We do not consider the exercise of such right by the communities concerned an unjust usurpation of the functions of the State. For example, till recently there was a religious ban on Hindus sailing across the seas and going to Europe or America for study, business or any other object, and even to-day there are some sections of the Hindu community in Bengal who would excommunicate all who would venture overseas. Similarly, as regards widow-marriage or inter-caste marriage we all know that they have still to pass current among the higher-caste Hindus of Bengal. All these therefore we leave to the communities concerned and we do not hesitate to concede to the particular communities

the option to accept or reject any reform they might consider desirable in the interests of their respective communities and the authority to enforce their decisions by such methods of coercion as are at their disposal. Nor is it relevant to say that these, as instances of psychological coercion appealing through the will of the agent are not on a par with physical coercion the right to which vests in the State alone. As a matter of fact, the right to physical coercion is no monopoly of the State any more than it is a special privilege of any particular association within or without it. For example, we do not question the parent's right to physically coerce the child, whether negatively by detention, or positively by physical chastisement, nor do we object generally to the exercise of a like authority by the teacher in respect of the pupils in his charge. It is therefore no real answer to our question to say that the right to exact the extreme penalty is not granted to any other association because the State alone is entitled to exercise coercive authority. And the reason why we do not find a satisfactory answer is perhaps that there is none to find, that there is as little justification for conceding this right to the State as to any other association, and that if the inequity still survives in civilized States, it is because we, in our inertia, have allowed it to continue because it *is*, not because we feel that it *ought to be* and cannot be dispensed with without prejudice to the real interests of society.

Let us labour this point a little. To say that the

State has no more right to penalise the life of a citizen than any other association is to affirm a fundamental principle as to the relation which holds, or ought to hold, between individuals and groups including the relation of State-and-citizen. The principle is that in the case of groups which are associations there never can be inclusion in the extreme sense of absorption and obliteration of the subordinate individuals and groups. Man may be a political or social animal, but to say that he is nothing but this is to make a part of human nature express the whole of his being. Though man is a social being, he is yet not merely social, and a large part of his life is, as a matter of fact, lived outside society in the strict sense. For example, it is not for society to tell me when I shall eat or read or sleep, how much I shall eat or how long I shall read or sleep, or how I shall walk in the public streets, whether I shall walk erect or with a stoop, fast or slow, by the longer or the shorter way. These are matters which concern myself and myself alone in respect of which even a socialistic State would not be justified in interfering with my personal freedom and preference. Nor is it a fact that the State as sovereign authority is the supreme association that absorbs all other associations into itself. As a matter of fact, even the most despotic state does not in practice venture to act in accordance with the logical consequences of this assumption. No state, for example, presumes to interfere with the internal affairs of *all* the multifarious associations within its territorial limits and in the case of the British Empire we all know that non-inter-

ference in internal religious and purely social affairs of Indians was part of the general policy of the rulers. It is also necessary here to emphasize the distinction between a citizen as such and the individual who in a certain relation only is the citizen in question. The individual is a citizen only as a member of the national state, *i. e.*, as living within its geographical boundary, but he may also be a member of several international associations none of which are amenable to the law of the national state. Here is then an obvious possibility of a conflict of loyalties which no theory of State-sovereignty will allow. For example, the national State may come into collision with an international association like that of labour and may call upon its citizens to sever all connection with it in the interest of internal unity. How is a division of allegiance possible where one association would thus presume to encroach on the other's province? Would the State deserve a preferential allegiance even if the general good require a close, intimate relation with the other? Nor is this conception of the monistic State as absolute sovereign authority in keeping with the facts of inter-state relations of to-day. The older militaristic conception of the state as an offensive-defensive organisation against aliens is no longer an accepted principle of political theory though it may take a long time still to be the governing rule of political practice. It comes to be increasingly apparent that the highest possible good cannot be secured except by co-operation of different States and that to the extent that the State

is treated as a self-contained entity concerned with domestic development and protection against external aggression to that extent it will fail to achieve any of these results.

The conception of the State as the Leviathan Association absorbing all subordinate associations and individuals and endowed with unlimited authority on its citizens is a fiction that will not stand the test of a strict realistic analysis. The State, as it exists, is no such inclusively representative association as it is claimed to be, and the will which as a matter of fact finds expression in it as act of State is no general will in the sense of a harmonious common will of all or of the majority but almost invariably of the economically dominant minority. The will, *e. g.*, of the Council of State in India under British rule was the will of the minority of its financial magnates, not the general will of India nor even of the majority of Indians and associations of Indians. It is only on the plane of abstract theory then that the extravagant claims on behalf of the State as infallible authority as expressing the will of all can be made good and it is only as we concede these extravagant claims that the right of State to claim life for life can be justified. No life ever belongs to the State so completely and entirely that it can be regarded as the property of the State and the right to impose the extreme penalty accrues only as we acknowledge this pretended claim to ownership. The logic of pure monism, the logic which will make of every relation an internal development of essence

may do in the sublime heights of idealism where all is harmony and peace, but as the logic of a world of war as well as peace, of struggle of might and right and of reason and unreason, it is only a mockery and a delusion. There is no more of that unity of purpose in affairs of State which idealism will enthrone than any commonness of aim in the political programmes of the rival parties in England. The empirical State in its internal affairs means in fact the rule of the group in power in its own special interests and often against the interests of rival groups. Nor is it strictly speaking a substitute for individuals in the sense of owning them as property and completely representing them in all their multifarious activities and functions.) Only in respect of certain specified functions does the individual come within the province of the State and the conception of the individual is no more exhausted in the conception of citizen than human life is summed up in the familiar epithet political. For the State therefore to pose as avenger and claim to exact the extreme penalty on behalf of the victim is to arrogate to itself the right of ownership which never belongs to it. \ It is entitled to compensation proportionately to the extent of its actual loss, and the damage in this case as far as the State is concerned is not the loss of the individual who never belonged to it entirely, but the loss of certain services rendered by the individual. It is therefore only in respect of these that it may demand the punishment of the wrong-doer, such punishment, *i.e.*, as will make

good its actual loss, or failing that, will be an effective safeguard against its repetition in future. To make away with the offending culprit may be the rough-and-ready solution that first impulse would seem to dictate but it is neither the best remedy nor in any way a reparation of the loss. In its naivete it is more like the child's frantic rage which will vent itself in tearing the hair and scratching the person since no better remedy is at hand. \ A loss is not made good by adding to it another and the summary execution of the culprit, though it may ensure the end of prevention, means yet the loss of another citizen to the State with all the possibilities of good of which he might be capable. Nor does it follow that the only effective safeguard in this case is the destruction of the culprit since deprivation of liberty is as good a preventive as any other. The argument of expediency, it should be observed, is not strictly relevant to the issue. The plea of public safety may sound strong commonsense in an administrator not very particular about the morality or otherwise of his political conduct, but is, ethically considered, \ only a thinly-disguised Machiavellism which no civilised State would dare avow in public. / We have as little right to punishment as a deterrent as we have to questionable and immoral means for the sake of an otherwise excellent and worthy end. The dignity of a person is the rock-bed of the moral life and the very idea of making an example of the culprit is a shocking violation of this basic principle of morality. \ The principle of end justifying

the means will in fact lead nowhere if strictly carried out as there is no more reason why we should stop with the culprit when to drag the father, the son and the brother to a common fate would serve our purpose far more effectively and thoroughly. Nor is there any reason why we should take care to avoid unnecessary cruelty or torture when the purpose of an effective deterrent is best achieved by maximising instead of minimising the suffering of the victim. If the culprit must pay for the bad example he sets, if his own example is to act as a wholesome check to the passions he himself excites in others, why not make as good an example of him as is possible under the circumstances? Why not kill him inch by inch, mutilate, butcher, torture in all imaginable ways before you finally send him to his account? It is no answer to our question to say that there is no need of these and that in the infliction of punishment care should be taken to avoid unnecessary cruelty and torture as far as possible. As a matter of fact the methods hitherto adopted have not stopped crimes for ever and the need of severity, in accordance with the logic of this theory, is still as great as ever. Further if cruelty and torture are to be avoided as being not really necessary or unavoidable we fail to see why the extreme penalty should not be similarly avoided as a monstrosity and a survival unworthy of civilized humanity. Moreover, the appeal to fear which lies behind the argument of expediency is an appeal to that self-same irrational element in man to which the Hegelians will attribute



the criminality of the culprit. It is an unworthy and immoral appeal to the inherent selfishness of man and if it succeeds sometimes in awakening the dormant higher man in us it must not be overlooked that it has failed more often than we are prepared to admit. Above all, it is necessary to remember that nothing is perfect under the sun and that the State is neither a perfect nor an inclusive association as it might be supposed to be. There is therefore much greater need of care and sympathy in administering a law not inherently infallible than a logically consistent retributive theory would allow. Punishment as a retribution may be the right thing in a world perfect and smooth and completely organised but in a world of warring groups and conflicting interests, its only valid meaning is *reformation*.

Behind the conception of the inclusive State having unlimited infallible authority on the lives of its citizens is the idealistic delusion that all relations are internal relations so that to be in a relation is to be completely merged in a higher inclusive whole expressing itself through the relation. Given two entities, the idealist argues, there must be a whole of the two entities, and given two such wholes or more there must be a higher unity comprehending and absorbing these as its integral parts. It is confidently assumed that no association can fall inside as well as outside another association that all associations are necessarily connected together by vital and essential ties, and that even where there is no visible link between one association and another

there must still be an invisible bond of unity whereby both are embraced in a more inclusive self-justifying system. The State, it is further assumed, is this self-justifying whole and its absolute authority is a necessary corollary of its logical status as the supreme all-inclusive body. Who is to judge, asks the practical politician here in league with the absolutist, between the respective claims of rival associations in cases of dispute and conflict? If an absolute, supreme authority is not admitted, if the right of State to unquestioned allegiance in all matters is not granted, chaos will be the result and society will fall to pieces. Who judges now, we ask in reply, between the claims of rival States? Is there a superstate of *all* the national states, any League of *all* the Nations with *authority* to coerce its members and enforce its decisions? There is, no doubt, some confusion, some war, some unnecessary waste as a consequence, but that is inevitable as long as the world is what it is, not a rounded off whole but a clash of contending forces, which can be called a monistic system only by a wilful blinking of the facts in the interests of logical orthodoxy.

We conclude then that all relations need not be internal relations, that given two or more things they may or may not be embraced in a higher unity or group, that given two or more groups they need not necessarily be absorbed in a higher inclusive group that the State is not a supreme all-inclusive group that completely absorbs all other groups, that individuals are never completely merged and absorbed into

the group or groups to which they may belong in certain relations, that individuals as citizens of the political groups called States are not properties of the State but have extra-political life as well outside the province of their respective States, that therefore the right of State to impose the extreme penalty does not follow even according to the retributive theory, nor also according to the deterrent theory which in the case of capital punishment tantamounts to the principle of end justifying the means—a principle, immoral in conception and unworkable in practice. The only valid meaning of punishment under the actual conditions of our life here on earth, is reformation, not retribution, and capital punishment as the negation of the offender is the negation of the very possibility of reform.

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## THE RELIGION OF ANCIENT EGYPT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

Classifications of religion into naturalistic and humanistic, or into tribal and universal, or again into monotheistic and polytheistic are not likely to be true except in a broad general way. A religion which is only naturalistic in its earlier phases may grow later into a distinctly humanistic type just as contrarywise a predominantly humanistic religion may also develop naturalistic tendencies. In the same way what is polytheism in the beginning may later show an approach to monotheism, just as what is decidedly monotheistic may later develop pluralistic-polytheistic tendencies. Take, for example, the modern conception of a suffering God frustrated by an independent principle of evil. Here we see monotheism giving way to pluralism and confessing to its failure as a satisfactory religion. Take, again, Hellenistic polytheism and its hierarchy of the gods and goddesses. It is evidently an approach to monotheism through the conception of a fixed order of rank among the deities.

The Egyptian religion also shows the same transition from one form to another and the same intermixture of different elements. We are told that the Egyptian religion is tribal, naturalistic and polytheistic. But none of these epithets describe the Egyptian religion truly. As a matter of fact, the religion of Egypt is neither purely tribal, nor purely naturalistic,

nor again out-and-out polytheistic. It is, no doubt, emphatically naturalistic at the beginning. But this is true only of its earlier phases. In its later developments it ceases to be purely naturalistic and becomes also to some extent humanistic. In Amenophis IV, in fact, it rises to universal humanism. It may be useful to illustrate this point in some detail. Take, for example, the Egyptian moon-god, Thoth. He is "the Ibis-headed representative of Re" (the sun-god) by night and, so far is nothing but a nature-deity. But he is also "the scribe of the gods" and "the judge in heaven who gave speech and writing and by his arithmetic enabled gods and men to keep account of their possessions." He is besides "the god of wisdom and learning", and the discoverer of "the written characters" (the divine words). He is thus not merely the moon that does duty for the sun by night, but the embodiment of many human functions and powers. Take again the goddess, Hathor — "the House of Horus," "the abode of the sun-god." We are told that *Nut* that had hardly any share in the Egyptian religion except as the sky-goddess and as wife of the earth-god, Keb, was extremely popular however in her other name of Hathor. Thus as Hathor she was "the goddess of the heavens" and very early became "the chief of the goddesses" and as such "the divine representative of women who worshipped her before all others." She thus came to be regarded as the "brilliant goddess of love and pleasure" and developed distinctly humanistic traits besides her natural function of a mere abode of the sun-god. Other aspects may

have grown out of her character as sky-goddess. She is called, for example, "the eye Re" (the sun-god) and appears also as "the goddess of the west" and as receiving the setting sun and the dead. But the human functions also persist along with these later accretions and so once more in Hathor we have a nature-deity combining human with natural functions. The same combination of mixed characters appears also in the usual representations of Hathor. For example, the figure of a cow in which she is at first represented is subsequently replaced by a distinctly human form, a kindly woman's face being substituted for the earlier animal representations, the ears of a cow alone surviving in the later forms but on a head covered by thick plaits of hair. Or else she is represented as an ordinary woman's head with a head-dress suggestive of the ancient celestial cow, *i. e.*, with two horns between which appears the sun. But while in Hathor we have a blend of naturalistic and humanistic traits, in another goddess called Maat, we have no trace of an origin in any of the recognised phenomena of nature. Thus Maat is regarded as "goddess of truth" and as such is conceived to be "wife of the divine judge Thoth and daughter of the supreme god Re" and her priests are the supreme judges. But though related to natural phenomena ( the moon and the sun ) as wife and daughter, she herself represents no natural phenomena and stands only for the human value of truth as its divine representative or embodiment. Maat, the goddess of truth, is thus not merely a human invention but also represents only

human functions. And the same remarks also apply to "the divine sculptor" Ptah who is another of the Egyptian deities worshipped in the temple at Hatke-ptah. Ptah is the patron-god of artists (corresponding to the Visvakarmā of Hindu mythology) and is supposed to give "form to all things." Here also we have neither a naturalistic origin nor a representation of nature-phenomena but only of properly human functions. Isis, the wife of Osiris, who is regarded as the goddess of magic and magical art, similarly illustrates the humanistic side to the Egyptian nature-worship.

What emerges from the foregoing illustrations is that many of the Egyptian deities are at once naturalistic and humanistic being gods of some aspects of nature and also of aspects of human social life and function. They stand in marked contrast in this respect not merely to the early Vedic gods who are predominantly naturalistic but also to the Greek gods generally who are predominantly humanistic. In another respect also the Egyptian gods present a striking contrast both to the Hindu and the Greek gods, *viz.*, in regard to their composite animal-human forms which are a distinguishing feature of almost every representation of an Egyptian deity. A composite form is repugnant to the rationalistic Greek whose gods are thus usually presented in full human form without any surviving trait of its earlier animal or physical origin. The same holds partly at least of the Hindu gods and goddesses who are rarely presented in composite form. It is otherwise with

ever with the Egyptian deities where a composite human-animal form is the rule and a complete human form the exception. Let us illustrate this in detail. Take the case of the representation of the sun-god which is the principal of the Egyptian deities. The most general name for the sun-god is Re, but he is also called Horus, Har-Akhte, Khepre, Atum, etc. There are various representations of the sun-god, some in purely animal forms and some in composite forms, partly animal and partly human. Horus, *e.g.*, is represented sometimes as a bird of prey with blazing eyes and sometimes as a human body with the bird of prey as the head. Atum, again, as the evening sun, is represented as an old man, Khepre as a beetle with its eye standing for the sun, etc. But the usual representation of the sun-god is in composite human-animal form, *i.e.*, as a human body with the head of a sparrow-hawk surmounted by the sun and encircled by the fire-spitting serpent that destroys the sun's enemies. The moon-god, Thoth, worshipped also under the name of Khonsu at Thebes, is similarly represented in composite form as the "Ibis-headed representative of the sun" by night. In Hathor, again, in her later representations, we have the composite form of a woman's face with the ears of a cow, while in Bast, the goddess of dancing and music, we have the head of a cat on a woman's body. Another of the Egyptian goddesses, Sekhmet, is lion-head. She is the goddess of war and as such the mighty one. Anubis, the ancient god of the dead, has the head of a jackal and so also



have the two gods Wepwawet called the guides (probably because of the close association of jackals with burials in the desert). Osiris however is an exception to the general rule. He is the chief of the gods of the dead and is represented in human form as a mummy with crown, sceptre and whip as symbols of his rank as king.

One thing clearly emerges from the above illustrations, *viz.*, that the differentiation of man from animal which is a distinguishing character of advanced religions is conspicuous by absence in the Egyptian mythology. In this respect Egypt certainly stands below both Hinduism and Hellenism being nearer the primary stage. Take, *e.g.*, the Hindu representations of the gods. Here animals no doubt figure as parts of the whole, but they seldom form a part of the deity itself being usually given subordinate functions as faithful followers or carriers of the deity. There are no doubt some exceptions, particularly in the incarnations, which are sometimes presented in purely animal forms and sometimes again in composite forms. But these exceptions only make the general rule more obvious and the contrast with Egyptian forms more striking. And the same remarks also apply to the Greek representations where every vestige of a grotesque composite form is rigorously excluded in conformity with its inherent rationalism.

The comparative backwardness of the Egyptian civilization also shows itself in its local and particularistic tendencies. Thus different localities worshipped different gods and sometimes the same god

in different names with a local pluralism which was subversive of religious unity. Hence in spite of a general agreement as regards the objects of worship, there was no unity of attachment and no consciousness of a common religion. It will thus be not altogether wrong to say that early Egyptian religion did not rise very far above the tribal stage. But it would be wrong to say that it was nothing but blind pluralism and that there was no attempt at unification and ordering. As a matter of fact, there was some classification of the gods into major and minor and thus some sort of ordering by gradation into higher and lower. The order was certainly not the same for all localities, different localities recognising different orders and gradations and thus accepting different modes of synthesis. But some order there was for every locality and thus some kind of unity of the bewildering variety. Thus Osiris was the chief of the gods of the dead. Hathor the chief of the goddesses, Amon the king of the gods of Thebes and the Sun-god the highest of gods and the sole creator.

A writer on Egyptian religion opines that the Egyptians excelled every other nation in their care for the dead, graves such as the Egyptian Pyramids or the rock-tombs of Thebes being without their parallel in the histories of nations. The remark however applies more to Pyramid-building than to the care for the dead, for the ghost-worship of some of the primitive peoples and the ancestor-worship of more civilized peoples do not suffer by comparison

with that of the Egyptians in this respect. We have no doubt many Egyptian myths of the under-world, of the fate of the soul after death and of its journey through the heaven and the stars, but this is no special feature of the Egyptian religion only. Worship of Osiris as the god of the dead is certainly an important feature of the Egyptian religion, but it is neither the all-important nor the universal feature of it. If anything may be called the most characteristic and universal feature of the Egyptian religion it is the worship of the Sun-god. The worship of the Sun takes different forms corresponding to the changing relations of the sun to the earth in its diurnal journey through the sky. Thus we have the worship of the morning, the noon-day and the evening sun with corresponding differences in its representations in human and animal forms. The progress of the sun is conceived as the victorious march of the sun against the terrible Apophis who is the power of evil and opposes the sun's journey. The fight which issues in victory for the sun is not the same as the difference between the gods of the upper world and the under-world. It is the fight between good and evil and not a mere difference between an "upper" and an "under". The sun is a "*great* god" and the creator and ruler of other gods and the earthly king who is "*the good* god" and such is worshipped in temples is supposed to become "*the great* god" after death. In later days the king is compared to the sun-god on earth, his place being the *horizon*, he being represented as *arising* when he shows himself and *setting* when he dies.

We shall now conclude with a brief reference to some of the other important features of the Egyptian religion.

One of these is the Osiris-Isis-Horus myth. Here we have the beginning of the conception of a triune god. The Egyptian triplicity marks a distinct advance from naturalistic culture representing as it does the conditions of human dynastic continuity through father—mother—and son. The dead Osiris comes to life again in his son Horus to avenge his murder on his brother Set. The Hindu Trinity, Brahmā-Viṣṇu-Śiva, furnishes a clear contrast to the Egyptian triplicity in his respect. There is no reference in the Hindu conception to human relations representing as it does the metaphysical attributes of creation, maintenance and dissolution.

Another peculiarity of the Egyptian religion is that its gods are conceived on analogy of human beings. Thus unlike the Greek gods the Egyptian gods are mortals like men, and are subject to growth, decay and death. They have further to be fed like men, and sustained by means food and drink. They are besides subject to magical forces and may be magically coerced by the magician's art.

The Egyptian priestly class constitutes another notable feature of the Egyptian religion. Originally a king who built a temple was regarded as the son of the god and therefore his chief priest. But this was soon found impracticable as a king who built many temples could not do the priestly office for all. Thus arose the practice of appointing priests as the

king's delegates. Though the priests were at first chosen from the more important families, they soon came to be connected with certain professions as specially qualifying them for the worship of certain deities. Thus the priests of Ptah were chosen from artists, of Maat from the judiciary, of Sekhmet from physicians, etc. Originally the priestly and the secular duties devolved on different persons, but later they were combined in the same functionary. For example, the Teti-Sabu (priest) who worshipped Ptah (the divine office) was also the superintendent of architecture (the secular duty).

We have already referred to the particularism of early Egyptian religion. Particularism however marks the early phase only. In the historical period through political unification the earlier particularism gave place to more uniform mode of worship. The so-called religious reform of Amenophis IV, for example, was towards a more universal and uniform worship of the sun-god suitable for a great empire of the old world. The attempted religious unity was thus in the interest of a larger empire consisting of heterogeneous peoples. Amenophis IV gave it the name of Ekh-en-Aton and hoped through it to check the disruptive tendencies of the earlier sun-worship under multifarious names and forms. The attempt no doubt proved a failure, for immediately after Amenophis there was a reversion to the older particularism. None the less it remains the first serious attempt at a universal religion that is to appeal to all peoples and all countries. The Egyptian

experiment in this respect will certainly bear comparison with some of the later attempts in the same direction. Marcus Aurelius only theorised on its possibility as a visionary and Akbar thought of it as part of the paraphernalia of his sovereignty. But Akbar's dream never materialised nor did the vision of Marcus Aurelius. It was Amenophis IV, and after him Asoka the great, who not merely theorised on but actually founded universal religion. It remains true however that while the universal religion founded by Amenophis did not last beyond his lifetime, that founded by Asoka moulded history and influenced the lives of nations.

## DEGREES OF GOODNESS AND BADNESS

If goodness is a value and value implies a value-system, there is no goodness or badness unless there are degrees of goodness. It follows that the good in itself, i.e., the unconditional irrelative good, whether regarded as the moral good or some good other than moral, is no more logically conceivable by itself than degrees of goodness and badness without reference to an absolute and unexcelled good. We propose to examine in the present paper the concept of relative goodness with reference especially to a criterion that will serve as an effective test for practical purposes.

At the outset we must reject the concept of absolute goodness as a concrete universal, immanently operative in the relative goodness and badness of human conduct. This is the Hegelian view of goodness as elaborated by the school of Bradley and Bosanquet. We reject this view for the obvious reason that it fails to reconcile the opposed moments of a goodness complete in itself as the timeless unity of relative goodness and a complete and timelessly real goodness which must yet realise itself in time through concrete temporal acts of goodness. We do not see how these contradictory moments can be reconciled except through a subjective 'make-believe' or 'act of faith' in a 'somehow' which is not logically comprehensible and is so far mystical. We are thus left with the

relative and the 'conditional good without an absolute goodness except as a thought and a far-away ideal rather than as an operative immanent reality as it is claimed to be.

But can there be a relative without an absolute goodness? Can there be degrees of goodness and badness except as approximations or otherwise to a complete and perfect goodness either as a transcendent ideal or as an eternally accomplished truth? We have rejected the latter alternative as untenable and we have now to consider whether and how far a perfect and complete goodness is logically conceivable as an ideal to be realised. When we talk of a perfection as an ideal or aspiration, of a perfect goodness which *is not* and is to be made actual, we must have a clear conception of what this perfection or perfect goodness means. Without a clear idea of the value that is asserted, a judgment of value is unmeaning and absurd.

Can we, then, give any intelligible account of perfect goodness as a value or an 'ought to be'? Can we make sense of this so-called axiological verity awaiting ingression into the ontological reality? The hedonistic conception of the best life as consisting in the greatest sum of individual pleasures needs no special consideration here. The paradox of hedonism and the difficulties which it creates for a theory of pleasure as the true end of conduct are too well-known to deserve special mention. Nor does the hedonistic ideal of 'the greatest sum of pleasure' admit of a precise definition to be a workable moral



standard for practical purposes. And that special variety of hedonism called Utilitarianism fares no better in this respect than what passes as hedonism proper. For the greatest good of the greatest number or the greatest sum of pleasures for sentient creation as a whole irrespective of this or that individual's share or portion in the sum-total is no more definable in arithmetical terms than the sum of pleasures possible in the case of a single individual. Nor does the pleasure-ideal as the goal of moral conduct appeal to the unsophisticated mind as answering to its conception of a best life. For though civilisation has refined our sensibilities and sharpened our appreciations of value without making for a happier life on the whole, yet should the common man be given a choice between a happier life with dulled sensibilities and our comparatively present unhappy life with its finer sensibilities, there is hardly any doubt what his answer will be.

Does rationalism, either as ethical rigorism as the outright negation of sensualism, or in its less extreme form as a logically planned and ordered sensualism, give a better account of ideal goodness than does the hedonistic theory? Assuredly not. For consider extreme rationalism as represented by Kant and the Kantians. If the best life is one of duty for duty's sake, actions for the mere love of them or out of sympathy or pity for a fellow-creature must be denied moral significance and a place in the best life. Nor does the conception of the ideal life as one of pure autonomous duty square with the common man's

conception of the moral life. For consider what this ideal of pure duty signifies. It obviously implies that the moral life must be one of unceasing war with our sensuous nature, that the sensuous self is the bad self which must be negated as often as it asserts itself in order that the higher self may be realised. But this amounts to saying that one must necessarily be bad in order that one may live the good life, that no man can live the moral life unless there is always a demon in him which must be slain as often as it raises its head.

But extreme rationalism otherwise called ethical rigorism or the doctrine of pure duty is far less difficult to dispose of than its less rigoristic variety which we have called logically planned and ordered sensualism. While a life of pure duty as the outright negation of our inclinations and affections may be repudiated as an empty ideal not answering to a healthy view of the moral life, the same, it may be contended, cannot be said of the good life conceived as the rational ordering of our sensuous nature. The best life or the ideal moral life, it may be said, is not a contentless void miscalled a life of pure practical reason, but a rationalised sensuous life, the life of impulse and inclination reduced to systematic unity under the direction of reason. The good life, in other words, is a logically planned life—not a life of pure reason lived *in vacuo* apart from and as the negation of our sensuous nature, but a rationally organised life of desires and inclinations wherein each element of our brute nature gets only such indulgence as is its

due compatibly with the claims of other competing impulses demanding expression and fulfilment in action. Hence the best life is a coherent, harmonious life from which conflict and competition have been eliminated, and wherein all our sensuous inclinations and impulses live a co-operative life of peace and amity furthering and supporting, instead of impeding and frustrating, one another. And such a coherent life is at once an integrated individual life and an integrated social life, for not only has it reduced all internal conflict to systematic unity, but has also by eliminating internal conflict made social maladjustment impossible. In other words, just in so far as it is completely at peace with itself, it is also for that very reason at peace with society and the world at large.

The above is sometimes called the doctrine of coherence, and before we examine it in detail we shall distinguish two varieties of it. According to one of these, the best life as a completely coherent life is a far-away transcendent ideal, a thing of heaven which we imperfectly imitate in our finite earthly lives. We may call it the theory of Transcendence. As distinguished from this, there is a second variety of the doctrine which emphasises the aspect of immanence. According to this second view, the best life is not a transcendent Platonic Ideal inspiring us from its heavenly aloofness, but an immanent urge or drive that acts in us as the spur to ever higher achievements. We may summarily dismiss this second alternative as untenable, for the

obvious reason that an ideal cannot be immanently operative except as a reality complete in itself which makes its further unfolding in our finite lives an unmeaning repetition. We shall therefore consider the first alternative only, viz., the view of coherence as a transcendent far-away ideal to which nothing actual corresponds completely, and which yet is the standard by which we measure degrees of relative goodness and badness.

We have seen that nothing can be asserted as an ideal which is not conceivable in intelligible terms and we have therefore to consider whether the best life regarded as a completely coherent and harmonious life is definable in logical terms. What, then, is this coherence or harmony as is here asserted to be the meaning of the best life regarded as an ideal to be realised ?

We may conceive coherence, in the first place, negatively as absence of collision or conflict, so that the ideal life will be one wherefrom not only has all conflict disappeared but which also precludes the very possibility of conflict. Before we proceed further, it is necessary to be precise as to the meaning of conflict, as a loose use of terms may land us in confusion and much fruitless discussion. We shall define conflict as a relation of exclusion between two or more elements where the repugnance may be reciprocal or asymmetrical. Thus *a* is in conflict with *b*, if the presence of *a* necessitates the absence of *b*, or the presence of *b* means the absence of *a*, or the presence of either

means the absence of the other. Thus if *a* repels *b*, or *b* repels *a* or each repels the other, *a* and *b* may be said to conflict with each other. Absence of conflict thus means not merely the actual absence of repugnance but the absence also of its very possibility. But can we ever be assured of a state which is free not only from any kind of actual conflict or collision, but is also incompatible by its very nature with conflict of any sort? Assuredly, what experience warrants in any case is nothing but actual absence of conflict, and justifies no inference about its logical impossibility. Our inductions, theoretical as well as practical, rest in the last analysis on uncontradicted experience, and thus assure nothing else than unfailing concomitance in the past which we can extend to the future only by an act of 'make-believe' or faith. For consider what a coherent life ordinarily means. It is a life, it is said, in which diverse purposes and interests form a harmonious unity without failing out in irreconcilable contradictions. But, then, what precisely is this harmonious unity, and what is the warrant that it will continue a harmonious unity without being disrupted in any future contingency? A harmonious unity, we shall be told perhaps, is unity in diversity—a whole in which diverse elements take their appointed places compatibly with one another without mutual repulsion or conflict. But, what, we ask again, is the criterion of this compatibility as distinguished from incompatibility, repugnance or incongruence? How do we know, e.g., that *a*, *b* and *c* form a harmo-

nious whole while  $a$ ,  $p$  and  $q$  are mutually repugnant and so far incongruent ?

Experience, we shall be told, is our evidence here, not experience as such, but uncontradicted experience. We found  $a$ ,  $b$  and  $c$  always to go together in experience and we never found a single case in which the concomitance was observed to fail, but  $a$ ,  $p$  and  $q$  we found to be incompatible so that the presence of  $a$  was found to exclude  $p$  in many instances, and the presence of  $p$  to exclude  $q$  similarly. But the question still remains whether unfailing association is itself any evidence of necessary connexion and whether there is any warrant for inferring inner connexion where we have nothing but brute conjunction and its repetition in varying circumstances. Assuredly, there is nothing in  $a$  by itself that shows any inner connexion with  $b$ , nor anything in  $b$  by itself that proves necessary relation to  $c$ . On the contrary, in so far as  $a$  is  $a$  and not  $b$ , and  $b$  is  $b$  and not  $c$ , any necessary relation between  $a$  and  $b$  or between  $b$  and  $c$  is not established by a brute conjunction howsoever often and in whatsoever varying circumstances it may be repeated. It may be said that unfailing association as such does not prove inner connexion, but only such as has been purged of all disturbing irrelevant factors. But the objection to this view is that the so-called relevant factors can be ascertained only by the self-same device of uncontradicted experience which has failed as often as it has succeeded as a criterion of necessary connexion.

It follows therefore that the absence of contradiction which is invoked to prove a necessary connexion is nothing but unfailing association, and proves at best a repeated conjunction and not any coherent whole as is ordinarily supposed. And what holds of coherence in the negative sense as absence of contradiction applies with equal force to coherence conceived positively as reciprocal logical support and reinforcement. For what evidence have we of *a* and *b* as reciprocally supporting each other as elements of a differentiated unity except the mere fact that they have always gone together in experience through varying conditions and have in no case been found to be dissociated? If unfailing association has not always given us a correct lead and if nothing can be discovered by analysis in *a* that reveals any necessary relation to *b*, are we not exalting a brute conjunction into a logically necessary connexion?

Moreover, when we descend from the abstract to the concrete and consider the coherence-ideal with reference to the concrete issues of life, we meet with irreducible surds that defy resolution into a coherent unity. Consider, e.g., the case of a man born with a native genius for painting and at the same time saddled with a large family to maintain. As a born painter he would be false to himself if he allowed his native genius to rust through disuse. At the same time, he would be false to himself as a member of society if he neglected his family and pursued his art heedless of his family needs. He

cannot do both—he cannot realise his social self except at the cost of his native genius, and he cannot realise his individual gift except at the cost of his family and his dependents. How should he reconcile these diverse and irreconcilable obligations? What could be the ideal unity in which these incompatible elements might be resolved into a coherent whole?

We conclude then that the ideal of a coherent unity resolves, on analysis, into a brute conjunction, and also that the coherence-ideal does not work when applied to the concrete issues of life. We therefore reject ideal coherence as a criterion of relative goodness and badness, and we shall now consider the question whether a concrete ethical relativism without reference to any ideal of absolute coherence does not provide a more effective criterion for our purpose.

We shall waive, for the present, the preliminary objection to our procedure, that no relative goodness or badness is conceivable except in reference to an ideal absolute goodness. We may suppose that the latter is only an abstraction, something abstracted from its concrete goodness and badness and considered in itself apart from its concrete setting in experience. We may even go further and consider the absolute to be nothing but a shadow of the relative, vastly magnified, so that what really exists is the relatively good or bad, there being no such thing as an absolute goodness or an absolute badness as is ordinarily supposed. According to this view therefore what is real is the concretely good or bad



relatively to some other situation, which is concretely good or bad relatively to the former. Thus we have only relative goodness or badness, i.e., goodness in the concrete or badness in the concrete, that are so only relatively to situations that are likewise relatively bad or otherwise. This is ethical relativism for which there is no moral value or disvalue except relatively to another, which is a disvalue or a value relatively to it. Hence every good is good relatively to a bad, as contrary-wise every bad is bad relatively to a good. The terms 'higher' and 'lower', 'better' and 'worse', have thus no meaning except relatively to one another, so that a situation is higher or better only relatively to another which it either displaces or anticipates. And the criterion which distinguishes relative superiority in every case is greater stability or coherence, so that the more coherent the life relatively to another that is less, the superior it is in moral worth or goodness. There is no question here of any absolute stability or harmony, which we never reach, nor can clearly conceive. What matters and what serves as effective criterion is superior coherence as evidence by the test of greater relative stability.

Does relativism, then provide a better criterion than the other theories we have examined? Does it ensure a more workable test wherewith to measure relative goodness and badness? Will it work better when we consider the issues of life in the concrete? We are told that the criterion is relative stability or coherence so that the more coherent the life, the higher it is in the hierarchy of moral values. Does

the formula work when we come to concrete cases ? Consider the life of a simple villager with limited interests, born of normal parents and without any hereditary handicap in the way of adaptation to his surroundings. Now compare his life with that of a co-villager born of criminal parents, brought up amongst criminals, and in perpetual want, and, with nothing favourable in the environment to act as an incentive to a decent life. If our villager in the first instance lives a comparatively coherent life, while his co-villager in the second instance lives an incoherent mal-adapted life, should we consider the former to be a higher life because it shows greater stability and coherence than the latter ? Should we discount the factors of internal and external resistance which may have been insuperable barriers to the latter's living the good life, even though he may not be lacking in the will to it ? Should we go by the simple test of greater relative stability, discounting all other factors that might have contributed to it in the one case or retarded it in the other ? Consider again a simple villager living a simple unvaried life because his education and surroundings do not afford any inducement for a more complex, larger life of varied interests. Compare the life of such a man with that of a statesman or a politician who has to look to the interests not only of his own party or group, but also the interests of other parties and groups in his country and of his country's interests as a whole in a total international setting, besides his ordinary domestic interests such as the well-being of his family. If in

these circumstances we miss in the statesman's life the unity and coherence which we meet with in the life of the simple villager, should we rank it as lower in the hierarchy of moral goodness because it is not as harmonious and unified as is the latter? Consider again another case. There is such a thing as being at peace with oneself without being at peace with the world at large, as contrary-wise there is such a thing as peace with the world without internal peace or satisfaction. Hence, as there may be coherence within answering to a coherence without, there may likewise be cases where the internal harmony is not reflected in external peace, and a peace without which is not also the expression of internal peace and contentment. How should we tackle these cases in accordance with the criterion of ethical relativism? Should we prefer the religious begotry that sanctions the burning of heretics as service of God to the worldly prudence that chooses peace with the world at the sacrifice of cherished beliefs?

It is needless to say that in these and other cases, ethical relativism fails both as a measure of relative goodness and as an effective guide to conduct. And to these and other objections to the theory must be added the initial one that degrees of goodness and badness without reference to an ideal goodness or excellence is as inconceivable as a journey without a destination, or progress and retrogression without reference to an end aimed at. There is besides the further difficulty in the theory that it practically obliterates

the dichotomy of good and bad, making every 'good' also a possible bad and every 'bad' a possible good relatively to a certain point of view.

The result of our enquiry so far has been mainly negative. We have rejected both hedonism and rationalism as failing to provide an intelligible criterion of goodness and badness, and we have also seen that ideal coherence, being indefinable, will not work as the criterion we are in quest of. And we further found that unless there is a fullness of which we are in possession somehow, our talk of degrees of goodness and badness is unmeaning verbiage. And this brings us to the question whether, when we talk of a fullness or perfection as a necessary presupposition of all relative goodness or worth, must we necessarily construe it in the language of the coherence-doctrine as unity in diversity? May there not be a fullness unlike the unity of coherence, and may we not ourselves be the repositories of this plenitude or perfection which we vainly seek in the world outside as unity of alogical surds? For what is coherence but the resolution of irreducibles—a-make-believe unity of logical repellents? What ground is there, e.g., for the belief that *a* and *b* form an integral whole except the fact of their unfailing association, which is only brute conjunction repeated through varying conditions? Further, is not coherence as both conservation and resolution of differences one of those mysterious entities for which there is no warrant excepting an act of faith? For consider what the coherence doctrine implies. If *a* and *b* always go together such

that we have never an *a* without a *b* nor any *b* without *a*, they must be regarded as self-differentiations of a unity  $\infty$  which is at once the conservation of *a* and *b* and the resolution of their logical repugnance. But how, we ask, is it possible for *a* to pass over into *b* which is its other and become one with it while continuing to be *a* at the same time? Is it not more straight-forward to acknowledge the evident imperVIOUSNESS as a given inexplicability, recognising the affirming consciousness as the only luminous and intelligible reality? It need hardly be said that this is the Śankara-vedāntist view which recognises the subject as the only luminous reality against which the so-called unities of experience stand out as unintelligible surds. That the reality which cannot be thought away is the reality of the Self, that the Self as the consciousness that shines forth, as the fountain-head of joy and bliss, as the fullness of an accomplished reality, is the pivot round which revolve both the Śankarite metaphysic and its theory of knowledge. In so far as all awareness is self-awareness, and in so far awareness of objects is awareness thereof as the 'other' of the self, reality must be conceived as the self-positing subject that posits objects as its 'other'. And since the undifferentenced unity of the self as subject is necessarily presupposed in the awareness of objective differences and surds, what we call the partial unities of experiences must be regarded as brute conjunctions shining by the reflected unity of the subject. Hence the so-called coherences or incoherences of life, the loose unities we miscall

integral wholes are nothing but imposters masquerading in the guise of the pure unity of the undifferentiated self. They possess no real unity in them except the borrowed unity of the self that reveals them, and their so-called goodness and badness as coherent or otherwise is only the joy of the self darkly reflected in their brute material.

It follows that what we call moral progress as ascent from a lower to a higher goodness is in reality a negative movement, a planned retreat as it were by which we withdraw from one illusion after another till the spirit by repeated seeking and frustration turns at last to the Self as the source of the joy and the bliss which it falsely believed to inhere in the object. The attraction of the object, the goodness or value with which we endow the objective situation or content is thus only a blurred reflection of the unalloyed joy which the Self itself is. And so moral education is essentially negative—a process of *neti, neti*, ('not this', 'not this') as the Upaniṣads say, whereby the deluded, prodigal self returns to itself at last after much fruitless wandering in the wilderness of objects. Like the musk-deer, the self becomes intoxicated as it were by the fragrance emanating from its own person, and runs about in frenzied madness seeking it in objects other than itself. Or we may say Narcissus-like, the self falls in love with its own image reflected in objects and runs about in vain pursuit of the phantom, forgetting that it is only the shadow of which the substance is to be found only in itself. And so moral education is education

in de-objectification in which through repeated frustration and disillusionment the self learns to rest at last in itself as that plenitude of joy whereof all other values are only blurred imitation or copies. And so the Upaniṣads say, "The husband is dear to the wife not because the wife loves the husband for his own sake, but because she believes she can discover in the husband something of the joy which her own self is. And riches similarly are desired not for the sake of riches, but because they appear to reflect some of the joy which the self is and which is desired above all else." (*"na vā āre patyuh kāmīya patih priyo bhavati, atmanastu, kāmāya patih priyo bhavati ; na vā āre vittasya kāmāya vittam priyam bhavati, atmanastu kāmāya vittam priyam bhavati—Brhadāranyako-panisad"* )

Are there, then, no degrees of goodness and badness, no higher and lower coherences, no gradation of values ? Yes, there are, though they are all false in the end as confused reflections, in alogical media, of the fullness that is the self. For though all empirical goodness is good only by proxy, as imitation of the fullness which is the self, and as such must lack real goodness and truth ;yet in so far as one apparent goodness has the power of overcoming another equally apparent, it must be reckoned superior to the one it cancels or displaces. And thus while empirical unities are false in the end as lacking ultimate truth and reality, yet we may talk of higher and lower coherences and of degrees of goodness and badness in so far as the higher falsity may be used for overcoming

the lower, but not *vice versa*. We use brute experience as a self-corrective as it were, in the same way as we extract one thorn with another, or extract a bullet with a knife though both are made of the same metal. Experience, in short, is a skilled homœopath, correcting itself, by itself, neutralising poison by poison, or using one set of germs for eliminating another. And in this sense, though all empirical values are false in the end, yet we may distinguish grades of falsity, and higher and lower values, in so far as they are asymmetrically related as correctives of one another. Thus the value that we call religion may be no less false than the false value which we call the life of pleasure. And yet while the illusion which is religion has the power of negating the illusory value of the life of pleasure, there is no corresponding power in the illusion which is pleasure-seeking to dispel the falsity which religion is. And in this sense we may talk of religion as higher than pleasure-seeking, of degrees of goodness and badness, and of progress from a less to a more coherent life though all partial unities are false in the end when judged by the criterion of the plenitude which the self as subject is.

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## SRIDHARA'S PRESENTATION OF THE VAISESIKA THEISTIC ARGUMENT.

The present paper will deal with the Vaiśeṣika Theistic Argument as set forth by Śrīdhara in the *Nyāyakandalitikā*.<sup>1</sup> The argument together with antitheistic objections and theistic rejoinders will be expounded in the order in which they appear in the text, with such slight deviations as may be necessary in the interests of clearness and easy comprehension.

The Vaiśeṣikas, it should be noted, are not concerned to prove a creator in the customary Christian meaning of the term. The Lord, as the Vaiśeṣikas conceive Him, is only the World-Orderer who arranges a cosmos out of pre-existing materials. The Lord is thus responsible for the order and arrangement of the Universe and not for the matter or stuff out of which it is made. He is the great world-architect which builds an ordered universe out of the *Paramāṇus* or Atoms as the potter makes his jar out of the lump of clay or the weaver weaves the cloth out of the threads of yarn. In Aristotelian phraseology, the Lord is the efficient, formal and final cause of the world, but not its material cause.

The Theistic Argument by which the Vaiśeṣikas

1. The reference is to the Vizianagram edition pp. 54—58.

endeavour to prove the existence of such a Lord of the Universe is an ingenious combination of the Cosmological and Teleological Arguments. The argument starts from the nature of the world as an effect and reasons from it to an Intelligent First Cause of the world. It is thus based on a recognition of the essential identity of causality with teleology. That the cause must in every case be an intelligent cause and that no effect can arise except as the product of an intelligent cause, is the paradox which the Vaiśeṣika theist never tires of urging against his sceptical opponents. Hence, according to the Vaiśeṣikas as according to Martineau in the West, the cosmological Argument alone suffices to prove both a First Cause of the world and an Intelligent Cause thereof.

The Vaiśeṣikas enunciate their Theistic Argument in the form of an *Anumāna* or Inference. The Inference is as follows ;—

The universe consisting of the earth and the rest must have an intelligent Cause,

Because it is an effect,

(Whatever is an effect, is the effect of an intelligent Cause),

Just as is the jar.

The ground or *hetu* of the argument, it will be seen, is *Kāryatva* or the nature of being an effect. From the fact that the universe possesses this nature of being an effect, the Vaiśeṣika infers an intelligent Cause of the Universe. It is therefore against this part of the inference that the antitheists launch their attacks. They point out that the argument, consi-

dered as a peice of inferential reasoning, is open to the fallacy of an unestablished ground (*hetvasiddhi*). For what is the real ground of the inference? The real ground is not *Kāryatva* considered by itself, but the invariable relation between *Kāryatva* "being an effect", and *Sakartrkatva*, "being the effect of an intelligent cause". Provided that whatever is an effect is also the effect of an intelligent cause, and provided further that the world is, in fact, an effect, the inference holds good, i.e., yields a materially true conclusion. The theistic conclusion thus follows jointly from the material truth of two propositions. viz., (1) the world is an effect, and (2) every effect is the product of an intelligent cause. But the material truth of these propositions is simply taken for granted and not actually proved. For what evidence is there to prove that the world *is* an effect? As nobody was present at the time of creation, nobody can say for certain that the world is an effect. Hence the presence of the *hetu* in the *pakṣa*, i.e., the character of an effect which is attributed to the subject of the inference, viz., the world, is a dogmatic assumption that cannot be verified. Thus the *hetu* i.e., the nature of an effect, being unestablished in regard to the *pakṣa* or subject of the inference, we have here the fallacy of an unestablished *hetu* or ground (the fallacy of *Svarāpāsiddhi* according to the Naiyāyikas, and of *sambandhāsiddhi* according to the Mīmāṃsakas).

In reply to this objection the Vaiśeṣikas point that it is not necessary to be present at the time of

creation in order to be assured of the nature of the world as an effect. One may arrive at the same conclusion from an examination of the structure of the universe. If we look carefully into the internal structure of the world we find that it is a contingent whole made of parts. That the world is made of parts is itself conclusive evidence of the fact that the world is an effect. For look at the familiar instance of the jar. It is a whole made of the combination of parts and it is also a temporal effect being the handiwork of the potter. It follows that whatever is a result of the combination of parts is an effect in time, and it follows therefore that the world which is made of parts is also a temporal effect. The composition of the world itself establishes its character as an effect, even though its actual creation may not be a matter of observation.

But the antitheist points out that there are other forms of an unestablished ground (*asiddha hetu*) besides the one above-mentioned and the theistic inference is not free from these other fallacies, even though it may not involve the fallacy of *svarūpāsiddhi*. For consider what is asserted to be the real *hetu* or ground of the inference. The real *hetu* or ground is not *kāryatva* as such but the *vyāpti* or invariable relation between *kāryatva* or "being an effect" and *upalabdhimatpūrvakatva*, "being the effect of an intelligent cause". Hence the ground of the inference is the universal proposition "whatever is an effect, is the effect of an intelligent cause". It follows therefore that this universal proposition must be materially

true if the inference which is based on it is to lead to a materially true conclusion. If the material truth of the universal proposition is open to doubt, we have the fallacy of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*, i. e., the fallacy of an unestablished ground in another form. But the material truth of this universal proposition is not quite apparent. No doubt we have the case of the jar as illustrating the asserted invariable relation between "an effect" and "intelligent authorship". But we have also many instances in experience to the contrary, i. e., many exceptions to the so-called universal proposition. Take for instance, the sprouting of the seed. It is something that happens without the supervision of any intelligent agent. We can also cite other instances of spontaneous generation which run counter to the theist's generalisation. And thus there being so many negative instances, the invariable relation on which the theist rests his case remains at best a doubtful proposition. Nor can it be said that these so-called exceptions being only doubtful cases of intelligent authorship may be comprised within the *pakṣa* or subject of the inference in respect of which a similar doubt exists and which doubt it will be the task of the inference to resolve and finally lay to rest. For such reasoning will ruin inference as a logical process and will render it useless as a source of knowledge. In fact, without a clear specification at the outset of what is to constitute the subject of the inference, what the *hetu* or ground, and what the *sādhya* or *probandum*, no inference can proceed a single step.

If the subject or *pakṣa* remains unspecified or only indefinitely specified, then every contrary instance may be easily disposed of by being merged into the indefinitely stated *pakṣa* or subject, and the evidently fallacious inference will thus fare quite as well as a valid reasoning.

In reply to this objection the Vaiśeṣikas point out that the Mimāṃsaka atheist should be the last person to raise an objection like this to the Vaiśeṣika theistic inference. For what does the objection resolve into? It is simply this that every inference must be based on an invariable relation or *vyāpti* and that the *vyāpti* on which an inference is based must be established beyond all doubt by the satisfactory disposal of all apparent exceptions to it. Till such contrary instances are fully explained away, the invariable relation or *vyāpti* cannot be said to be finally and conclusively established and the inference which is based on such imperfect inductions cannot be said to yield logically valid conclusions, and yet the Mimāṃsaka who holds this view does not hesitate to use the *sāmānyato h-dṛṣṭa* form of inference to prove the "Sun's movement" from the observed fact of "the Sun's change of place." And how does the Mimāṃsaka arrive at this conclusion in regard to the sun's movement? He starts from the observed correlation between Devadatta's "change of place" and Devadatta's "movement," and he extends this generalisation to the case of the sun even though he has observed it only in the case of beings who inhabit this earth and has never observed it in the case of the distant stars

and other like objects. It is no doubt open to the Mimāṃsaka to argue, that distance being a bar to sense-perception in the case of the stars and the like, the non-observation of movement in these cases cannot overthrow an induction based on repeated observation of an unconditional invariable relation between "movement" and "change of place" in innumerable other instances. But in this case the theist also may argue in a similar way in respect of the so-called negative instances of the sprouting of the seed and the like. He may reason with equal force that sprouting, etc., are no exceptions to his rule, that they are axamples of intelligent authorship quite as much as the jar is ; only the author in these cases is not visible to our observation on account of the absence of a body.

But the antitheist now points out that even this does not establish the case for an intelligent author of the universe. For what does the theistic inference really establish ? It establishes at best the case for the universal or generic essence, intelligent authorship of the universe. In other words, it proves only a generic essence and not a concrete individual. And yet a generic essence is not what is really intended. The theist is not concerned to prove an abstract universal, but a particular intelligent agent—an agent who will be equal to the task of creating the world. An agent of any kind, e. g., an agent of limited intelligence like ourselves, is not what he intends to prove. And yet the illustration of the jar and the potter points to an agent like ourselves. If we have to go

by this illustration, we shall have to admit only a finite agent like ourselves and such an agent is neither intended by the theist nor can possibly be the Creator of the Universe.

In reply to this objection the Vaiśeṣikas point out that the question of a concrete individual agent does not concern us at the outset. On the strength of the invariable relation we first of all prove the intelligent authorship as a universal. But since the universal cannot go wandering (*nirvisesa-sāmānyasya asiddhatvāt*), we argue from the universal to the particular in which the universal must embody itself. In other words, we first prove the generic essence, "intelligent authorship" (*kartṛtvasāmānya*), and thence we argue to a concrete individual author of the universe. From the universal to the particular—this is a necessary epistemological step in every reasoning.

But the antitheist points out that there is no such epistemological step involved in inferential reasoning. As a matter of fact, no inference proves a mere universal, for only in so far as it establishes the universal as particularised, it involves a real march of thought. Otherwise inference would be a process of *gṛhitagrahana*, of unprofitable repetition of thought. Every inference, in fact, consists of two essential factors. One of these is *vyāpti* or invariable relation between a certain mark and some other character or generic essence with which the said mark is associated. The other is *paksadharmatā*, the presence of the mark in the *paksa* or subject of the inference. Through the former



the inference makes known the universal or generic essence which is associated with the mark or sign. Through the latter again the said universal is shown as particularised by the *paksa* or subject of the inference.

The Vaiśeṣikas in reply observe that this does not affect the theistic inference. Even if we admit the force of the above reasoning, the theistic conclusion is not overthrown thereby. For through the *vyāpti* we get the universal, 'intelligent authorship,' and through the *pakṣādharmatā*, we get this universal particularised as an individual competent to create the universe.

The antitheist however points out that he objects not to an intelligent author as such, but to the particular intelligent author that is required for creating a world. From the universal to the particular may be a necessary step, but a particular that is *pramāṇaviruddha*, i. e., a particular that contradicts the organised body of experience, is not logically admissible. In inferring fire on the side of the mountain from the perception of smoke at the same place, I am not running counter to the accumulated testimony of knowledge. The particularisation of a generic essence like "fire" by localisation in space and time is a common experience of everyday life. It is otherwise however with the particular intelligent agent which is intended to be proved by the theistic inference. For the intelligent agent of the theistic argument is not one or other of two contradictory alternatives and is thus *aprāmāṇika* and imaginary like the hare's horn. For this agent cannot be either an embodied agent like ourselves

nor a disembodied spirit free from the limitations of the body. It cannot be an embodied agent because as such it will be subject to the limitations of the sensibilities and will thus lack the omniscience necessary for creating the world. It cannot also be disembodied because as lacking the bodily apparatus it will be incapable of the function of acting and therefore of carrying out its task of creating a world. The theistic argument thus establishes an agent X which is neither A nor not-A and this is absurd on the face of it. It will not do to say that the body is not a necessary condition of action. Every intelligent action involves (1) firstly, a grasp of the materials and tools, (2) secondly, desire to accomplish something with the help of these materials and tools, (3) thirdly, the will to carry out the desire into overt action, (4) fourthly, the putting forth of bodily effort, (5) fifthly, manipulating tools and materials by means of the body. (6) sixthly, achieving the object by effecting the necessary changes in the environment. And just as all these processes are involved in the carrying out of an intelligent action, so also when one or other of these processes is wanting there is no intelligent action. And thus it is proved by agreement in presence and agreement in absence that the body is as much necessary for intelligent action as is the exercise of intelligence. Hence if the theist will dispense with the body as a condition of Divine Action, one may, with equal logic, dispense with the Divine Intelligence as a condition of creation. But how, it may be asked, is it possible to create without prior

knowledge of the materials and tools? In the same way, it may be retorted, as it is possible to create without a body. The body, in fact, is the *avyavahita* or immediate antecedent of action, while intelligence, desire and choice are remote antecedents. Therefore if any of the conditions of action may be omitted, it is the intelligence as a remote antecedent and not the body which is the immediate antecedent. And thus the theistic argument leads us nowhere. The argument proves an agent which yet cannot be either an embodied or a disembodied agent. And as there is no escape from this dilemma, the theist must confess that this great world-architect of his is an imaginary being no more real than the hare's horn. But what, it may be asked, is the fallacy in the argument? The fallacy, the antitheist replies, consists in the use of an incongruous *hetu* or ground. The *hetu* is *kāryatva*, i. e., the nature of being an effect and it is incongruous with the *sādhya*, i. e., that which is to be established by it. The *sādhya*, the object to be proved by the inference, is not the universal or generic essence, intelligent authorship. It is a concrete individual, a concrete particular person who is competent to create the world. Now this person must be a disembodied being if He is to be equal to the task of creating the world. Hence the *sādhya*, that which is to be proved, is a disembodied intelligent author of the universe. But the *hetu* which is to prove this disembodied author is competent to prove only an embodied agent like ourselves. For the *hetu* is "the nature of being an effect," and this

*hetu* is the invariable concomitant of "an embodied agent" as the illustration of the jar and the potter shows. Thus the *hetu* is compatible only with an embodied intelligent agent like ourselves and is incongruous with a disembodied agent, i. e., with that particular kind of agent which is sought to be proved by the theistic argument. The incongruity (*virodha*) here being not between the *hetu* and the *sādhya* in its generic character but between the *hetu* and that particular variety of the *sādhya* which answers to the theist's requirements, the particular logical fallacy involved is the fallacy of a *visesaviruddha hetu*.

The Vaiśeṣika in reply to all this points out that the antitheist is overestimating the body as a condition of intelligent action. For what does the antitheist mean by saying that the body is an indispensable condition of intelligent action? Does he mean that "acting intelligently" and "possessing a body" are the same thing? Or does he mean that "intelligent acting" is manipulating tools and materials with prior knowledge of their efficacy to produce definite results? That the antitheist does not mean the former of these alternatives is obvious enough. The sleeper, when asleep, is not separated from his body, and yet the fact of his possessing a body does not amount to his acting intelligently during his sleep and quiescence. So also the *udāsīna*, the passive, non-acting being, may possess a body, but such possession does not mean his being active or his intelligently exerting himself. It follows therefore that "intelligent acting" is not the same thing as "possessing a

body." Hence "Intelligent acting" must mean actively manipulating materials and tools with knowledge of their capacity to yield specific results. And this being the real meaning of intelligent action there is no reason why a disembodied agent should be incapable of acting intelligently despite the absence of a body. For how does the self act in moving the body to which it is attached? Obviously it does not require the outside assistance of a second body in moving its own body. No doubt, the self in moving the body requires the body as the object on which to act. But the body is necessary as the object to be moved (*prerya*) and not as being itself the moving force (*preraka*). If it be argued that the body at all events must be there and cannot be dispensed with, the theist's reply is, the Lord also is provided with a body in this sense in the *paramānus* or *a'toms* which are the objects of His creative activity. The Lord, in other words, moves the *paramānus* as the self moves its body, and just as the latter does not require any other body for this purpose so also the Lord does not require any in acting on the *paramānus* and arranging them into the form of a cosmos.

But it may be said: the body is moved only through desire and effort, and as desire and effort require a body, the moving of the body must also require the body through the desire and the effort presupposed by it. In reply to this the Vaiśeṣikas point out that the body is necessary for evoking desire and effort but not for its own moving. Hence when the desire and the effort are already there, the body

is not necessary for its own moving, i.e., not necessary except as the object to be moved. Now we must distinguish between desire and effort as adventitious (*āgantuka*) generated events, and desire and effort as non-generated and essential states or attributes. The body is a condition of desire and effort only when these are generated states, but it is not a condition of desire and effort as essential and eternal attributes of objects. There may be effort in the Lord as Creator, but as it is an essential and eternal attribute of His Personality it does not presuppose a body. That qualities like desire and conative effort may be eternal as well as adventitious is no more paradoxical than that qualities like colour etc., may be eternal as well as non-eternal according to the differences of their substrates.

But it may be said : why assume a Lord as the mover of the Atoms? Why not attribute this task to the individual self? The Vaiśeṣikas point out in reply : the individual self is not competent to discharge this function for obvious reasons. The individual self is limited by its own body and the sensibilities. Hence its intelligence is limited by its sensibilities. The individual thus lacks the omniscience necessary for creating the universe.

But why, it may be asked, should the individual self be lacking in omniscience? Is not the self's intelligence both innate (*sahaja*) and all-pervading? How, in these circumstances, can the intelligence of the self be said to be limited?

The Vaiśeṣikas in reply point out : there is no

reason to suppose that the self's intelligence is innate. If it had been so then inasmuch as this intelligence is also all-pervading and object-revealing by very nature, there should be an uninterrupted knowledge of all things at all times. And thus there would be no room for that sense of novelty (*apūrva-avabhāsa*) that is a common feature of our experiences in this life. It will not do to say that this innate intelligence centres in the self itself at death and is withdrawn from the objects, and this accounts for the sense of novelty at a later birth. For how are we to speak of the intelligence being withdrawn from objects seeing that it is the very function of the intelligence to reveal, and therefore to be connected with objects? Nor can we speak of this intelligence being arrested in its function, for if the intelligence becomes defunct through any cause (e.g., death), the self will cease to have any knowledge thereafter. Nor can we say that the intelligence is arrested in certain circumstances (e.g., at death) and functions normally again in certain other circumstances (e.g., after birth). For why should the intelligence behave differently under different circumstances? It does not improve matters to say that these differences are due to differences in respect of the relations in which the intelligence stands to the sensibilities in the two different circumstances. For this is to admit that the individual intelligence depends on the sensibilities in revealing the objects and that objects are not revealed by the intelligence through the sheer fact of their proximity to the intelligence. And thus the individual intelli-

gence being admitted to depend on the sensibilities in the matter of revealing objects, it follows that the individual self cannot possess the omniscience necessary for creating the universe. And so we conclude, there must be a superintending intelligence or Overlord other than the individual self, one who is Omniscient and full of innate intelligence and possesses the qualities of a Creator of the Universe. All this, we claim, is a necessary hypothesis (*kalpanā*), as we never see any non-intelligent thing accomplish anything without the guidance of a presiding intelligence.

Having proved the existence of a Superintending Intelligence as a necessary hypothesis, we next proceed to discuss the question whether it is one or many. Our own view is that it is one and that a plurality of such intelligences is a superfluous assumption. For consider the matter carefully. If there be a plurality of these intelligences, then the question is: Are they all non-omniscient like ourselves or are they all Omniscient and unlike ourselves? If they are all non-omniscient, then they are all alike incapable and powerless like ourselves, and therefore cannot possibly create the world. And if they are all omniscient, then inasmuch as one such Omniscient intelligence suffices to account for the creation of the world, the assumption of the other intelligences involves an unnecessary multiplication of hypothesis and leaves nothing for these other intelligences to accomplish. Nor is unanimity of purpose (*aikamatya*) a common enough thing among equals of coordinate rank, and unanimity being not likely in such circum-



stances a plurality of equals will spoil and mar instead of furthering the task of creation. And if the many submit to authority of one amongst themselves, then that one is the real Master and Overlord and the rest are subordinate to his authority. We observe the same thing in the management of temples where there is one real Master, a first among equals, to whose authority the others submit without question.

Since this Superintending Intelligence possesses—

- (1) Omniscience (*sarvajnatva*), therefore
- (2) it cannot be wanting in the knowledge of the special nature of anything (*na kutracidvastuni visesānupa'ambhak*), and therefore
- (3) cannot have erroneous knowledge arising therefrom (*natunnibandhana mithyajñānam*), and therefore
- (4) any attachment and aversion springing therefrom (*tanmularrāgadvesau*), and therefore
- (5) any action under the influence of attachment and aversion (*tatpurvikā pravṛitti*), and therefore
- (6) any merit or demerit resulting from such action (*tatsadhyau dharmā-dharmau*), and therefore
- (7) any pleasure or pain born of merit or demerit (*tajiayorapi sukhaduhkha-ayah*).
- (8) And lastly, it follows, its Intelligence being an “eternal now” i. e., an

eternal intuitive vision of all things, it cannot have anything like a reproductive indirect cognition (*smṛti*) or faint impression (*sanskāra*).

According to another view, its intelligence itself constituting its irresistible will-power ( *avyāhatākrityāsakti* ) it does not possess any other form of desire and will.

As this Superintending Intelligence is not subject to the miseries (*kleśādi*), known technically as the bonds that bind, it cannot be said to be a spirit in bondage. It cannot also be said to be a liberated spirit as liberation presupposes a prior stage of bondage. We may therefore say that it is eternally free (*nityamukta*), or, as Patanjali says, one who is for ever untouched by the miseries, by karma and by the fruits of karma.

### **Summary of the Vaisesika Theistic argument as set forth in Sridhara's Nyayakandalitika**

The Vaiśeṣika Theistic Argument is a blend of the cosmological and teleological arguments and bears a certain resemblance to Martineau's presentation of the Theistic Argument in the West.

The Vaiśeṣikas admit a Creator only in the sense of the Formal, Final and Efficient Cause of the world, the material cause of it being, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, the *Paramānus* or Atoms. The Lord arranges the original chaos of the atoms into the form of a cosmos and in this sense is the World-Creator.

The Theistic Argument which the Vaiśeṣikas

offer in proof of such a Creator is an *Anumāna* or Inference which is based on the nature of the world as an effect. The Inference is as follows :—

The Universe must be the creation of an Intelligent Agent.

Because it is an effect,  
just as is the jar.

The argument thus reasons from the world as an effect not merely to an uncaused First Cause of the world but an intelligent First Cause thereof.

The following are the antitheistic objections to the argument :—

(1) There is no proof that the universe is an effect, nobody being actually present at the time of creation.

(2) There is no proof also of the *vyāpti*, i. e., the invariable relation, between *kāryatva* “being an effect”, and *buddhimatpūrvakatva* “being the effect of an intelligent cause”. Experience abounds in instances of spontaneous generation.

(3) The illustration of the jar and the potter warrants the inference of a finite agent like ourselves, and such an agent is not equal to the task of creating the world.

(4) Besides, the agent which is sought to be proved by the argument cannot be an agent in general, but a determinate particular agent that is capable of creating the world. But no such agent, is really proved by the argument. For this agent, if there be any such, must be either an embodied agent or a disembodied spirit. But an embodied agent would not

be equal to the task of creation, while a disembodied spirit would not be an agent at all as lacking the bodily apparatus through which to act. Thus the agent sought to be inferred is an imaginary entity like the hare's horn.

The Theist replies to these objections as follows :

(1) The universe being made of parts, must be an effect, *sārayavatva* of the world proves its *kāryatva*.

(2) The so-called instances of spontaneous generation are in reality cases of intelligent authorship, but the author is not actually observed as lacking a physical body.

(3) The inference proves only an agent in general, but as the universal must clothe itself in a concrete instance ( *nirviseśa sāmānyasya asiddhatvāt* ) we reason to a particular concrete agent as the creator of the universe as an epistemological implication of the conclusion of the inference.

(4) The objection that a disembodied agent cannot be an agent at all is untenable. The self in moving the body does not require the body except as the object to be moved. And the Lord in creating the world does not also require any except the atoms as the objects of His creative activity. Even if the moving of the body be not possible except through desire and conation, it cannot be said that such desire and conation always require a body. A body is required only in the case of adventitious desire and will, but not when these are essential and non-adventitious as in the case of the Lord.

(5) That there cannot be more than one such Creative Intelligence is proved by the fact that a plurality of Creative Intelligences, if non-omniscient, would be all alike incapable of creating the universe, and, if omniscient, would be without occupation, one omniscient intelligence being sufficient for the task of creation. Besides *aikamatya*, unanimity being not always possible among equals, there must be one supreme authority to which the rest must submit and this supervising authority thus will be the real master or Lord.

Since this Overlord must be *savajna* or omniscient, it follows that—

(1) it cannot have any *visesānupālambhah*, non-apprehension of the special characteristics of things, and therefore

(2) any *mithyājnāna*, error or illusion, resulting therefrom, and therefore

(3) any *rāgadvesau*, any attachment or aversion due to *mithyājnāna*, and therefore

(4) any *pravṛitti*, will or choice determined by *rāgadvesa*, and therefore

(5) any *dharmādharman*, merit or demerit resulting from such willing, and therefore

(6) any pleasure or pain as the consequence of merit or demerit, and lastly

(7) it cannot have either *smṛti* i. e., reproductive experience, or *sanskāra*, mere impressions of past experiences, it being *sarvada anubhavasvabhāva*, i.e., of the nature of an eternal presentative experience.

According to another view—its intelligence con-

stitutes its irresistible will power (*avyāhata kriyāśakti*) and therefore it does not require any other form of desire and effort, so that altogether its attributes are six in number.

As freedom presupposes prior bondage, it cannot be said to be *mukta* or free, and it also cannot be in bondage, the bonds of the miseries, etc., being impossible in its case. And thus we may say that it is *nityamukta*, eternally free.

## THE NATURE OF RELIGION : THE VIEW OF A MODERN SCIENTIST.

I propose in the present paper to discuss Prof. Eddington's view of religion in relation to his view of the world of science and of the familiar world of sense.

Prof. Eddington's religious theory is closely bound up with his general position and may be best considered in relation to the latter. Hence it may be considered under the following heads :—

### 1. *The Constituents of Experience*

The constituents of experience, according to Eddington, are :—

- (a) *Mental Images*. These are in our minds and not in the external world ;
- (b) *The counterpart of our sense-experience*. It is in the external world and is inscrutable ; and
- (c) *A set of pointer-readings which science connects with other pointer-readings*.

(a), according to Eddington, is a construction out of (b), while (c). i. e. the world of mathematical equations and symbols, is an abstraction from it.

We shall now consider (c), (a) and (b) separately.

First consider (c). It is the *world of physics* and is amenable to treatment under the following heads :-

- (1) The materials of "field physics." These are relations and relata. In the end we are left with sixteen co-efficients for each relation, ten of them being symmetrical from which geometry and mechanics are constructed, and six of them asymmetrical from which is derived the science of electro-magnetism.
- (2) The physics of discontinuity which deals with (a) quanta and (b) electrons. But these are discovered by the empirical methods of the laboratory,

Now consider (a), i.e., the familiar world of sense. It is a mental construction. The secondary qualities, i.e., colour temperature, etc., as well as the primary qualities, i.e., permanence, structure, substantiality, etc., are the products of the mind's faculty of world-building.

Lastly, consider (b), i.e., the inscrutable counterpart of the sense-world and the world of science. Eddington opines that this background may be conceived as being a "spiritual substratum." It is not mental activity or consciousness but may be conceived as mind-stuff, "more general than our conscious minds, but...not altogether foreign to the feelings in our consciousness." As stuff, however, it is not substance, but only a basis of world-building. It may be noted that (b) is sometimes treated as an objective basis and sometimes as continuous with our conscious life,



## II. *The Nature of Religious Experience.*

Religion springs from our spiritual nature. We construct a "spiritual environment" in response to our spiritual nature just as we construct the world of sense in response to our sense-endowed being. Our spiritual environment is "just another world comparable to the material world of familiar experiences" and is "no less real" than the latter.

The reality of the spiritual world is, however, conceived from one of the following three different standpoints :

(1) Sometimes the *objective* standpoint is maintained as when Eddington speaks of our "deeper feelings" as "glimpses of a reality transcending the narrow limits of our particular consciousness."

(2) Sometimes again the standpoint of a *qualified subjectivity* is substituted for that of pure objectivity as when Eddington speaks of the higher reality as continuous with our consciousness and as "Universal Mind or Logos."

(3) Lastly, sometimes even qualified subjectivity is given up and we have pure, *unqualified subjectivity instead*. "We see in nature," Eddington says, "what we are equipped to look for" ; we "build the spiritual world out of symbols taken from our personality." Indeed Eddington sometimes goes so far as to affirm that value and significance are projections of our spiritual nature on a valueless, non-significant reality.

If we now consider Eddington's different lines of thought critically, we are at once struck by his view of science as a sort of symbolism restricted only to

certain physical aspects of the universe. He evidently equates science to the science of physics and is not disposed to regard the biological, psychological and other sciences with the same degree of favour or approval as he seems to do in regard to mathematical physics and its differential and other equations. And thus he misses what is essential to a fruitful scientific outlook, viz. the unity and interdependence of the different science, biological, physiological and psycho-sociological. What modern science is trying to build up is a system, symbolic it may be, but permitting of quantitative and qualitative relations between physical, physiological and psycho-sociological phenomena. It is now possible, e.g., to proceed mathematically from physical energies and their quantities to their equivalents in sensational intensity or distinctness and also to their physiological reactions and thence to their psychological values in respect of reaction-time and other temporal and quantitative aspects of cognitive experience. Eddington's view, in fact, will result in a physical science of pointer-readings altogether separated from the rest of the sciences.

And it is not only the symbolic world of pointer-readings that thus gets detached from the rest of the sciences in Eddington's world-view; the familiar world and the objective background of the familiar and scientific worlds are also disrupted and sundered from each other. The unity of the world of experience is thus dissolved into three independent and diverse realms. Experience is one unitary whole

which we differentiate into subjective and objective elements comprised in the whole. Eddington, however, exalts into a fixed division of mental images, objective substratum and pointer-readings what are only constructed distinctions within a unitary experience. Such tripartite disruption, though not in itself illegitimate, is only admissible within such limits as will permit the reconstitution of the whole or unity which has been thus sundered into independent elements. Eddington's three strata, however, are so sundered both in origin and character as to preclude all reconstruction of the original unity of experience.

The same defect of want of cohesion also characterises Eddington's view of religion as an experience of a spiritual reality. He gives us three alternative standpoints which do not admit of unification into an intelligible whole or unity.

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## THEORIES OF VALIDITY IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

The present paper will deal with the Indian treatment of the question of validity and invalidity. A logical presentation of the discussions will be attempted and the aim will be to bring out the distinctive Indian contribution to the problem as far as possible.

There are four different theories of validity and invalidity in Indian Philosophy, viz, the Sāṅkhya theory of intrinsic validity and intrinsic invalidity, the Buddhist theory of intrinsic invalidity and extrinsic validity, the Nyāya theory of extrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity and the Mimāṃsaka theory of intrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity. The Vedāntists (i. e. the Śāṅkarites) subscribe to the Mimāṃsaka theory, only differing from the Mimāṃsakas in their view of empirical cognition as a temporal modalisation of the Pure Intelligence which is timeless.

The Buddhists, the Naiyāyikas and the Mimāṃsakas regard cognition as a temporal mental event arising from empirical causes that can be definitely ascertained. The Sāṅkhya and the Śāṅkara-Vedānta distinguish between two kinds of cognition, viz., (1) cognition as a temporal event which is assignable to definite empirical causes, and (2) cognition as timeless which is the presupposition of empirical cognition in time.

The empirical self, according to Sāṅkhya, is a transformation of the Intelligence-illuminated primal matter or Prakṛti and empirical cognition is a function or state of the empirical self generated by certain objective and subjective causes. Since the effect, according to Sāṅkhya, is pre-existent in the material cause, the validity or the opposite of cognitions as generated events must be regarded as being somehow inherent in the cognitions. You cannot make anything out of anything, the Sāṅkhya philosopher argues, and so the action of the cause can bring out only that which is inherent in the casual ground. By no device could the causal substance be made to yield what is not inherent therein, or otherwise the unreal and the fictitious like the sky-flower would be capable of being produced by causes.<sup>1</sup>

The Sāṅkhya view is not accepted by the Mimāṃsakas who favour a theory of intrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity. The Mimāṃsakas point out that the Sāṅkhya view falls with its doctrine of causality of which it is a logical corollary. The notion of pre-existent effects is, according to them, the negation of the very essence of causation as a process of real effectuation. If the effect pre-exists in the cause and the cause only manifests the pre-existent effect, the manifestation is itself something that did not exist and comes into existence through the action of the cause. And thus the Sāṅkhya has to admit the manifestation as a new beginning. Further, how can

1. Gaganakusumādināmapyutpattiprasaṅgāt : "Mānameyodayah"  
T. S. S. p. 74.

validity and invalidity be alike inherent in one and the same cognition seeing that they are contradictories of each other like fire and water ?<sup>1</sup> Nor is the difficulty obviated by the assumption that validity is intrinsic to the valid cognition and invalidity is intrinsic to the invalid cognition. For in the absence of any reference to extraneous tests, how can cognition intrinsically determine itself as valid or invalid ?<sup>2</sup>

The Naiyāyikas also reject the Sāṅkhya view as untenable. If cognitions, they argue, were either intrinsically true or intrinsically false, they could not lead to unsuccessful practical reaction. But practical maladjustments and consequent disappointments are very common occurrences of life.<sup>3</sup>

The Buddhists accept the Sāṅkhya theory of intrinsic invalidity and reject the Sāṅkhya theory of intrinsic validity. Since cognition reveals the momentary, *sui generis* real as a stable object related to other objects by causality and co-essentiality, all cognition, the Buddhist argues, must be inherently false as being the cognition of a conceptual fiction (*avastu*). Metaphysically, therefore, every cognition must be regarded as intrinsically invalid, and the so-called valid cognitions are accepted as such only as leading to certain desired results and not as revealing reality or the true nature of things. Hence validity

2. Payahpāvakayorivātyantavireddhayoh prāmāṇyāprāmāṇyayoh kathamekasminerva jñāne samāveśa, "Mānameyodayah". (T. S. S. p. 75)

3. Kāraṇāntaranirapekṣasya jñānasyaivopalambhaHetutve kim kva jñāne bhavātīti sakyam vivektum : "Sāstradīpikā" (C. S. S. p. 36)

4. Pravṛttasya visamvādadarsanāt : "Nyāyamanjari" (V.S.S.p. 160)

is extrinsic and of practical significance only while invalidity is inherent in the nature of cognitions as representations of stable objects.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas reject the Buddhist theory of intrinsic invalidity on the following grounds. They point out that a theory of intrinsic invalidity cannot account for the facts of unsuccessful practical reaction. Besides, every instance of a cognition cannot be made out as the cognition of a conceptual void. Even some forms of non-valid cognition are without an objective-presentative basis. A *samśaya*, or doubt, e. g., arises only when some object is actually presented. An illusion of sense is similarly a misrepresentation involving a presented fact. Thus doubts and sense-illusions have an objective basis in fact and so every cognition cannot be regarded as the cognition of a conceptual void.\*

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that validity and invalidity are alike extrinsic both in respect of *utpatti* or causation and *pratipatti* or confirmation in consciousness as such. Thus according to them the causes which produce a cognition are not the causes which make it a valid or invalid cognition. Similarly the process of verification, i. e., the process whereby a cognition is recognised as valid or invalid is distinct from the process which constitutes the essence of the cognition as the apprehension of an object. Consider, e. g., the simple case of a cognition such as the perception of the blue. The mere fact that 'blue' appears

5. *Samśayaviparyayātmanah, aprāmānyasya vastutvāt : "Nyāya-manjari"* (V. S. S. p. 160.)

in consciousness does not make the cognition a valid perception of 'blue'. Provided that there are no defects of media or sensibility and provided further that the sensibilities possess the requisite potency to produce a cognition that has the logical character of validity, the resulting perception is valid or true. Moreover the cognition of blue does not immediately cognise itself as a cognition of 'blue', far less as a valid cognition of 'blue.' This is admitted by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas themselves who hold that a cognition cognises itself only mediately by inference. Nor is there any evidence to show that as soon as there is the perception of 'blue' there arises immediately following on it a cognition of the validity or invalidity of the perception in question. Introspection does not reveal any such secondary cognition following on the primary cognition.<sup>6</sup> The perception of blue as a bare cognition is thus concerned only with revealing the blue. To ascertain the truth or otherwise of the revelation we must have recourse to extraneous tests other than the cognition itself, i. e., we must put the cognition to the practical test and if it succeeds, i. e., leads to the expected results, we may accept it as valid or true.

Against the theory of intrinsic validity the Naiyāyikas raise a series of objections: Thus (1) Udayana argues that since a valid cognition is more than a cognition as such and since a cognition *qua* cognition arises from certain definite conditions, the

6. Na hi nilasamvitprasavas m nantalam yathūrtheyam nilasamvittiriti samvedanāntaramutpādayamanubhuyate : 'Nayāyamanjari' ( V. S. S. p. 168 )



valid cognition must arise from causes which include conditions in addition to those which produce a cognition as such.<sup>7</sup> (2) Besides, if a valid cognition as a form of cognition were to arise from no other conditions than those which produce a cognition as such the invalid cognition as a form of cognition must also arise from the self-same conditions. And thus a cognition which is accepted as valid as being produced by certain conditions may also for the self-same reason be rejected as false, and *vice versa*.<sup>8</sup> (3) Again, if the process by means of which a cognition is recognised as valid or invalid be identical with the process that constitutes the essence of the cognition as the revelation of an object, mental doubts and uncertainties as to whether a cognition is valid or invalid will be inexplicable. But such doubts are very common occurrences of life.<sup>9</sup>

Hence the Naiyāyikas conclude: the causes which make a cognition valid or invalid must be other than those which make it a cognition as such. Also the process which constitutes the confirmation of a cognition in consciousness as valid or invalid must be distinct from the process which constitutes the essence of the cognition as the revelation of an object. And thus validity ( and its correlative invalidity )

7. Pramāṇjñānāhetvatīkṛtāhetvadhūnō kāryatve sati tadviśeṣatvāt apramāvat : 'Mānameyodayah' ( T. S. S. p. 76. )

8. Aprāmāṇyajnānesvapi prāmāṇyam syāt, tatprāpijñānāhetunām sambhavāt : 'Mānameyodayah' ( T. S. S. p. 75. )

9. Yadi jñānagrahakapramāṇenuiva prāmāṇyapramāṇyam vā gṛhyate, tathā katham. mamedamutpannam jalajñānam pramāṇamā-pramāṇam veti samśayopapattiḥ : 'Manameyodayah' ( T. S. S. p. 75. )

must be regarded as extrinsic to the cognition both in respect of *utpatti* or causation and *pratipatti* or conscious realisation in the experience of the cogniser.

The Mimāṃsakas who favour a theory of intrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity here join issue with the Naiyāyikas. The object of cognition, they point out, is that which a cognition reveals and a cognition is a cognition only as it reveals some object. This being so, it follows that a cognition cannot fail to be valid or true from the nature of the case. For how can a cognition be a cognition and yet fail to cognise or reveal its object? And how can it reveal its object without being valid or true? Intrinsically therefore every cognition is necessarily a valid cognition of an object, and the causes which make it a cognition must also make it a valid cognition of its object.<sup>10</sup> No doubt there are cases where a cognition is rejected as false, but this is because it fails to lead to certain expected results and not because it fails to reveal its object.

The Naiyāyikas distinction between a cognition and its validity, the Mimāṃsakas argue, leads to insuperable difficulties. If a cognition be entitatively different from its validity or invalidity, then a cognition must be logically neutral, i. e., neither valid nor invalid. But a neutral cognition is a psychological fiction. Every cognition is a revelation of an object. It thus amounts to a judgment involving predication and must therefore be either true or false. A pure

10. Arthaprakāśanameva ca pramāṇakāryam arthaprakāśanasva-byhāvasyaiva tasya svahetorutpādāt : 'Nyayamanjari' ( P. 161. V. S. S. )

cognition which is neither a true nor false apprehension of an object is not a psychological detum. Besides, the alternatives valid and invalid exhaust the whole universe of cognitions between themselves so that a cognition which does not come under the one class must necessarily be included in the other. A tertiary cognition which is neither valid nor invalid is a logical absurdity<sup>11</sup> Nor does the Nyāya contention that a bare cognition is of the nature of a doubt or supposal ( and not a categorical belief ) bear close examination. Since *samśaya* or doubt, according to Nyāya, is a form of non-valid or invalid cognition (*apramā*), a bare cognition, as above explained, will amount to an invalid cognition and the conditions which produce the so-called bare or neutral cognition will also be the determinants of invalidity. But this amounts to a theory of intrinsic invalidity and involves the surrender of the Nyāya theory. Besides, the Nyāya view contradicts actual experience.<sup>12</sup>

In fact, every cognition does not present itself as a form of doubt at first. Doubt paralyses activity and if cognitions were at first of the nature of doubt, they would not prompt practical activity in any case.

11. *Dvividhaiva khalviyamupalabdhih yathārthatvāyathārthatvabhedona* : "Nyāyamanjari" p. 161. V. S. S.

*Anyatarenāpyākārenārthamanavagamāyadvijñānam nissvabhāvam syāt* : "Sāstradīpikā", C. S. S. p. 56.

*Sarvam hi vijñānam svasvabhāvadvaye antarbhitam kincit pramāṇasvabhavamavaśiṣṭamāpramāṇasvabhāvam* : "Yuktisnehapraparaṇi" C. S. S. p. 56.

12. *Na hi prāmāṇyāprāmāṇyavyatiriktam kincidapi svarūpamasti vijñānasya...pratitvirodhāt sandehasyāprāmāṇyapakṣanikṣepenāpramāṇyasya svatastvaprasangācca* . *Minameyodya*" T. S. p. 76.

The cogniser is not impelled to action by mental uncertainty but only by the certain knowledge of objects.<sup>13</sup>

Where a doubt arises in respect of the validity of a cognition, there also the cognition in the beginning is accepted as truly revealing the object. The doubt that arises is due to the subsequent perception of defects in causes or to the consciousness of contradiction.

To question the intrinsic validity of cognitions is, the Mimāṃsaka argues, to invalidate every cognition and commit logical suicide.<sup>14</sup>

For consider the test of practical fruitfulness. How can a practically fruitful experience validate a cognition without being itself similarly validated? But this leads to an intolerable infinite regress. And if the practically fruitful experience is to be accepted on its own evidence, so may also be the primary cognition which it is supposed to validate.<sup>15</sup>

Nor is practical fruitfulness always a test of validity. The practical fruitfulness of a dream-

13. Sarveṣṭmapi jñānānām sandehagrahastatvādarsanāt : "Mānameyodayah" ( T. S. S. p. 77. )

14. Arthaparicchedaḥ pravartamānah pramātā pramāṇenaiva pravartito bhavati na saṁśayāt : "Nyāyamanjarī" ( V. S. S. p. 165 ).

Yadi hi sarvameva jñānam svaviśayatathātadvadhūraṇe svayamasamartham vijñāntaramapeḍṣeta tatah...aparamapi tatheti na kascidartho janmasahasrenapyadhya vasyeteti prāmāṇyamevotsidet : "Sāstradīpikā" ( C. S. S. pp 58-9 )

15 Kimidamarthakriyādivijñānam svata eva pramānam, uta pratah Na tāvat paratah, tasyāpyarthakriyāntarāpekṣātenūnavasthūprasañ-āt Atha svata eva kima parāddhamādyajñānena, jena tasya paratahpramānyapakṣamkṣepah : "Mānameyodaya" ( T. S. S. p. 77 )

experience, e. g., does not ensure its acceptance as valid or true. A dream-thirst may often culminate in a dream-quenching of the dream-thirst, but this does not ensure the acceptance of the dream-water as a reality.<sup>16</sup>

Nor can it be said that validity is cognised through the consciousness of the absence of contradictions. For the consciousness of non-contradiction must consist either in the consciousness of non-contradiction at the time of the cognition or the consciousness of non-contradiction for all time and in all conditions. But consciousness of non-contradiction during the time a cognition lasts is no proof of validity. A cognition which is non-contradicted in its first appearance is often found to be overthrown by later experience. And non-contradiction for all time is within reach only of an omniscient being, and not a humanly attainable ideal, ignorant, imperfect beings as we are.<sup>17</sup>

Nor lastly can it be said that a cognition is validated by another numerically distinct cognition following on it.

For this secondary cognition must either be a cognition of the same object as the primary cognition or a cognition of a different object. If it be a cognition of the same object, then it is the same cognition

16. Svapnāvasthāyāmasatyapyudakāharane arthakriyavijnānadarśanāt "Sāstradīpikā", C. S. S. p. 5".

17. Nāpi bādhakābhāvaparicchedāt prāmānyaniscayah sa hi tātkūliko na paryāptah kim citkālamanutpannabādhake api kālāntare tadutpādadarśanāt sarvathā tadabhāva-stu nūsarvajnasya gocarah : "Nyāyamanjarī" ( V. S. S. p. 162 ).

repeated for the second time and must therefore require to be validated like the primary cognition. But this leads to an endless series of cognitions. And if it is contended that the series is not really endless and that it ends in a cognition that is valid in itself, the reply is, in this case there is no need of going beyond the primary cognition which may similarly be regarded as self-evident. Again, if the secondary cognition be the cognition of a different object, then there is no sense in speaking of a harmony between the primary and the secondary cognition. How can the cognition of a pillar (*stambhajñāna*) be made to consist with the cognition of a pitcher (*kumbhajñāna*) and thereby validate or confirm the latter ?<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, Udayana's argument in proof of the extrinsic character of validity is confuted by a counter-argument which proves the opposite conclusion. Thus one may reason as follows : a valid cognition cannot be the product of any additional excellence or any additional absence of defects in the causes of a cognition as such, because it is a form of cognition just as invalid cognition which is a form of cognition is not due to any such additional factors. And this counter-argument has logical priority over Udayana's argument because it is based on a *hetu* or

18. Koayam samvāda nāma kimuttaram tadviṣayam jñānamātrām aho svidarthakriyājñānamiti, Adye pakṣe cottarasamvādātpurvapurva-pramāṇatām vadanto nādhigaccheyurantam yugasatairapi. Sudūramapi gatvā tu prāmānyam yadi kasyachit svata evābhidhiyate ko dvoṣaḥ prathamam prati. Atha anyaviṣayajñānamapyasya samvāda ucyate tadayuktam adarśanāt na hi stambhajñānam kumbhajñānasya samvādah "Nyāyamanjarī". ( V. S. S., pp. 162-63 )

ground which is presupposed by the *hetu* or ground advanced by Udayana in his argument. Thus Udayana argues from the specific character of valid cognition as valid and concludes that this special character of validity must involve additional special factors in the assemblage of causal conditions. But this counter-argument is based on the generic character of valid cognition as a form of cognition as such and thus rests on a non-specific ground or *hetu* (*aviśeṣaṇahetuja*) Since a cognition must first of all be a cognition before it can be either a valid or an invalid cognition, it follows that what is involved in its nature as a cognition as such must have logical precedence (*śiḡhrabhāvi*) over its implications as a valid or invalid cognition.<sup>19</sup>

Hence the Mimāṃsakas conclude : every cognition is intrinsically valid or true. Where a cognition is rejected as false it is either because it is contradicted by some other cognition or because it is perceived to arise from defective causes. Invalidation or rejection is thus determined by extraneous factors. It does not arise from anything in the nature of the cognition itself but only from its relation to a contradictory cognition or a cognition of defects in its causes.

There are no doubt cases where a secondary cognition contradicting the primary cognition may itself be infected with doubt, but as such doubt is liable to

19. *Pramāṇa* gunadoṣābhāvayoranyatarādhinā na bhavati jñānatvād apramāvadityanumānena bādhitaviśayatvād Saviśeṣaṇahetuḥ prācīnānumānādaviśeṣaṇahetujasyānyānumānasya śiḡhrapravṛtṭyupapattiriyuktam ca prācīnānumānasya bādhitaviśayatvam "Mānameyodaya" (T. S. S. p. 76)

be resolved by a tertiary cognition following on the secondary cognition, there is no reason for apprehending a *regressus ad infinitum*. Nor does this entail a surrender of the doctrine of intrinsic validity. Where the tertiary cognition is in agreement with the primary cognition, the tertiary cognition only removes the false sense of invalidity which temporarily disturbed the intrinsic validity of the primary cognition. It thus plays a negative part only and does not lend any positive support to the primary cognition which shines forth as intrinsically true as soon as the disturbing factor is removed. Where the tertiary cognition confirms the secondary cognition, it dispels the doubt and strengthens the consciousness of contradiction and thereby overthrows the primary cognition as false or invalid. Hence the primary cognition validates itself through itself and is invalidated only by a secondary or tertiary cognition other than itself. Thus cases of a serial succession of cognitions present no special difficulty in a theory of intrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity.<sup>20</sup>

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*Note on Abbreviations :—*

- (1) T. S. S. = Trivandram Sanskrit Series.
- (2) C. S. S. = Chowkhamba „ „
- (3) V. S. S. = Vizianagram „ „

20. Yatrāpi kva cidbādhakapratyaye saṁśayo jāyato jātāpi tṛtīyajñānāpekṣanānavasthā na ca svataḥ prāmāṇyahāniḥ yatra prathamavijñānasamvadi tṛtīyajñānamutpādyate tatprathamasya prāmāṇyamaotsargikam sthitameva dvitīya vijñānāropitālikakālūṣya-saṁlikānirūkaranam tvasya tṛtīyena kriyate na tvasya samvādātpāmāṇyam yadi tu dvitīyajñānasamvādi tṛtīyam jñānam tadā prathamasyāprāmāṇyam taccaparata iṣṭameva. "Nyāyamanjari" (V. S. S., p. 166.)



## **THE SANKHYA THEORY OF KNOW- LEDGE IN RELATION TO SOME OTHER EASTERN AND WESTERN THEORIES**

It is proposed in the present paper to expound the Sankhya theory of knowledge in detail and incidentally to discuss some of the kindred eastern and western theories by way of comparison and contrast. The enquiry will be confined to the purely philosophical issues and the aim will be to present Sāṅkhya Philosophy in relation to Philosophy in general in respect of its contribution to the problem of knowledge.

Notable amongst the Hindu theories of cognition besides the Sankhya are the Idealistic theory of the Vedāntist and the Realistic theory of the Nyāya Schools. The Purvamīmāṃsā realism represents an intermediate position—a sort of half-way house between uncompromising Vedānta Idealism of Pure Thought and the extreme realism of the Nyāya Philosophy. The Sāṅkhya theory is of peculiar interest in this respect. Attempting at a synthesis of the irreducible given with self-pointing, self-revealing thought, it combines in itself the weak points both of idealism and realism. But despite these inherent difficulties of its task, it tackles the knowledge-problem with a thoroughness and a conscious

perception of the issues involved that will repay serious study even at the present day.

We shall preface our exposition of the Sāṅkhya view with an account of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā theories and incidentally we shall also refer to the Vedānta theory and some of the kindred western theories as throwing light on Sāṅkhya realism proper.

(( According to the Naiyāyika, cognition is a quality (*guṇa*) of the self as substance (*dravya*), a quality that originates under certain special conditions and has the character of referring beyond itself. Hence cognition is non-eternal quality of the self, a quality which the self may be with or without and which appears only as certain special conditions are fulfilled. Cognition according to Nyāya is thus an inessential attribute of self-substances; it belongs to self-substances, and self-substances alone, but it does not constitute self-substances nor is otherwise essential to or inseparable from self-substances. As a matter of fact in the state of transcendental freedom (the Mokṣa state) the self becomes a pure substance (a *śuddhadravya*) and becomes free not merely from pleasure, pain and the miseries of life (*Samsāra*) but also from all forms of experience including *Jñāna* or cognition. And even in the empirical life there are states of pure unconsciousness when the self becomes a pure substance devoid of all forms of experience. Cognition is not a constituent of the self, nor is it an inseparable attribute of the self as such though in the supreme self (the *Paramātman*) it abides as an eternal quality, a timeless intuition of all

things that are or may be. Cognition thus, according to Nyāya, is not a relation but a quality and a quality only of self-substances. It is related to the self by the relation of inherence and is not itself a relation but a quality. But as a quality inhering in the self, its nature is to transcend itself, to refer beyond itself to reveal something other than itself. Thus cognition does not cognise itself but something different from itself; it reveals the *visaya* or object and not itself. It is related to the *visaya* or *object* by the relation of *visiyatā*,—the relation of objectifying or making an object of it. Thus it is subject to a two-fold relation: It is related to the self by the relation of *Samavāya* or inherence and it is related to the object by the relation of objectifying (*visiyatā*). The Nyāya view of cognition furnishes a contrast in this respect to that of the Rāmānujists who also conceive cognition to be an attribute of the self as substance. The Rāmānujists are idealists and regard intelligence as an essential quality of the self. (Cf. Śrībhāṣya Thibaut's English Tr., 1, 1, 1.) "Nor can it be said", as says Rāmānuja "that this 'I', the knowing subject, is dependent for its light on something else. It rather is self-luminous; for to be self-luminous means to have consciousness for one's essential nature. Analogously to the lamp, the self is essentially intelligent (*kid-rupa*), and has intelligence (*kaitanya*) for its quality. And to be essentially intelligent means to be self-luminous," (Ved. Sut. Eng. Tr. 1, 1, 1, pp. 58-60). The conception of intelligence being essential to the self is however repugnant to the Naiyāyika realist

according to whom reality is wider than thought, the latter being no more than an accident, an ephemeral quality or function of a section or part of reality. Rāmānujists contend that since the Absolute is an Omnipersonality, i. e., an Inclusive Self or Atman of which intelligence is an essential quality, reality is essentially intelligence or self-revealing. But Naiyāyikas reject this idealistic conception of intelligence as constitutive of reality. Thought does not constitute reality, it is not even a constitutive or essential character of the self whose quality it is. As a matter of fact, there are states, both empirical and transcendental, in which the self lapses into pure unconsciousness, into the non-intelligent Being of a free self-substance. Naiyāyikas also repudiate the Rāmānujist conception of intelligence as *svayamprakāśa* or self-revealing. Rāmānujists hold that intelligence or consciousness is self-revealing in the sense that it reveals itself to its own substrate by means of its own activity. A stone, e. g., is not self-revealing as it does not reveal itself to its own substrate: it has being-for-another, no being-for-self. Not so however intelligence or consciousness. It reveals itself to its own substrate by its own being: it has being-for-self in and through itself at the time of its appearance. Thus a past state may be revealed to its substrate, the self, by another state, but is not so revealed either by itself or at the time of its occurrence. There is no consciousness without object, but this by itself does not deprive it of *svayamprakāśatva* in the above sense of being revealed to its substrate, the self,

through its own being, Says the "Śrībhāṣya". "The essential nature of consciousness—or knowledge—consists therein that it shines forth, or manifests itself, through its own being to its own substrate at the present moment", ( Thibaut's Tr., p. 48 ). And it adds "that knowledge is of the nature of light depends altogether on its connexion with the knowing 'I': it is due to the latter, that knowledge, like pleasure, manifests itself to that conscious person who is its substrate, and not to anybody else." Again ( p. 63 ), "as the knowing self is eternal, knowledge which is an essential quality of the self is also eternal. Consciousness besides is an essential, and therefore eternal, quality of the self which is itself eternal, but knowledge in itself unlimited, is capable of contraction and expansion .....In the so-called *kṣhetragñā*-condition of the self, knowledge is, owing to the influence of work (*karma*), of a contracted nature, as it more or less adapts itself to the work of different kinds, and is variously determined by the different senses. With reference to this various flow of knowledge as due to the senses, it is spoken of as rising and setting" ( p. 63 ). Thus according to Ramanujists, knowing supposes both the knowing subject and an object known. And the knowing reveals both itself and the object to its substrate, the knowing self or subject. Further it reveals the object as *jāda* or non-intelligent datum while it reveals itself as *ajāda*, i. e., as intelligent cognition of the non-intelligent datum. But it does not reveal itself to itself but only to its own substrate, the

knowing subject or self which is also intelligent as knowing self as distinguished from the non-intelligent datum known. And further, according to them, knowledge owes its character of self-revelation-to-its-substrate to its connection with the latter : it is owing to connexion with the self-revealing knower which reveals itself to itself that knowledge reveals itself to its substrate. The knower would not be knower without knowing itself as a knower of objects known, and the knower would not know itself as such without Intelligence. Intelligence is thus an essential quality of the self and is, like the self, eternal. The Naiyāyikas agree with the Rāmānujists only up to a certain point. Cognition is a quality of the self, but not, as Rāmānujists think, an essential and eternal quality of it. Nor does it necessarily reveal itself to its substrate in revealing an object different from itself. It reveals itself only in a secondary act of retrospection, and even then it *reveals itself as an object known and not as subjective knowing*. It is thus not generically distinct from other qualities as intelligent knowing (*ajāda*) from non-intelligent data known as Rāmānujists think. On the contrary it is generically of the same nature as other qualities ; it is objective like the rest of qualities, only specifically differing from them as revealing objects and qualifying the particular set of substances called self-substances. Rāmānujists distinguish between intelligence as an essential, eternal quality of the self and the temporal-spatial limitations of intelligence in the self in its *ksetrajña*-condition. But no

such essential eternal intelligence in the self as knower is admitted by the Naiyāyika realist according to whom cognition does not constitute, but only reveals reality. Further, as we have seen above, Naiyāyikas admit non-intelligent conditions of the self, states of suspended intelligence or consciousness, when the self becomes free from the trammels of experience. Against this Naiyāyika view however it is urged by the opponent that such existence without consciousness is not removed very far from dead materiality. Nyāya realism is therefore no better than Cārvāka materialism. The Naiyāyika meets this objection by distinguishing between the self as spiritual substance and the atoms and their compounds which are material substances. But since the Naiyāyika can justify this distinction of substances only by a differentiation of their respective functions, cognition as a function of self-substances must be allowed to constitute its proper substrate. This, however, the Naiyāyika as a realist is not prepared to admit.

Śankara-Vedāntism is the antithesis in this respect to Nyāya realism. The Naiyāyika makes cognition dependent on reality : cognition does not make reality, it only reveals it. The Śankara-Vedāntist, on the contrary, resolves reality to cognition, to the illumination of reality. Take away illumination, and reality is engulfed in darkness, in a blank void. Reality is illumination of reality ; being is *prakāśa* of being—or rather being is nothing but *prakāśa* which is the light that reveals, Reality as a pure datum, reality as object of cognition and therefore as other of cognition,

is an illusory fiction, an unreal projection of māyā (which is the principle of Cosmic Hallucination). The Self as knower is pure light of consciousness. The self as knowing subject distinct from pure consciousness, the Self as a being that illumines as distinct from illumination as such is an unsubstantial fiction, an illusory projection of nescience. Reality is illumination and the Self is real only as pure self-luminous light. Self as anything else than the light that reveals, self as substance or subject or being distinct from pure consciousness, is the other of reality and therefore unreality or illusory appearance. Nothing therefore is real except Pure Intelligence, undifferented self-shining Thought. The object of thought as the other of thought is self-contradictory and therefore indescribable. The subject likewise as distinct from thought as such is indescribable and inconceivable. What reveals itself in all thought is pure self-positing self-revealing thought. The world is the play of free self-positing Thought ; it is the free Intelligence objectifying itself as a system of causally-linked appearances.

The Naiyāyika however repudiates the Śāṅkara-Vedāntist equation of thought and reality. The so-called identity of being and thought is, according to him, an idealistic delusion which the commonsense practical world of facts does not substantiate. The world of practice is based, according to the Naiyāyikas, on an essential distinction between thought and reality, between cognition and the object it reveals. Thought is neither reality nor coextensive with reality



as one of its essential or inseparable aspects. It is an ephemeral quality or attribute of the self, an attribute that is generated under peculiar conditions. The self becomes conscious only when there is a special relation of contact between the self and the mind and between the mind and a particular cogitable content. Thought therefore is a function not of substances in general but only of self-substances or souls and of these only as certain peculiar conditions are fulfilled. It is a matter of common experience that this is so, and experience proves it as conclusively as it disproves the Vedānta equation of reality and pure thought. Thought thus is thought of reality and is not itself reality. It is the very nature of thought to point beyond itself, to refer to that which is not itself. Without the *visaya*, the external object to think of, thought is an unreal abstraction. Thought thus always looks beyond itself, refers to an object different from itself. Its nature as a quality of the self is to reveal not itself, but an object as the other of itself. Thought thus does not think itself, but only the object which is not itself. In this way subjective thought transcends itself and comprehends the external transcendent object.

How, then does thought know itself? Or does it never know itself? If thought knows only the object it thinks, is it anything entitatively different from its object? Is it other than the object, or just the object thought? If thought is the object thought, how does the object thought differ from the object-in-itself? If thought is not itself the object, if thought is thought

of or thought *about* the object, how does it differ as *thought* from the object of which it is a thought? Further, how does the object-in-itself differ from the object thought of? What, in other words, does the object gain by being revealed to, or apprehended by, thought? The Naiyāyika answers these questions from the realistic standpoint. Thought is neither the object nor a phase or aspect of the object thought. Thought is thought *of* or thought *about* reality. All the same, thought does not think itself, but only an other of itself, a *visaya* or object from which it is distinguished as *visayin* or thought of the object. The very nature of thought as *visayin* is to comprehend not itself but an object other than itself as *visaya*. Thought therefore is the subjective activity of apprehending an object as an object. To know it in its distinctive character of a subjective cognitive act it must itself be made the object of a secondary retrospective act. In other words, the primary act of apprehension of the object must itself be apprehended in a secondary act of retrospection. Introspection therefore is retrospection: it is only the holding of the primary knowing act as an object to a secondary cognition. In this way we know thought as subjective apprehension (*visayin*) of an object (*visaya*) which it apprehends but does not constitute. It follows that thought adds nothing to the object. The object-in-itself gains nothing in the process of being an object thought. The new relation to an apprehending knowing act (*visayin*) makes no difference to the *visaya* or object. The Naiyāyikas

repudiate the Bhāṭṭa conception ( the Bhāṭṭas are followers of Kumārila Bhāṭṭa, a Mīmāṃsaka Philosopher) of an apprehendedness ( *Jñātatā* ) accruing to the object in consequence of its being known. The assumption of an *apprehendedness* being generated in the object in consequence of its being subjectively cognised in a cognitive act will make the cognition of the past and the future impossible. The past is no more and the future is not yet. They are thus alike non-existent. If therefore the cognition of the past or the future object should generate in either a new property of apprehendedness, even the non-existent must be supposed to acquire new properties as existent positive characters. But this is clearly absurd. Therefore there is no such thing as an apprehendedness generated in the object in the process of being known. The object-in-itself is only the object out of relation to the knowing act. The object known is the object ( *viśaya* ) of the subjective apprehension ( *viśayin* ).

The Nyāya view of cognition as revealing not itself but the object is opposed to the doctrine of cognition as self-luminous, a doctrine which is common to the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, the Sāṅkhya and the Śāṅkara-Vedānta Schools. The doctrine that cognition reveals only that which is not itself is, according to the Naiyāyika, a necessary implication of the realism that accords only a secondary place to cognition in the order of being. The Prābhākara here joins issue with the Naiyāyika and contends that realism does not necessarily com-

mit one to any such view about the nature of cognition. In fact, the immediate evidence of consciousness establishes not merely a cognition of an other but also a simultaneous cognition of the cognition, an awareness of the awareness. An act of cognition may be said to be self-luminous in this sense. It points not merely to an object beyond itself but also, and in the same act, turns towards itself, apprehends itself as apprehending a beyond or other of itself. The Prābhākara develops this doctrine in connection with its particular theory of triune perception (*triputisamvitpratyakṣa*) which he opposes to the Nyāya theory. According to him, an act of perception is at once an awareness of the object perceived, of the subjective perceptive act and of the subject perceiving. The object is perceived as the apprehended, the act as subjective apprehension and the subject as the apprehending or cognising agent. Each thus is apprehended in its own proper form, the object as the apprehended, the act as subjective apprehension, and the subject as the apprehender or cogniser. The Naiyāyika, according to the Prābhākara, has allowed his realism to impugn the immediate evidence of consciousness. The realistic doctrine of cognition does not require a denial of the self-illumination of consciousness. Consciousness may know itself without forfeiting thereby its capacity to know simultaneously an external, transcendent object.

The Nyāya and Prābhākara-Mimāṃsā views are the parallels in this respect to the doctrines of some

of the European realists of the present day. The Nyāya view of cognition as looking beyond itself has its echo in contemporary thought in John Laird's realistic theory of cognition. In his contribution to the "Contemporary British Philosophers Series". Prof. Laird, in expounding his theory of cognition, observes, "Our cognitive processes are, in their usual exercise, the processes, *with* which (not *at* which) we look ; and none of them, perhaps, can look at itself. It does not follow, however, that *another* (introspective) look cannot be directed towards this process of looking. Even 'awareness of awareness,' then is not impossible, and this conclusion is consoling, since if anything *seems* to occur, introspection does. What is there except observation to acquaint us with the difference between pleasure and pain, or between belief and repugnance." Prof. Laird like the Indian Naiyāyika, thus holds to the conception of cognition as essentially self-transcendent, as always looking beyond itself. He repudiates the Bergsonian intuition of a neutral experience-flux wherein knowing coincides with the object known. The knowing act, according to him, necessarily points beyond itself to an other, to an object different from itself. The dualism of knowing and known cannot be resolved in a monistic experience-flux with which one may be said to be intuitively at one in the subliminal, infra-intellectual process of life. The distinction between cognition and its object is no pragmatic fiction born of practical need ; it is essential to the very natures of cognition, an integral part of its make-up as subjective

apprehension of an object different from itself. Hence we cannot be aware of our awareness in one and the same specious present. We can be aware of it only in retrospection, i.e., in a secondary cognitive act which makes the primary act the object of its observation. Cognition, therefore, cannot be itself cognised except in a numerically distinct cognitive act enduring in a separate specious present. This, as we have seen, is also the Nyāya view. The Naiyāyika, as a consistent realist, objectifies the subjective cognition just as Prof. Laird does. Cognition can be cognised, but only as an object, as a datum presented to a secondary cognition. The prābhākara-Mimāṃsā as we have seen joins issue here with Nyāya. Knowing cannot be unaware of itself in the act of being aware of the object. Therefore there is no cognition of an object which is not also a cognition of the cognition. But the essential distinction of knowing and known is not annulled thereby. Knowing knows itself as knowing (*samvit*), not as the known (*samvedya*). We do not know knowing as the known just as we do not know the object as subjective knowing. The Prābhākara distinction of the two kinds of knowing corresponds closely to Prof. S. Alexander's distinction of *enjoyed* and *contemplated* knowing. Like the Prābhākara Mimāṃsāka, Prof. Alexander subscribes to an awareness of awareness accompanying every act of awareness of object—an *enjoyed* awareness which goes with every awareness of an object contemplated. There is, however, in the Prābhākara conception of *self-illumination* an emphasis on the

aspect of revelation in intelligence which we miss in Prof. Alexander's concept of enjoyment. Enjoyment is an inner sympathy, a one-ness in feeling as distinguished from contemplation from without. It thus does not import self-revelation in the prābhākara sense of realisation in intelligence.

When the Prābhākara speaks of a cognition of cognition as being involved in every act of cognition of an object, he does not mean any logical mediation of subject-cognition and object-cognition. The triune character of cognition is, according to the Prābhākara only a brute datum, a given fact of experience which we must accept at its face-value. The standpoint of the Prābhākara is empirical and *a posteriori*. We have to remain satisfied, according to him, with the given togetherness of the three different awarenesses in every single act of cognition. Beyond the bare togetherness we cannot go. We cannot say whether there is mutual logical implication besides the brute conjunction. It remains true at least, the Prābhākara argues, that the cogniser is not a self-luminous subject as is his cognition. As a matter of fact, the cogniser has states of unconsciousness in which it remains steeped in darkness. The same is true of the object cognised. The object is not the cognition of the object and may very well be without being cognised at all. The inseparability therefore is not an inseparability of the subject, the object and the cognition of the latter by the former. It is merely an inseparability of the subject-cognition, the cognition of the cognition and the object-cognition—the given together-

ness of every cognition of an object with a cognition of the cognition and cognition of the cogniser. And this inseparability is a brute conjunction which proves nothing as regards any mutual logical implication.

The Naiyāyika and the Prābhākara agree in respect of their methods of approach. Both appeal to introspective evidence, to the immediate deliverance of consciousness, though they differ in their respective accounts of what consciousness really delivers. Cognition, according to both, is therefore to be taken at its face-value: it is what it presents itself as in actual experience. The realism of the Sāṅkhya stands contrasted in this respect with Nyāya and Prābhākara realism. The Naiyāyika and the Prābhākara arrive at realism on the way of psychology through analysis of the actual report of consciousness. Cognition, according to them, does not present itself except as dependent on and therefore externally related to the *cognitum*, to the transcendent external object. The very nature of cognition as revealed to introspective analysis thus points to an independent reality-in-itself. This is how, according to them, we are assured of independent realistic objects-in-themselves. The Sāṅkhya, however, follows a different method. From experience as given it argues to the not-given presuppositions of experience. Its method is thus metapsychological and transcendental and differs from the psychological methods of Nyāya and Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsā. Cognition, according to Sāṅkhya, can be understood fully only by going beyond and behind it to its transcendental presuppositions, its antecedent



generative conditions. Empirical cognition, cognition as a mental event in time is a compound—a composite psychic process that results from the illumination of the Primal Matter which is Prakṛti as a pure datum, by the Transcendental Subject which is Puruṣa as pure light of consciousness. Cognition as a temporal event is thus a transformation of Prakṛti resulting from Puruṣa's illumination of the latter. It is the pure intelligence imprisoned as it were in a temporal mode of Prakṛti as empirical psychic process or mind-stuff referring beyond itself to corresponding matter-stuff. The correspondence and objective reference of the mental content points, according to Sāṅkhya, to a neutral matter of experience from which both the mental and the nonmental arise. This neutral experience-stuff is Buddhi which is a transformation of Prakṛti, the indeterminate transcendental object. This neutral experience-stuff or Buddhi is not given in experience : it is presupposed in experience and can be reached only by criticism and transcendental analysis. It may be presented also in a special intuition ( cf. Pātaṅjala Sāṅkhya ) but cannot be given in our practical, relational experience. But even Buddhi does not explain experience fully : a neutral experience-matter differentiating into conscious mind-stuff and intelligible matter-stuff implies a union of intelligence as self-revealing light and a non-intelligent datum as that which gets revealed by self-revealing intelligence. Hence as the preconditions of a world of experience we must assume two ultimate metempirical principles—

Puruṣa, the Transcendental Subject and Prakṛti, the Transcendental Objective Background. Puruṣa is the self-luminous Intelligence that lights up experience—the light of Consciousness in which objects reveal themselves as significant contents of experience. Prakṛti is that which gets revealed by Puruṣa into a concrete world of experience—the indeterminate Object-in-itself in which things as objects of experience materialise and dematerialise in the light of Pure Intelligence which is Puruṣa.

Neither Puruṣa nor Prakṛti are objects of experience. They are the transcendental presuppositions of experience as a world of significant objects, the antecedent generative conditions of a world of experience. Hence they are not themselves experienced facts, at least in the customary meaning of experience as the equivalent of our normal, practical consciousness of a world of objects subject to the relations of space, time and causality ( cf. *Savīcārā prajñā* which means cognition of objects as space-time-and-causality-determined—*deśakāla-nimitta-āvaśchinna* ). They are the not-given presuppositions of experience which we discover by analysis and criticism. The method of the Sankhya in this respect has a close family likeness to Kant's transcendental critical method: from experience as the given it works back to its not given presuppositions. But in one aspect of it the Sankhya method is removed from the Kantian critical standpoint. Kant will not allow a positive knowledge of the transcendental principles that make experience possible. Any assumption of

a positive knowledge of these is inconsistent with the critical standpoint proper and implies a capacity of non-sensuous intuition which we do not possess. We have thus only a negative knowledge of these transcendental principles : we know them only as not given in experience, we do not know them in themselves except as an unknowable X. Sankhya however goes farther than Kant. Repudiating relational sensuous experience of these noumenal principles, Sankhya yet claims for them an infra-empirical, metapsychological intuition in Yogika realisation—an intuition which is free from the forms and relations of normal, empirical consciousness. We have thus not merely a negative knowledge of these transcendental principles, we have also a positive knowledge of these in non-relational, non-sensuous intuition below the level of our normal, relational experience of things through sense-given data.

The Sankhya conception of a non-relational, non-empirical intuition is an essential part of its theory of knowing as an empirical, temporal event. Empirical knowing according to Sankhya is a composite effect, a transformation of Prakṛti shining by the light of Puruṣa which is Pure Intelligence. But the given union of Prakṛti-Puruṣa in experience does not affect either their logical contrariety of nature or their ontological independence and disjunction of essence. In fact, Yogika intuition is a realisation of this essential disjunction and separation despite their actual commingling in experience—a de-realisation of the empirical connection involved in the realisa-

tion of their essential detachment and logical opposition. Empirical knowing, according to Sankhya, is thus rooted in an original unreason. Involving as it does a union of logically opposed and distinct principles, it points to a beginningless non-discrimination (*aviveka*) at the source of the beginningless chain of experience which we call *samsāra*. It is this beginningless unreason that leads through *sānnidhya* or bare togetherness of Prakṛti and Puruṣa to that closer union (*samyoga*) which brings on a world of experience. Sānnidhya is a bare relation of presence which by itself does not explain the closer connection of Prakṛti-Puruṣa in experience. That connection involves a deeper unreason underlying it, a beginningless *aviveka* that causes Puruṣa's attachment to Prakṛti effecting the latter's transformation into a beginningless world of experience. Experience thus is grounded in unreason : aiming at the inherently impossible task of a complete resolution of the unrelated manifold to the pure unity of thought, of the indeterminate, non-intelligent Prakṛti to the significant unity of intelligence, it is destined for ever to move from form to form in ceaseless flow. And the Sankhya thus posits, as the highest ideal, the consummation of the true freedom of Intelligence by a snapping of the cord that binds it in unholy union with Prakṛti. It is unreason, the original beginningless non-discrimination that starts the process of experience. To negate the unreason by true reason, to remove non-discrimination by the realisation of Puruṣa's essential detachment from

Prakṛti is to strike at the root of experience and reverse the whole process. This is the way to realise freedom, to restore Puruṣa to its original purity as free self-revealing Intelligence. Experience is a transformation of the indeterminate Prakṛti, a transformation that results from Puruṣa's illumination of Prakṛti. Hence experience entails Puruṣa's bondage—the imprisonment of the pure intelligence in blind, non-intelligent matter. It is Puruṣa's light that accomplishes the indeterminate Prakṛti into a world of experience. The union of Puruṣa and Prakṛti in experience is however incomplete and artificial. The formless Prakṛti, the indeterminate given manifold cannot be completely transformed into the free unity of thought. Nor can the self-revealing intelligence truly find itself in the shifting forms of non-intelligent Prakṛti. The given, the merely real, in other words, cannot be completely resolved into pure self-revealing truth. Intelligence is pure self-revealing truth, and given reality cannot be merged into pure truth without, a remainder. Hence arise the contradictions of experience, the miseries and sorrows of life, the disappointments and baffled hopes that darken mundane existence. Rooted in unreason it can produce only irrational longings, futile hopes, desires that can never attain their objects. To negate experience by negating the basal unreason is to recover Puruṣa's lost status as eternally self-accomplished Intelligence, to be free from the dominion of matter, to conquer material hunger.

The Sankhya theory of knowledge, it will be seen,

rests on a distinction between Pure Intelligence and empirical knowing. Puruṣa is Pure Intelligence, eternally self-revealing light of consciousness. As the light that reveals experience, it is itself eternally self-revealing. As the Intelligence that accomplishes non-intelligent Prakṛti into a world of intelligible objects, it is eternally self-accomplished Intelligence. Puruṣa is thus the eternally self-accomplished truth that shines forth in experience, the self-positing Intelligence that reveals all things. Pure Intelligence reflecting itself into Prakṛti effects the so-called empirical cognitions of our temporal lives. An empirical cognition is a temporal mode of Prakṛti shining by the light of Pure Intelligence which is timeless and eternal. Empirical cognitions appear and disappear in temporal succession in accordance with causal laws and in relation to their respective objects. Pure Intelligence is unaffected by the process : it does not become with the becoming of its temporal ectypes. The eternally self-accomplished Intelligence is not itself accomplished in the history of a world which it causes to appear. There is thus, according to Sankhya, cognition not merely as a temporal event with a concrete empirical mould conformally to the shape of a corresponding empirical object, but also, and as the presupposition of the temporal knowing act, pure timeless Intelligence as that which illumines both itself and its temporal unfolding in experience. Puruṣa is this timeless Intelligence. As accomplisher of all things, it is accomplished in itself independently of Prakṛti. It is thus unlike its temporal ectype not

merely as timeless and eternal but also as free self-accomplished truth. Empirical cognition is object-mediated cognition and is true only as corresponding in nature and form to the essence of the object. Not so Pure Intelligence which is the presupposition of empirical cognition. As accomplishing Prakṛti it is inherently self-accomplished, self-revealing light. It is thus eternally true in itself independently of the mediation of Prakṛti. Hence it is contradictorily related to its temporal double. The latter requires the mediation of an object both in being and in being made valid or true. But Pure Intelligence is self-positing, self-validating truth and does not require the mediation of an other.

As transcendental presuppositions of experience Sankhya thus posits Puruṣa as free self-shining Intelligence and Prakṛti as the indeterminate primal matter revealed by Intelligence. The parallelism here with the main results of the Kantian *Critique* are too obvious to deserve special notice. But despite the close parallelism there are important differences that must not be overlooked in a comparative estimate of the two systems. In Sankhya c. f., we have nothing corresponding to the agnostic conclusions of the Kantian *Critique*. Sankhya does not confess to a bankruptcy of the reason in its application to the transcendental principles, to a final despair of knowledge in respect of the ultimate presuppositions of experience. Puruṣa, c. f., is not known merely as the logical implicate of our experience of a world of objects. It is also cognised as its ontological prius in

non-relational, metapsychological intuition. Nor is Prakṛti shut out from knowledge by an unsurmountable barrier—as are the Kantian things-in-themselves. A rational world of experience is Prakṛti affiliating itself, as it were, to the free, self-positing Intelligence. Through its affiliation to the self-revealing Intelligence, the non-intelligent Prakṛti, the brute datum, becomes an intelligible world of experience. The ordered world, in other words, is the indeterminate manifold reflecting into itself the unity of pure thought, the blind Prakṛti shining by the light of Puruṣa's Intelligence. The givenness of experience as a relational system points, according to Sankhya, to an original affiliation of the given plurality to the not given unity of pure truth, a beginningless illumination of Prakṛti by Puruṣa. Prakṛti-in-itself, Prakṛti without relation to Puruṣa's Illumination is an unrelated manifold, an indeterminate plurality. •Prakṛti as a determinate world is the indeterminate manifold affiliating itself to the self-determination of pure reason, to the self-accomplished light of Intelligence. The becoming of Prakṛti, the transformation of the indefinitely given manifold into the definitely known order of a significant world is no phenomenal appearance separating Prakṛti-in-itself from Prakṛti-in-experience by an unbridgeable gulf. The transformation is a real transformation of Prakṛti, an ontological becoming of the given plurality into the unity-in-plurality of an empirical world. It is out of the indeterminate, formless Prakṛti that Puruṣa calls forth a world of



experience. Worlds are thus made and unmade in Prakṛti; they are the diverse manifestations of Prakṛti in relation to Puruṣa. They are not appearances, distorted reflections of Prakṛti in Puruṣa's Intelligence. Neither are they the projections of the free Intelligence, fictitious creations of self-shining, self-positing thought. *Sankhya parināma-vāda* as a doctrine of cosmic evolution is negatively related not merely to monistic Vedānta Idealism but also to Kantian dualism of phenomena and noumena. The manifested world, according to Sankhya, is a transformation of the primal matter and is held within the bosom of the latter. The dualism of appearance and reality, of a known world of phenomena and an unknowable noumenal reality that escapes phenomenal determination is not admitted by the Sankhya. While agreeing with Kant in the main about the fundamental presuppositions of experience and their logical opposition, Sankhya yet allows a real transformation of Prakṛti as a consequence of its illumination by Puruṣa. The judgment of experience is thus according to Sankhya a description of the given reality. The real subject of our causal, temporal and spatial judgments is Prakṛti manifesting itself in experience, the definitely given world as consubstantial with and held within the indefinitely given manifold. The judgment of experience, according to Kant, has valid application only in the domain of phenomena. The subject of the empirical judgment is, according to him, the phenomenal world which is only the appearance of the noumenal reality to the

antecedent generative conditions of knowledge. The forms of phenomena supply no clue to a valid knowledge of their noumenal antecedents. The categories, Kant tells us, cannot be employed except in reference to sense-intuited data. "(In the absence of sensibility) their whole employment, and indeed all their meaning ceases." Therefore we cannot claim to have a knowledge of noumena except only in a negative sense. A knowledge of them in the positive sense, a knowledge of noumena as objects of a positive non-sensuous intuition would require a faculty of non-sensuous intuition which we do not possess. Noumena, according to Kant, can therefore be known only negatively as mere limiting concepts, i. e., as what cannot be objects of a sensuous intuition and therefore cannot possibly be the subjects of our empirical judgments involving the application of the categories to sense-intuited data. They cannot be known positively as objects of a non-sensuous intuition for such intuition we do not have. Kant thus is led to insist on the existence of noumenal principles while yet denying all experience of them through the application of the categories to sense-given data. He fails to show however how if things-in-themselves must be postulated as existing, they can yet be beyond the reach of the categories which include the notions of existence and reality. The Sankhya theory however is free from these inherent inconsistencies of the Kantian phenomenalism. Phenomena, according to Sankhya, are the noumenal realities shining by the light of Intelligence. The phenomenal world is thus

the noumenal Prakṛti, transformed into a system of intelligible objects. The metamorphosis, the transformation which results from Puruṣa's illumination of Prakṛti, entails no absolute dualism of the manifested world and its generative antecedents. The world evolves in Prakṛti and is ontologically non-distinct from it. As its antecedent generative conditions it presupposes not merely Puruṣa's Illumination but also the primal formless Prakṛti of which it is a transformation. It is through Puruṣa's Illumination that the indeterminate formless Prakṛti becomes determined as a world of forms.

The Sankhya theory of cosmogenesis thus answers more nearly to the Aristotelian dualism of God and world than to the Kantian distinction of appearance and unknowable things-in-themselves. The world is the transformation of an original, primal stuff—a passage from potentiality to actuality or form. The transformation, the transition of potentiality to actuality presupposes a *mateira prima*, a formless primal matter, viz, Prakṛti, which comes to form in the process. But the temporal unfolding of Prakṛti presupposes a timeless final cause, an unmoved mover. Puruṣa is this unmoved mover, the final cause that imparts meaning to the process and makes it empirically significant. And yet the free Puruṣa remains ontologically distinct from Prakṛti. It is Prakṛti that moves, unfolds itself in time. Puruṣa as self-revealing Intelligence reveals, accomplishes Prakṛti as a world of objects. It is not itself enriched in the process, accomplished in the accomplishment of Prakṛti

into a world of experience. To accomplish experience it must itself be eternally self-accomplished. Hence Puruṣa is timeless, self-revealing, self-accomplished truth. Prakṛti is the given manifold temporally accomplishing itself in experience. Puruṣa is eternally free Intelligence. Prakṛti is the non-intelligent datum, the given indefinite that gets defined into a significant world through Puruṣa's illumination. Puruṣa is thus the logical opposite of Prakṛti. Being its logical opposite it is also ontologically distinct from the latter. Both Puruṣa and Prakṛti are presupposed in experience. Experience is not a self-explaining, self-justifying whole. It is a temporal process that points beyond itself to a non-empirical unity and an equally non-empirical diversity or plurality. The bare plurality is not by itself significant even as a plurality ; as an unrelated plurality, a pure manifold, it is indeterminate and formless. It is only through the unity of Intelligence that the formless manifold becomes a significant plurality, a related system of object of experience. The becoming is a becoming of the plurality, the bare plurality becoming a unity-in-plurality by self-affiliation to the Unitary Intelligence. The becoming conceived as a becoming of the timeless Intelligence would render time itself meaningless and illusory. That experience involves the irreducible, the irrational surd that cannot be logically resolved into pure thought is what the Sankhya stresses in its conception of Prakṛti as the formless objective background. The concept of Prakṛti is according to Sankhya, a conceptual form-

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lation of the given indefinite, of the logically irreducible. It is presupposed in experience as a synthesis of *given* distincts, as the unifying of irreducibles. But the unity, the synthesis is not given in the plurality : it is the not-given unity of the pure Intelligence reflecting itself into the manifold that makes it into a unity-in-plurality, into the determinate plurality of an empirical world. Hence experience is a transformation of the given plurality, a transformation which is mediated by the not-given unity of pure Intelligence. The Sankhya here agrees with Kant in the main outline of his teaching in the Critique of Pure Reason. But the Sankhya repudiates Kant's dualism of phenomena and noumena approaching in this respect the Aristotelian conception of a monistic becoming of an original primal matter. The Sankhya theory in fact is metaphysics and epistemology in one, a theory of cosmogenesis which is also an account of the genesis of experience. The different stages of the becoming of Prakṛti represent, according to Sankhya, the successive stages of a world coming into being. They are thus the generative antecedents of a cosmos and our experience of it, the stages of the transition of Prakṛti from metempirical formlessness to the form of a world of experience. The becoming of Prakṛti is thus a real, ontological becoming which also may be said to be the becoming of experience. It is not a becoming in experience, mere phenomenal becoming as Kant would say, it is the becoming of Prakṛti itself, Prakṛti's descent into empiricity and manifestation. Nor are the noumenal presuppositions of an empirical world,

beyond our reach as Kant contends. They are objects of a metapsychological, metempirical intuition even if they be inaccessible to the relational sense-determined intuitions of the empirical life. We have thus a positive realisation of them in Yogika vision besides a negative knowledge of them as limiting concepts. Yoga is the ascending movement of Prakṛti corresponding to its descending movement into empiricity. It is Prakṛti dematerialising itself into initial formlessness, the empirical individual and his world dissolving back into the transcendental, noumenal background. Yogika realisation is thus both positive and negative. It is a realisation of the transcendental principles of experience by the transcending of experience, by the resolution of it into its original preconditions. It is, in fact, both objective and subjective, cosmic and individual. It is the world melting back into its original formlessness in the experience of an individual, experience negating itself, as it were, into its transcendental presuppositions. It thus culminates in a positive non-empirical intuition, a realisation of the transcendental principles together with a corresponding derealisation of their empirical transformations. A positive knowledge of noumena, according to Kant, is a transcendental Illusion. A positive realisation of them, according to Sankhya, is no illusory fiction, but actually within the reach of Yoga.

Even the Sankhya however admits a Transcendental Illusion of the Unity of Intelligence—an illusory realisation of the empirical unity of the primal mani-



fold as the fulfilment of the Transcendental Unity which reflects itself into it. This is, e. g., the idea that underlies Vijnānabhikṣu's conception of a double reflection and *pratibimbavarūpabhoga* i. e., of bhoga or experience as a reflection of the manifested Prakṛti back into the unity of Puruṣa. (C. f. Pravachana-bhāṣya I, 87). Vijnānabhikṣu urges this against the rival commentator Vācaspati Miśra who will not allow this double reflection of Puruṣa into Prakṛti and of Prakṛti back into Puruṣa. Vijnānabhikṣu contends that experience as a unity-in-plurality becomes intelligible only as Puruṣa's realisation of its reflected unity in the given plurality of Prakṛti. This realisation is the true meaning of *bhoga* or experience. *Bhoga*, is *Jñāna* or knowledge and knowledge is realisation in Intelligence. Hence experience or *bhoga* involves Transcendental realisation in Puruṣa's Intelligence. And yet timeless Intelligence as the logical presupposition of temporal becoming cannot itself become in time in the strict sense. Hence we can speak only of an illusory realisation in the Transcendental Intelligence, an illusion of *bhoga* or fulfilment which does not entail Puruṣa's actual accomplishment in time. *Bhoga* as an illusory fruition in Puruṣa, an hallucination of *bhoga* involving an element of projection as in an echo (*pratidhvani*) or reflection, is in other word, a necessary implication of Prakṛti in evolution and transformation. It is this illusion of *bhoga* or realisation in Intelligence that gives meaning to the empirical unity of Prakṛti as an accomplished fact. To be sure, Vijnānabhikṣu argues,

there are the Naiyāyikas who would repudiate an experience of experience, a knowing of knowing. Knowing according to these Naiyāyikas, is a knowing of an object. Cognition is essentially self-transcendent and thinking regarded as a thinking of thinking, i. e., as a thinking of the subjective activity of defining out an object to itself, is an absurdity. Even the Naiyāyika, however, Vijnānabhikṣu points out, indirectly confesses to a common form of knowing thereby admitting a knowing of knowing as different from the object known. How otherwise can the Naiyāyika account for the practice of designating widely different knowing acts ( such as the knowing of a jar, a piece of cloth, etc. ) as instances of knowing ? The Naiyāyika has thus to admit not merely a common form of knowing but also a knowledge of this common essence or form of the different knowing acts. Hence an experience of experience, a transcendental illusion of an empirical world in Puruṣa's Intelligence, is neither impossible nor absurd. It is, in fact, a necessary implication of experience as a transformation of the primal manifold through the reflected unity of the Pure Intelligence. Puruṣa's *bhoga*, in other words, is the last term in the process, that in which experience culminates as a significant temporal process in Prakṛti. But it is only *pratibimbavarūpabhoga*, a transcendental illusion or appearance of fruition which cannot really affect the eternally self-accomplished spirit.

The conception of the Transcendental Puruṣa as many and as inducing a pluralistic transformation of

Prakṛti into many different worlds in relation to the many Puruṣas is also another cardinal point of the Sankhya doctrine of knowledge which marks it off from Kant's theory. Kant never tires of emphasising the essential difference between the phenomenism of his Critical Philosophy and the subjectivism involved in Cartesian realism and the sensationism of Hume and Berkeley. That the subjective or mental is itself phenomenal and presupposes as its antecedent generative condition an affection of the transcendental self-in-itself by the noumenal things-in-themselves is what Kant urges against every interpretation of his teaching as a revival of the older subjectivism under a new name. Kant is thus drawn into the conception of a double affection—a noumenal affection of the noumenal self by noumenal things-in-themselves generating a noumenal manifold which appears through the interpretation of the synthetic activities of thought as a common world of experience and an empirical affection of the empirical individual by empirical objects generating the subjective private world of mental states. And the problem with which Kant is faced is to account for the appearance of this subjective private world which is the possession of a single individual mind, i.e., to explain the possibility of a class of objects which while originating through the conditions of empirical objectivity in general, should yet be restricted to one single individual mind. Sankhya, however, with its conception of many Puruṣas as the necessary presupposition of empirical diversity, is not faced with the inherent

difficulties of the Kantian philosophy. It is Prakṛti that evolves into a world of experience according to Sankhya, and the transformation of the non-manifest noumenal Prakṛti into the manifested world is an eventuality which is determined by Puruṣa's illumination of Prakṛti. But as there are many Puruṣas we must suppose a pluralistic illumination of Prakṛti by the many numerically distinct Puruṣas, an illumination that calls forth not a single common world or universe, but a multiverse or *pluriverse*. By the world in the singular is meant thus the conceptual class of the many different worlds that appear in Prakṛti's bosom, the empirical multiverse that blossoms forth in the noumenal Prakṛti through the illumination of the many Puruṣas. In its conception of a multi-verse as following on a pluralistic illumination of the noumenal primal matter, Sankhya is thus able to provide for the individual, the personal aspect of experience without denying to it its impersonal, purely objective side. Kant, it may be noted, in stating the knowledge-problem, is led, under the influence of his mathematico-physical preconceptions, to overemphasise the objective and impersonal factors to the detriment of its purely personal aspects. According to Kant, the problem of knowledge is virtually the problem of the possibility of self-transcendence in the subjective knowing act. "How are synthetic judgement *a priori* possible?" How can the object be determined in advance in accordance with the forms and conditions of the thinking activity?" are Kant's manner of stating the knowledge-question

with reference to its generative presuppositions. Kant is thus led to overestimate the universal and common aspects of experience neglecting the unique, the purely individual character that also distinguishes it. Starting however with a fuller, more adequate conception of experience as the overindividual in relation to an individual, Sankhya is able to tackle the knowledge-problem more successfully without being committed to the Kantian makeshift of a double affection. According to Sankhya every world is an owned, personal world related uniquely to an individual empirical self. This *svatvasvāmitvasambandha*, this unique relation of the ownership is what makes experience what it is, viz., the experience of particular individual. There is, in fact, no purely objective, impersonal experience, no dehumanised overindividual world which is nobody's world and is not related uniquely to some individual's mental continuum. 'Myself and my world,' 'yourself and your world,' this is the law of experience, the common form of an empirical world and our experience of it. This one-one ordering of experience, this universal dichotomy of life is the problem of knowledge proper. 'How is knowing as this one-one ordering of a world of experience possible?' is thus the question which the theory of knowledge must tackle, according to Sankhya. Every bit of experience is a personally owned experience. The pleasure of one is not the pleasure of all and one man's unhappiness is not every man's unhappiness. Within an apparently common world every man lives in a world of his own, in his

own uniquely determined individual world. How is this individual, objective world possible? How is this personal, private relation to an objective over-individual world possible? These are the epistemological questions proper, according to Sankhya—questions for a theory of knowledge to attack and solve. Kant was too much engrossed in the objective and the common to allow sufficient weight to the individual aspect of experience. Sankhya building on a broader empirical foundation is not driven to any of the Kantian expedients to fit the facts of experience, into the structure of a preconceived theory. Experience, according to Sankhya, is the objective in relation to an empirical subject, a personally owned and individuated objective world. Thus experience points beyond itself not merely to a noumenal objective manifold but also to an Individual Transcendental Subject. The individuality of experience, its personal and individual character, in other words points to a beginningless relation of ownership between every individual Puruṣa and the noumenal Prakṛti. A pluralistic noumenal illumination is thus a necessary presupposition of experience as this one-one relation between an empirical individual and his particular world.

There are obvious difficulties in the Sankhya theory that call for criticism. The Sankhya theory does not account for the individuality of a Transcendental Subject or Puruṣa. It does not tell us how one Puruṣa is distinguished from another even though each is nothing but pure, self-shining Intelli-

gence. The individuality of a Puruṣa as pure Intelligence is thus a brute datum that contradicts its very nature as self-luminous light. Nor is Sankhya more successful in explaining the fact of a socially shared, common world of experience. Experience as the over-individual in the individual, the objective in relation to an empirical subject does not necessarily connote a shared common world which is a precondition of social life. Even Vijnānabhikṣu's conception of a *samasti-Buddhi*, a common or overindividual *Buddhi* as the precondition of cosmogenesis or *ṣṛṣṭi* ( cf. *Pravacanabhaṣya* 1. 63 ) does not account for a mutually shared, intersubjective, independent world. Since every individual is cut off, according to Sankhya, from every other by an unsurmountable barrier he may transcend himself so as to embrace the objective independent world in himself, but cannot possibly enter the experience of another and share it in common with the latter. The impossibility of a common, mutually owned world is thus a necessary corollary of the Sankhya conception of the individual as exclusive and absolutely isolated. Despite how ever these obvious defects of the Sankhya theory, it cannot be denied that the Sankhya statement of the knowledge-problem has the merit of a fullness that we miss alike in the Kantian and the Pragmatist formulations of it. The problem, as Kant states it, has the advantage of an objectivity which is secured only at the cost of the individual and personal side of experience. The defect of the Kantian starting-point comes out never so clearly as in the Idealistic

development of it in Hegel's system wherein the individual including the unique and the contingent is sought to be deduced out of the Absolute Idea by necessary logical process. Nor do the usual pragmatist formulations of the problem fare better than the Kantian statement in this respect. They represent the other extreme, emphasizing the individual and personal in experience to the prejudice of its necessary and universal side. Compared with either of these, the more carefully-guarded Sankhya formulation of the problem is certainly more adequate and much nearer the actual facts of the case. One need not accept the Sankhya answer to this all important question of philosophy. It need not be supposed either that Sankhya has said the last word on the subject. But it remains true that Sankhya has at least smoothed the way to a right answer by a fuller statement of the problem and the issues that require to be tackled in a theory of knowledge proper.





## SANKHYA REALISM : A COMPARATIVE AND CRITICAL STUDY.

Sankhya realism is a compromise between the Psychological Realism of Nyāya and the Transcendental Idealism of the Śāṅkara Vedānta. Of special philosophical interest in the Sankhya theory is its method of approach to the knowledge-problem in which it differs alike from Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. While both the latter prefer the way of psychology and rest the case for a realistic object on the actual report of consciousness, Śāṅkha chooses the transcendental path interpreting the immediate deliverance of consciousness in terms of its metaphysical presuppositions.

For the Naiyāyika realist, cognition (Jñāna) is an inessential quality of the self, a quality which inheres in the self and reveals an object different from itself. It is thus a quality and not a relation. Further it is related both to the self and the object it reveals—to the former by the relation of inherence (*samarāya*) and to the latter by the relation of objectifying (*viśayita*). This means that there can be no cognition which does not abide in some self and which does not reveal an object other than itself. It does not mean that the self cannot exist without cognition or that the object cannot be without a

cognition of the object. In fact, the self is without cognition in the state of transcendental freedom (*mokṣa*) when it is free not only from pleasure and pain but also from *Jñāna* or knowing. The self also is free from cognition in states of suspended consciousness such as sleep or unconscious trance. Cognition is thus an adventitious quality of the self which the latter may be with or without. It is inseparable only from the supreme self (*paramātmān*) whose cognition is timeless (*ajanya*). Similarly the atoms, etc., are eternal while cognitions are non-eternal qualities of selves. Therefore objects which comprise the eternal atoms, etc., are only cognised and not constituted by cognitions in the strict sense.

The Rāmānujists also conceive cognition as an attribute of the self as a substance, but true to the idealism of the Vedānta they regard it as an essential and inseparable attribute of the self. Further, according to the Naiyāyika, cognition reveals not itself but an object that is other than itself. But Rāmānujists hold that cognition is self-revealing in the sense that it reveals itself to its own substrate by its own activity. A stone *e. g.*, does not reveal itself to its own substrate, a past experience may reveal itself to its own substrate, the self, but it so reveals itself only through present mental activity and not by itself and through its own activity. But cognition or consciousness always reveals itself to its substrate, the self, *through its own activity*. In this sense, consciousness is intelligent (*ajāda*) like its substrate, the self, and differs from other

things which are non-intelligent (*jada*). Thus the self reveals itself to itself and as such is intelligent, and consciousness reveals itself to the self which is its substrate and as such is also intelligent like the self which is *for itself*; but things other than these are not self-revealing in either sense; they are not for themselves and therefore not intelligent in any sense. Further, since reality, according to Rāmānujists, is an Inclusive Self or omnipersonality, it is essentially self-revealing and intelligent and has consciousness as one of its essential attributes.

Naiyāyikas as consistent realists do not admit consciousness as an essential quality of the self or the object. Further, according to them, consciousness does not reveal itself but only an object different from itself. It is aware of itself only in retrospection when the primary cognitive act (*vyavasāya*) becomes the object of a secondary cognition (*anuvyavasāya*). The Prābhākara Mimāṃsakas here join issue with the Naiyāyikas. According to Prābhākaras, every cognitive act is both an awareness of an object and an awareness of the awareness. Prābhākaras expound their theory of cognition in connection with their doctrine of triune perception (*triputisamvitpratyakṣa*). Every perceptive act, they contend, is a cognition of an object, a cognition of the cognition and a cognition of the cogniser. Each of these is cognised in its true form, the object as the apprehended (*samvedya*), the cognition as subjective apprehension (*samvit*) and the subject as the apprehender. The Naiyāyika denial of a *simul-*

*taneous* cognition of cognition is according to the Prābhākaras not in keeping with the facts of introspection, while the Nyāya view of cognition being cognised only in a secondary retrospective act is open to the objection of objectifying the subjective cognition. Besides a simultaneous awareness of the awareness in every case of an awareness of an object is, according to the Prābhākaras, quite consistent with the realistic doctrine of external independent objects-in-themselves. All that it means is that there is no cognition of an object which is also not a cognition of the cognition or a cognition of the cogniser. It does not mean that there is no object without a cognition of the object or that there is no cogniser or knower where there is no cognition. As a matter of fact the object does not cease to be, when the cognition ceases to be, nor is there a cessation of the knower with the cessation of his knowing activity as in sleep or unconsciousness.

Both Nyāya and Prābhākara realism have their parallels in European philosophy. Prof. John Laird who denies an awareness of awareness in one and the same specious present while admitting it in a secondary retrospective act enduring in a separate specious present does not differ substantially from the Naiyāyika Realist of the Indian Schools ( *cf.* Prof. Laird's article in the "Contemporary British Philosophers" ). Likewise the Prābhākara view of a simultaneous cognition of cognition in every act of cognition of an object corresponds closely to Prof. S. Alexander's distinction between *enjoyed* and *contemplated*

knowing. The Prābhākara like Alexander in the West stresses the distinction between knowing of knowing and the knowing of the object though admitting the inseparability of the two in every cognitive act as Prof. Alexander does.

Sankhya realism stands on a different plane in this respect and must be distinguished both from Prābhākara and Nyāya realism. Both the Naiyāyika and the Prābhākara appeal to introspective evidence, to the immediate deliverance of consciousness. Sankhya however arrives at realism on the way of transcendental analysis and criticism. The Sankhya method in this respect has a close family likeness to Kant's transcendental method. Both start from experience, but both alike resolve experience into its noumenal antecedents, its transcendental presuppositions. But these noumenal antecedents according to Sankhya, are themselves objects of a metapsychological intuition of a non-empirical Yogika vision. This is not admitted by Kant and here Sankhya Transcendentalism parts company with Kantian Phenomenalism. We have no faculty of non-sensuous intuition, says Kant. Therefore we have no more than a negative knowledge of the noumenal principles. We are capable of a metempirical non relational intuition in Yogika vision, says Sankhya. We have thus a positive knowledge of the noumenal principles and no mere negative consciousness of them as limiting principles. The metapsychology of Sankhya is therefore to be distinguished alike from the psychological realism of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā and the critical Phenomenalism of Kant.

Experience, according to Sankhya, is a composite process that points beyond itself to two radically distinct principles. One of these is a datum, a something given that gets revealed in experience. The other is the light of consciousness, the illumination of Intelligence that reveals the given datum. Since Intelligence reveals the datum, it must itself be self-revealing and self-accomplished. Hence Intelligence is timeless light of consciousness which reveals the given as a significant world of experience. But experience presupposes, besides Puruṣa which is eternally Pure Intelligence ( *nityaśuddhabuddha* ), Prakṛti as the objective background. Prakṛti is the given, the pure datum that presents itself in the light of Puruṣa's Intelligence. Therefore Prakṛti is revealed as a world in Puruṣa's light. Hence apart from the illumination of Intelligence, Prakṛti is only the indefinite background, the non-manifest ( *avyakta* ) primal matter, the "dark ground" beneath the illuminated surface. Through Puruṣa's light the non-manifest ( *avyakta* ) ground becomes a manifested ( *vyakta* ) world comprising the subjective private world of mental states and the objective overindividual world of facts. Both subjective mental states and objective facts are transformations of the primal Prakṛti, the manifested forms of that which is non-manifest without Puruṣa's light. Since Puruṣa is self-revealing intelligence and Prakṛti is the brute datum that shines by the light of Intelligence and since further Puruṣa is *nitya* or timeless while Prakṛti evolves and transforms itself in time they are radi-

cally distinct principles whose coming together in experience must presuppose an original unreason, a beginningless *aviveka* or non-discrimination behind it. Through this beginningless non-discrimination Puruṣa's bare togetherness (*sānnidhya*) with Prakṛti becomes a closer connection or *samyoga*. Through this *samyoga* or close relation, Prakṛti is affected by the light of Puruṣa's consciousness and starts on its career of evolution. This brings on a world of experience consisting of subjective states and objective facts. The temporal world is thus a transformation of Prakṛti as brought on by Puruṣa's illumination of the latter. It is Prakṛti or the "dark ground" transformed into significant experience by self-affiliation to the self-revealing Intelligence. But since Prakṛti, the brute datum, is the logical contrary of Puruṣa which is self-luminous Intelligence, the complete resolution of Prakṛti into the pure light of Intelligence remains only an aspiration never to be realised in fact. This accounts for the miseries that darken mundane existence. Since the given matter, the blind manifold of Prakṛti can never be completely resolved into the unity of Intelligence, freedom lies the other way, viz., in a severance of the connection of these two disparate principles. Since the connection is due to an original non-discrimination (*aviveka*), right discrimination (*vivekakhyāti*) as brought on by the methods of Yogika meditation will end this unholy union. This is how Yoga makes liberation from the bondage of experience possible, Yoga is the ascending movement of Prakṛti corres-

ponding to its descending movement into experience and manifestation. It is both subjective and objective, cosmic and individual. It is the world dissolving itself into its noumenal antecedents in the experience of an individual, experience negating itself into its transcendental background.

The conception of a realistic transcendental background that is not constituted but only manifested by consciousness is common both to the Kantian and the Sankhya theories of knowledge. Common to both also is the distinction between consciousness as the transcendental presupposition of experience and consciousness as a temporal mental event. But the analogy breaks down when we come to Kant's dualism of phenomena and noumena. Kant will not allow an extension of the forms of experience beyond the domain of phenomena. The categories, according to Kant, cannot be employed except in relation to sense-intuited data. Hence the subject of our empirical judgments is not the noumenal reality but only the phenomenal world which is ontologically discontinuous with its generative antecedent. We have thus no more than a negative knowledge of the noumenal principles, a positive knowledge of them requiring a faculty of non-sensuous intuition which we lack. To none of these positions does Sankhya subscribe. The manifested Prakṛti, according to Sankhya, is not ontologically discontinuous with its non-manifest background. It is continuous with the latter or rather one with it. Hence the subject of our causal, spatial and temporal world is the manifested Prakṛti as con-



substantial with its non manifest background. The world evolves in Prakṛti and is Prakṛti itself. Phenomenalism either in the Kantian meaning of the term or the Vedantic sense of an unreal projection of consciousness is not admitted by the Sankhya realist. The world is a real determination of a realistic Prakṛti, no 'no man's land' which is neither a qualification of consciousness nor a determination of the things-in-themselves. Neither is it an unreal projection of consciousness, a self-alienation of the pure Intelligence as the Sankara-Vedantist contends. On the contrary it is one with its noumenal background and held within the bosom of the latter. Further the noumenal Prakṛti is not an unknowable which we cannot know except only as a negative limit. We can realise it positively in non-relational Yogic intuition though we may not know it in the relational consciousness of the empirical life.

The Sankhya theory of experience thus answers more nearly to the Aristotelian theory of a monistic becoming of an original primal matter than to the Kantian dualism of appearance and unknowable things-in-themselves. The world is a transformation of Prakṛti, a transition from potentiality to actuality or form. The transition presupposes a *materia prima* a formless primal matter, *vis.*, Prakṛti, which comes to form in the process. But the temporal unfolding presupposes an unmoved mover, an unchanging Intelligence as its final cause. Puruṣa is this unmoved mover, the final cause that imparts meaning to the process. The parallelism here with the Aristotelian

metaphysic is too obvious to deserve special mention. But the Sankhya regards this temporal unfolding from the dual standpoint of epistemology and metaphysics. The successive stages of the unfolding are the stages not merely of a world coming into being but also of our experience of the world. The Sankhya theory here overreaches both Kant's purely epistemological standpoint and that of Aristotle's metaphysics and may be said to be a sort of synthesis of the two.

This brings us to another important aspect of the Sankhya theory, *viz.*, its conception of a pluralistic transformation of Prakṛti and of a consequent *pluri-*verse *or* multiverse. Puruṣa in the singular stands, according to Sāṅkhya, for the conceptual class of the many numerically distinct Puruṣas that are presupposed in experience. The empirical world is likewise not one, but many. In fact it is only a name for the empirical multiverse that blossoms forth in Prakṛti through the illumination of the many Puruṣas. The variety, the diversity of world (*Jagat-vaicitra*), alone accounts for the diversity, the discontinuity of individual experience-continua. No experience-continuum wholly coincides with another. My world is not *your* world and your pleasure or pain is not also my pleasure or my pain. The rule of experience is thus a unique relation between an individual and his own world, a relation of ownership (*svatva-svāmitva-sambandha*) that individuates the world uniquely in relation to a particular individual. Myself and my world, yourself and your world—this is the rule of experience, this one-one-relation that

ensures individual differences in a world that is both objective and personal. The dichotomy of experience, the diversity and individuality of empirical reality thus point to a pluralistic illumination, an illumination of Prakṛti that presupposes not one but many numerally distinct Puruṣas. It is thus that an objective, individual world is made possible, and it is because the world is not only objective but also individual and therefore uniquely related to a particular mental continuum, that its dissolution in Yogika intuition becomes possible. Yoga as a subjective-objective process of negation of the empirical life means only the negation of the particular individual's world and his experience of it. It is the dematerialisation of Prakṛti into initial formlessness as far as the Yogin's own world is concerned. Other worlds run their course as usual even though the Yogin's own is dissolved and reabsorbed into its original background.

If we compare the above with the Kantian account of experience as set forth in the Critical Philosophy, important differences at once present themselves in spite of a general similarity. Kant was too much engrossed in the universal and common to allow sufficient weight to the personal aspect of experience. His main task was to refute the subjectivism of the Cartesian Philosophy and the sensationism of Berkeley and Hume which arose out of it. That the subjective or mental is itself phenomenal and therefore presupposes an affection of the self-in-itself by the noumenal things-in-themselves is what Kant urged

against every interpretation of his teaching as a revival of the older subjectivism. And the problem with which Kant was faced was to account for the subjectivity and privacy of these mental states, that is, to explain the possibility of a class of objects which, while originating through the conditions of empirical objectivity in general, should yet be restricted to a single individual mind. Sankhya, however, with its conception of empirical reality as a multiverse and as presupposing a pluralistic illumination of Prakṛti is not faced with any of the difficulties inherent in the Kantian theory. Experience, according to Sankhya, is the objective in relation to an empirical subject, a personally owned and individuated objective world. Hence it is private as well as trans-subjective, objective as well as individual and presupposes not merely a realistic Prakṛti as its objective background but also a unique relation to a transcendental individual subject.

One more point remains to be noted here. The non-manifest Prakṛti becomes the manifested world by reflecting the light of Intelligence into itself. It is through the reflection of the unity of Intelligence that the original plurality, the primal manifold becomes a unity-in-plurality, a significant world. But the unity of the world is never perfect and cannot possibly be so considering that Prakṛti is the logical opposite of the pure unity of Intelligence or Puruṣa. Hence a completed world, a world completely unified and organised and fully realising the unity of the Intelligence through which it shines remains only an aspiration.

an unrealised goal towards which Prakṛti for ever moves, but which it never actually realises. A similar line of reflection led Kant to repudiate the idea of the world as a whole except as an ideal fiction but despite this he was forced to acknowledge its *necessity* as regulative of empirical synthesis. Without this idea as a regulative principle, the organisation of experience is not possible and the synthetic activities of experience can proceed only on the assumption of the reality of a completed synthesis to which yet nothing real can correspond from the very nature of the case. The idea of a whole is thus a Transcendental Illusion, necessary though inherently void of reality, an illusory idea which we are yet compelled to admit as real or true. In this sense every empirical synthesis is a realisation of the ideal unity, an illusory realisation of a unity or whole which we are compelled to admit as the presupposition of the empirical synthesis. The commentator Vijnānabhikṣu also by a similar line of reasoning arrives at his conception of *bhoga* or experience as a transcendental reflection or pratibimba in Puruṣa ( *e. g.*, Pravachanabhāṣya ). Experience, according to Vijnānabhikṣu, presupposes not merely a reflection of the unity of intelligence in the primal manifold, but also a reflection of this reflected unity back into the pure Intelligence. It is only as the unity-in-difference of a world of experience is realised as the realisation of the unity of Intelligence that experience becomes truly significant. Hence the synthesis of experience requires to be reflected back into Puruṣa, to be realised

as Puruṣa's *bhoga* or fulfilment. But since this by itself is inherently impossible, *bhoga* in the sense of Puruṣa's fulfilment of the fulfilment of a significant world can only be of the order of reflection or appearance. An hallucination of *bhoga* or fulfilment in Puruṣa, an illusory realisation of it involving an element of projection as we have in a *pratidhvani* or echo, is thus a necessary presupposition of experience as the synthesis of an originally unrelated plurality.

The Sankhya theory as set forth above is not altogether free from difficulties. Sankhya realism, *e. g.*, does not account for a socially shared, common world, though it provides as objective-personal, over-individual-individual world as the stuff of experience. Even Vijnānabhikṣu's conception of a *Samaṣṭi Buddhi*, a common or overindividual understanding (*Buddhi*) as a precondition of cosmogenesis or *śrṣṭi* (*c. f.* *Pravachanabhāṣya*) does not account for a mutually shared, intersubjective world even though it ensures its objectivity and independence. Despite this it cannot be denied, however, that the Sankhya statement of the knowledge-problem has the merit of a fullness that we miss alike in the Kantian and the Pragmatist formulations. Kant is able to secure the objectivity of experience only by ignoring the personal subjective aspects which he, in fact, is unable to restore. The defects of the Kantian statement come out clearly in the Hegelian reconstructions of it wherein the individual including the unique and the contingent is sought to be deduced out of the

Absolute Idea by necessary logical process. Nor do the usual Pragmatist formulations fare better than the Kantian statement in this respect. They emphasize the personal, the individual aspects to the prejudice of the universality and objectivity of experience, representing in this respect the opposite extreme of the Kantian universalism and impersonalism. Compared with either of these, the more-carefully guarded Sankhya statement of the problem is certainly more adequate and much nearer the actual facts of experience. The Sankhya doctrine of a plurality of Puruṣas and the Sankhya conception of a realistic Prakṛti which is yet non-manifest (*avyakta*) in the transcendental state prior to evolution and transformation are some of the other weak points in the system that have evoked criticism from the rival schools. If Puruṣa is pure, self-luminous light of Intelligence then the individuality of Puruṣas which is a corollary of their numerical plurality involves a manifest self-contradiction. If the individuality is a brute datum, a given inexplicability, it contradicts Puruṣa's nature as self-luminous Intelligence. Hence, the Śāṅkara Vedantist contends, Sankhya Puruṣa stripped of its inherent inconsistencies merges into the monistic Brahman of the Vedantist. Besides, if Prakṛti is non-manifest as a transcendental principle, it cannot be defined even as a *realistic, existent* background. Thus the Prakṛti of Sankhya is only another name for the Māyā of the Vedantist, the indefinite background which is not definable either as being or non-being. Both

according to Sankhya and Śankarite Vedānta empirical reality is consubstantial with its noumenal background, but while Sankhya will allow to this indefinite ground a vestige of existent reality, the Śankarite will not concede even indefinite reality either to the ultimate ground or its empirical modalities. The Śankarite, in other words, is not satisfied with the Sankhya half-way house to a realistic indefinite and rejects the Sankhya interpretation of Prakṛti as an existent material cause. Since the primal matter is nonmanifest in itself, it cannot without contradiction be defined as an existent ground. To interpret the Transcendental Ground in terms of being or existence is to import empirical characters into that which even in the Sankhya view is essentially transcendental or non-empirical. Instead therefore of construing the Transcendental Ground as a realistic datum, the Śankarite interprets the givenness of empirical reality in terms of the indefinite background. The one interprets the Transcendental Ground in terms of empirical reality while the other interprets empirical reality in terms of the Transcendental background. Śankarite Idealism, in short, is a critical reconstruction of Sāṅkhya realism. The one is a logical corollary of the other even as Hegelian Absolutism is a logical development of Kantian Phenomenalism.

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## DISBELIEF

Disbelief is not mere absence of belief. To doubt is not to believe, but it is not disbelief. In ignorance there is no belief, but ignorance is not disbelief. Disbelief, in fact, is a form of belief : it is belief in the falsity of another belief. To disbelieve is to refer to another belief and to reject it as false. A disbelief is thus a belief that involves another belief as its point of reference. Whether disbelief can extend to all beliefs is a moot question of philosophy. Universal scepticism has usually been held to be self-contradictory. As the rejection of all beliefs it has been held to entail its own rejection as well. Whether such an attitude is psychologically possible is a much debated question. Buddhist *nirvāna* prescribes the extinction of all beliefs, but this will include also the *nirvāna* of Buddhism and Buddhistic beliefs. The Śāṅkarite is not as thorough-going in his negative philosophy. His world-denial is itself based on the realisation of the consciousness which rejects the world-appearance as false.

There is no disbelief without prior belief. Where belief is impossible, disbelief is also impossible. Nobody believes in an obvious absurdity such as a square-triangle, a sky-flower, or a barren mother. Hence it is absurd to speak of one's disbelief in such absurdities. Just because nobody believes them, none can also disbelieve them. The Buddhists have a

technical name for these absurdities: they are *vikalpavritti*, functions of *kalpanā* or imagination, according to them. They represent imaginative combinations, attempted synthesis of incompatibles without objective counterparts. Two grades of such *vikalpas* may be distinguished. *Vikalpas* may be such imaginative combinations as "the hare's horn", "the sky-flower", etc. Here an objective counterpart is possible, though not actual. A higher grade is that of "the barren mother." Here we have an attempted synthesis of incompatibles or contradictions. One cannot be a "mother" and "barren" at the same time. These are the true *vikalpas*, imaginative combinations of incompatibles, mere attempts to think and no completed thought. In either case however there is no belief, and because belief is absent, disbelief also is impossible.

Disbelief is the negation of belief and as such may be expressed in the form of a negative judgment. But the negative judgment which expresses disbelief is not on a par with other negative judgments. A negative judgment usually expresses denial of a supposed connection. But disbelief is a denial not merely of a supposition but of a complete belief. When I say, "A is not B", I do not necessarily suppose any belief in "A being qualified by B" which I make the object of my denial. I am more concerned with expressing the objective incompatibility of B with A than with the denial of any subjective belief in such incompatibility. It is otherwise however with a negative judgment which expresses dis-

belief. Here I am concerned to deny both subjective belief and the content believed in. To say "A is B" is false" is not to say merely that "A is not B". The latter expresses an objective incompatibility which does not necessarily imply prior belief in compatibility, but the former expresses a prior belief and rejects both the subjective belief and the compatibility which was believed in. Disbelief may therefore be logically characterised as correction of false belief, i.e., recognition of the false as false and its consequent rejection.

What, then, is the nature of the false appearance which correction rejects or cancels as false? We may summarily reject the Buddhist view that false is the *asaṭ* or unreal (*Aṣaṭkhyāti*). The false cannot be the unreal or the imaginary like 'barren mother' or 'sky-flower', for the unreal is never believed and therefore cannot also be disbelieved. The Naiyāyikas say that the false is the *elsewhere elsewhen real* taken to be *real here and now*. The false snake is the elsewhere (jungle) snake taken to be real here and now in the locus of the rope. But this view offends against experience. When I reject the false snake I do not posit it as the jungle snake, i.e., as the elsewhere real snake. The deliverance of experience does not support the Nyāya view. My rejection is absolute and unqualified rejection: it is not mere displacement and redispotion. The false therefore can neither be the elsewhere real nor the absolutely unreal and imaginary. It is therefore other than reality as well as unreality—an indescr-

bable positivity without reality, something that fills experience and yet does not share the character of a real determination. Disbelief is the recognition of this indescribable positivity. The logic of disbelief implies the indescribable as a category of experience.

We may briefly refer here to Bradley's account of negation in "The Principles of Logic." There is, according to Bradley, no objective counterpart to the denial in a negative judgment: the negative judgment does not assert any objective exclusion or objective repulse. When I say, "A is not P", I mean merely that 'A is an ( unknown ) Q' which accounts for A's incompatibility with P. The objective counterpart to the judgment is the unknown positive quality which constitutes the ground of the subjective denial. The negative judgment thus resolves itself into a suggested qualification and a subjective withdrawing of the suggestion in view of the positive incompatibility ( Q ) in the subject A. There is no objective repulse of P from A, but only a subjective ascription or suggestion and a subjective withdrawing thereof.

Bradley's analysis of the negative judgment obviously does not cover all cases. It is manifestly inapplicable to disbelief which implies not merely prior suggestion or supposition but also prior belief. Further it does not provide a basis for the distinction between true and false disbeliefs. A true disbelief has an objective counterpart to it which a false one has not. And what may be the objective counterpart to it except an objective repulse or objec-

tive incompatibility which Bradley so rigidly shuts out from his theory of negation? In fact negative judgments may be of various types. When we say, "A is not B", the negation asserted is the objective incompatibility of B with A. The content of the judgment here is an objective exclusion, i.e., the fact of B's exclusion from A. A negative judgment may also import both negated belief and negated content. When we say, "'A is B' is false," we assert prior belief in B's compatibility with A and we negate both the belief and the compatibility that is believed in. Lastly, negation may be negation merely of a suggestion or a possible supposition as distinguished from a complete belief or content believed in. When we say, "It would be a mistake to take A as B," we are referring to a possible supposition and denying its tenability, but not referring either to any actual belief or (excepting indirectly) to any objective incompatibility. Bradley's reduction of all negative judgments to the last variety ignores the intrinsic differences between the different classes of negative judgments.

The Naiyāyika distinguishes between *antecedent*, *emergent*; *absolute* and *reciprocal* negation. Antecedent negation is the absence of a thing before it comes into being. For example, the childlessness of the childless man before a child is born to him is a case of antecedent negation. Antecedent negation is without beginning but has an end. E.g., when a child is born, the childlessness ceases, i.e., has an end. Emergent negation is the negation which emerges through the

destruction or cessation of a thing. Emergent negation has a beginning but no end. For example, the man who becomes widower through the death of his wife, is a case of an emergent negation which has a beginning but no end, for though he may marry again and have another wife he can never have his former wife. Absolute negation without any qualification or restriction as to time i.e., negation without either beginning or end in time. For example, the absence of consciousness in a stone or block of wood is a case of absolute negation which holds for all time. Lastly, besides the above three, we have contrariety or disparity which we may call logical or reciprocal negation. Reciprocal negation is the negation of the relation of identity between things and is not the negation of the things themselves. For example, when we say that "A is not B" we do not negate either A or B, but we simply deny that one can be identical with the other.

The question we have to consider here is whether disbelief as negation of belief will admit of being characterised as one or other of these different forms of negation. Some hold that disbelief being unqualified and absolute rejection of the believed content must also be unqualified and absolute rejection of the belief as well. Since the content is recognised as unreal, the belief therein must also appear as unreal, i.e., as mere semblance of belief. This view however does not agree with the deliverance of experience. When the snake is rejected as false appearance, there is certainly no denial of our prior belief in it as a

real snake. It would therefore be more accurate to say that disbelief, while it is absolute negation of the believed content, is only emergent negation or destruction of the primary belief. When we say that the 'snake' is not, we do not say that there was no belief in it as a real snake.

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## NEGATION

Whether negativity or *Abhāva* may be an objectively real fact has been a moot question of philosophy, both Indian and Western. While western philosophers with their predominantly positive outlook have generally favoured a subjective view of negation, amongst Indian philosophers we have advocate both of the subjective and the objective conceptions. Our task in the present paper will be to discuss some of the principal western and Indian views of the question and incidentally to suggest how the different view-points may be combined into a more synthetic, comprehensive theory which will be more in agreement with actual experience and will meet the requirements of the case.

Amongst western philosophers who have discussed the problem of negation in some detail, the name of F.H. Bradley deserves special mention. Consistently with the western positivistic outlook on experience, Bradley subscribes to 'a subjective view of the negative judgment. Since negation, according to him, is no objective fact, there are no objective referents of our negative judgments, strictly speaking. "We might say that, as such and in its own character, it (logical negation) is simply subjective : it does not hold good outside my thinking. The reality repels the suggested alternation ; but the suggestion is not



any movement of the fact, nor in fact does the given subject maintain itself against the actual attack of a discrepant quality. The process takes place in the unsubstantial region of ideal experiment. And the steps of that experiment are not even asserted to exist in the world outside our heads." (Bradley's "Principles of Logic", Book I, ch III § 13). Hence, according to Bradley, the negation signified by a negative judgment does not answer to any objective exclusion or repulse. Negation is only the rejection of a subjective suggestion as incompatible with the given reality. There is no objective attack of a suggested quality nor any objective repulse strictly speaking: the whole process resolves itself into an ideal experiment, an ideal suggestion subjectively withdrawn as inconsistent with the nature of reality. We may say then that, according to Bradley, a negative judgment involves, triple ideality. What the negative judgment affirms is an unknown positive ground of the rejection. This is the affirmative element in the negative judgment and this is what the judgment asserts as real, i. e., refers to reality. As such however it is not completely real for it qualifies reality only transformed and transmuted in a fuller context. But what the negation discards or excludes is not even an asserted ideality. What it excludes or rejects is a mere suggestion, i. e., something that is less than a judgment and lacks reference to reality. It is this subjective suggestion which is below judgment and therefore an ideality of the second order which the negation discards as ideal or

merely subjective. Negation is thus the rejection of a double ideality, the idealisation of what is itself doubly ideal. Hence the negative judgment involves triple ideality. What it affirms or asserts is the unknown positive ground of the negation. This is the positive element which is referred to reality. The rest is ideal experiment. Hence the judgment, "S is P", reduces, according to Bradley, to the assertion, 'S is (an unknown) Q'. The rest is not judgment but suggestion or unreferred thought and its rejection. The so-called objective repulse does not exist anywhere except in our heads; there is no objective counterpart to the subjective rejection, no objective repulse or exclusion of B from A. The negative judgment in Bradley's view thus reduces to a negative answer to a positive question. A question is not an assertion or judgment; it is a mere enquiry with a suggested pointing. The answer "no" is the recognition of the imaginary character of the suggested qualification. The question "Is that a snake?" involves no objective reference and the negative answer is the recognition of the subjectivity of the unreferred suggestion.

Bradley's account of negation is deficient in two respects. In the first place, Bradley's view leaves no room for correction as a form of negation. A correction is negation of a complete belief. Hence it is more than the rejection of an unreferred suggestion. Correction implies prior belief and therefore prior judgment. It is the rejection of an objectively referred idea as false. Secondly, Bradley's analysis

does not provide any basis for the distinction between the true and the false negative judgment. Since the negative judgment has no objective counterpart to its negative element, the true and the false negative judgments share the same fate of a subjective suggestion or attribution subjectively withdrawn. But this is not how we distinguish between a true and a false judgment. The true judgment has its objective counterpart, i.e., qualifies reality even if transmuted and transformed. But the false judgment is without objectivity in this sense. But Bradley's analysis will reduce both the true and the false negative judgment to a false suggestion with nothing but an unknown positive ground as its objective referent.

The Prābhākara Mimāṃsakas amongst Indian Philosophers also deny objective absence or negation. The assertion of absence, according to the Prābhākaras, is nothing but the assertion of the bare locus, i.e., of the location of the absence as bare or empty. The Prābhākaras point out that the cognition of the location together with a subjective idea of a possible qualification amounts to a judgment of negation or absence. The judgment "No jar on the ground" is nothing but the assertion of the bare ground with the idea of the Jar as a possible qualification. Hence there is no objective referent to the negative element in a negative judgment. In a similar way Bergson also denies real absence. The judgment of absence expresses our baffled recollection or expectation of a possible qualification. Hence the cognition of absence

is nothing but the cognition of a persent object as qualified by a baffled feeling.

In a more metaphysical way the Sankhya philosophers also deny the conception of real absence. Since the effect, according to Sankhya, is pre-existent in the cause, there is no such thing as real emergence or real cessation. Hence what is, always was and always will be, and what we call emergence and cessation are only names for the transition from non-manifest to manifest being. The distinction between presence and absence is thus one between manifest and subtle being, between the potential and the actual. Hence everything potentially at least is in everything and there is no such thing as the absolute absence of anything in any other thing.

Diametrically opposed to all these views is that of the nihilistic Buddhist. For Bradley, Bergson, Prābhākara etc, negation is disguised affirmation. For the nihilistic Buddhist, affirmation is disguised negation. To judge is to affirm, to assert reality, says Bradley. To judge is to negate, to deny unreality, says the Buddhist. Judging is thus describing unreality or *śūnya* by negation of the negative. It is characterising the characterless, determining the indeterminate. Being is the negation of non-being and determinate being is the negation of indeterminate being. Judging is determining, defining the indefinite through the process of negation of negation. Definite position is the negation of indefinite position which itself is the negation of indefinite negation. Hence every affirmation is the defining of the indefinite,

of the absolute negative or *śūnya* by negation of negation.

The Naiyāyika realists reject both these extreme views. According to Nyāya, both presence and absence are objective facts. Facts may be either positive or negative. An affirmative judgment asserts a positive fact or presence, a negative judgment asserts a negative fact or absence. To affirm is to assert the inclusion of something in something else, the positive qualification of a thing by another thing or attribute of a thing. To deny is to assert the exclusion of some thing from something else, the absence of some thing as a qualification of something else. The objective counterpart of an affirmation is the presence of one thing in another just as the objective counterpart of a denial is the absence of a thing in another thing. There is however a difference between presence and absence in one respect. Presence has no direct reference to absence, but absence is absence of an elsewhere, elsewhen present thing in a locus which is also a present object. Thus absence presupposes presence, but presence does not require absence as a point of reference. But in spite of this, absence has its own intrinsic being as a knowable, its *svarūpasattva* as a known objectivity, though it lacks positivity (*bhāva/ta*) as well as *sattīyoga* or relation to the universal of being. Absence, in other words, has its intrinsic being as negativity as distinguished from presence which possesses intrinsic being, positivity as well as (in the case of substance, quality and action) being as *sattīyoga*, or relation to the uni-

versal of being. Absence as presupposing a present locus and a present negatum excluded from the present locus is related both to the present locus and the present negatum the exclusion whereof from the present locus constitutes its character as absence. The relation of absence to the present locus and the negatum is *viśeṣaṇatā* or adjectivity—a relation other than that of *samjoga* or *samavāya*. An objection to the Nyāya view is that adjectivity is an indirect relation presupposing a primary relation either of contact or inherence. Thus a thing becomes adjectival to another thing either by being in contact with it (the book on the table, etc.) or by inhering in it (the brown colour of the table). The book is an adjective of the table, through the relation of contact with it in space, and the brown colour qualifies the table by inhering in it. But no such intervening relation can be supposed between absence and its present locus or negatum. Contact is a relation that holds between substance, but absence is not a substance and so can not be in contact either with its locus or the object that is absent. Further absence cannot inhere in the locus and thus become its adjective or *viśeṣaṇa* for just as when brown inheres in the table the table becomes brown (inherence being a constitutive relation), so also if absence were to inhere in the locus, the locus would become absent. The Naiyāyikas say, all this is spurious reasoning. Adjectivity is a mediated relation only as holding between positives. It is however not mediated when holding

between a positive and a negative. Experience is the evidence here, just as experience is our evidence in respect both of external, Āsijunctive relations like contact and internal, conjunctive or constitutive relations like inherence. Experience shows that adjectivity is direct as between a positive and a negative just as experience also shows that it is indirect, mediated as between one positive and another. A negation is a direct determinant (*Svarūpasambandha*) of its positive negatum and locus whereas one positive is adjectival to another only through an intervening relation of inherence or contact. A further objection to the Nyāya view is that adjectivity is a new relation not comprised within the seven kinds of knowables (*padārthas*) recognised by the Nyāyāyikas. The Nyāyāyikas are *niyatapadārthavadins*—believers in a fixed number of *padārthas* or knowables. Hence they are not at liberty to add to their number of *padārthas* according to their convenience. The Naiyāyikas say in reply that adjectivity is no additional eighth *padārtha*. It is a form of *svarūpasambandha*. By a *svarūpasambandha* is meant a *sambandha* or relation in which one or other of the relata or *sambandhis* is itself the *sambandha* or relation. Negativity *Abhāva* is adjective or *viśeṣana* of its locus and negatum and this means that *abhāva* itself is its relation to the locus and the negatum. *Abhāva* is one of the seven *padārthas* or knowables and as *abhāva* itself is its relation of adjectivity or *viśeṣanātā*, no additional eighth *padārtha* has really been assumed.

Since negation presupposes a real negatum as well as a present locus, pure negation either as negation of *sūnya* or nothing or of the *satvilakṣaṇa* or contra-real as well as *niradhisthāna* negation or negation without a location of the negation must be rejected as absurdities. This disposes of the Buddhist view of *asaṅkhyāti* as well as the Śāṅkarite view of *anirvacanīyakhyāti* as the rejected content of a corrected falsity. The Śāṅkarite reduces the false to an indescribable objectivity which is other than reality, i.e., to a positivity without attachment to reality, while the Buddhist makes it into a sheer nought and therefore incapable of filling the false experience. But both these views contradict the intrinsic nature of a negative fact. And the same is true also of the Śāṅkarite negation of the entire universe as false appearance : it is negation without a locus of the negation, negation from nowhere, the whole universe being the negatum and there being nothing left to serve as a location of the negation.

According to the Naiyāyikas, therefore, a bare negation is an absurdity, negation being always the negation of a real negatum from a real locus. And the negation is itself a real exclusion answering to an objectively real repulse of a real negatum from a real locus. There are thus negative as well as positive facts, real exclusions as well as real inclusions. Change, e. g., is an objective fact entailing real emergence as well as real cessation. And emergence and cessation are not intelligible unless there is objective absence. An entity emerges only in so far



as it was not and begins to be. Thus antecedent absence is a necessary presupposition of real emergence. Cessation similarly is ceasing to be, vanishing, being resolved into nothingness. Hence emergent absence is a necessary presupposition of cessation. And just as change and emergence and cessation are facts of experience, so also the difference between one real and another entailing reciprocal absence or reciprocal negation. And lastly, absolute absence is also a fact of experience quite as much as emergent, antecedent or reciprocal absence. There are not merely conjunctions and dissociations in experience, but also absolute incompatibilities, dissociations or disjunctions that hold for all time. All these prove not merely the objectivity of negativity but also its objective reality.

A brief reference to the Śāṅkarite view will not be out of place here. The Śāṅkarites accept the Nyāya realistic view of negation as suitable for the conduct of life, but they reject its ultimate truth or reality. Negativity is a transsubjective fact, and no mere subjective suggestion or imagined possibility. But the objectivity of negation does not prove its ultimate reality or truth. The mistake of the ordinary realist is to equate the real with the objective. But the objective cannot be real for the obvious reason that it is in itself self-contradictory and incoherent. To be out of the mind is not necessarily to be real just as to be in the mind is not necessarily to be unreal. The criterion of reality is consistency and not objectivity, and in so far as the idea of the objective is not internally self-consistent it cannot constitute the

criterion of the real. Absence is objective just as is presence, but the objectivity of absence no more proves its reality than the objectivity of a present fact such as the object of an illusion. And thus while both negatives and positives are objective facts and so possess empirical reality, they lack ultimate truth and reality as being internally discrepant and so self-destroying. They are thus contents without reality, indescribable appearances, eternally cancelled objectifications of the unobjective consciousness or subject in which they appear.

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## THEORIES OF FALSE APPEARANCE IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY—I

When we perceive a rope as a snake, or a mother-of-pearl as a piece of silver, we say we have perceived wrongly and we reject our cognition as a false apprehension. The question therefore arises, what is it that constitutes the falsity of the false apprehension? Is the epithet 'false' to be attributed to the apprehension itself, or to the content apprehended, or to both the apprehending and the apprehended? The present paper will deal with the principal Indian views of the questions, and the enquiry will be confined to an exposition of the different views without any critical estimate which is reserved for a second paper.

Since the false apprehending takes its character as false from the nature of the content apprehended, and since further the correction which follows is a rejection of the content and is never a denial of the psychic facthood of the apprehension, the nature of the false appearance relates primarily to the objective content rather than the subjective apprehending. Hence controversies in Indian philosophy, called the *khyātivādas*, centre round the nature of the false content. *i.e.*, the status of the content which appears rather than of the subjective fact of the apprehension itself.

There are six principal theories about the nature of the false appearance called respectively *Asatkhyāti*, *Atmakhyāti*, *Akhyāti*, *Anyathākhyāti*, *Anirvacaniyākhyāti* and *Satkhyāti*. We shall consider these theories serially, explaining each view as clearly as possible and reserving a critical estimate of each for a second paper to follow.

The *Asatkhyāti* view is professed by *Śūnyavādi* Buddhists or *nihilists* who maintain the *voidness* or absolute nothingness of all experiences and their contents. Error, according to the nihilistic Buddhists, is the cognition of the *asat*, of the absolute nought. When the rope is cognised as a snake, the snake which is falsely cognised is *asat* (non-existent), an absolute nought. We must distinguish between an absolute *asat* and a relative *asat*, between absolute non-existence and relative non-existence. An absolute nought nowhere exists : it is without attachment to reality anywhere. A relative negation is only partially excluded from reality : it is non-existent in one place but exists in some other place.

A jar may be non-existent relatively, *i. e.*, it may be non-existent in one place, but may exist in another place ; or it may be non-existent at one time but may exist at some other time. But an absolute nought does not exist anywhere, or at any time, *i. e.*, it is excluded from the whole of reality. A sky-flower is an absolute non-existent in this sense. So is a horned hare. A sky-flower exists no-where and nowhen, and so does a horned hare. They are fictions of the imagination, absurd combinations suggested

by the trickery of language—*alika* or imaginary, without any attachment to reality anywhere. Of such imaginary fictions (*vikalpas*), we may distinguish two grades, viz., (1) the factually non-existent, and (2) the logical impossible. Thus the horned hare is an absolute nought of the first type : it nowhere exists as a fact, but we do not perceive anything absurd in its existing. We may even suppose that nature may bring forth a horned hare in course of evolution, though till now it has no attachment to reality. A barren mother however illustrates the absolute nought of the second type : it not only is not existent but cannot but be so, contradicting as it does the very conditions of its attachment to reality. Now when the cogniser is in error, he cognises according to the Buddhist nihilist, an absolute nought in one or other of the above two senses, for what he cognises is a combination of in-compatibles which is without its parallel in experience. For example, when the cogniser perceives the rope as a snake, what he perceives is not a snake only, but a rope that has appropriated to itself the properties of a snake. In other words, he perceives not a snake as such, but the rope-snake, a snake which is a rope as well—an evident absurdity. He thus perceives what nowhere exists : the snake may exist, but a rope-snake is nowhere found except in cognitions of the false.

There is another Buddhist view, the *Atmakhyāti* view of the *Vijnānavādins*, which rejects the nihilistic view of error as a contentless cognition

that cognises nothing. The *Vijnānavādins* as subjective idealists repudiate the conception of cognition as the cognition of nothing. Such cognition, being cognition of nothing, must also be itself nothing. An error, they contend, which is itself indistinguishable from nothingness, must itself be nothing, *i. e.*, must be not even error. Hence they accuse the *nihilists* of denying the self-evident cognitive fact. Error is not the cognition of an absolute nought : it does not apprehend a non-existent blank. It cognises the cognitive fact itself, *i. e.*, it cognises the psychic fact as a transcognitive object. Error thus arises from cognising the mental as an extramental fact. Blue is the cognition of the blue, but the erring mind cognises it as the extramental blue. The psychic fact is thus mistaken for a transcendent meaning. What is cognised is only the subjective image, but this is wrongly taken to be the cognition of an external object. The *Atmakhyāti*, *i. e.*, the self-cognition of the psychic fact, is imagined to be the cognition of the objective trans-psychic reality. Hence error is not *asatkhyāti*, the cognition of a sheer nought, but is the cognition of the subjective state as an objective fact.

The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas who advocate the view known as *Akhyāti* repudiate both the *Asatkhyāti* and the *Atmakhyāti* views of the Buddhists. They contend that error always involves a given element, the error arising, according to them, from a confusion of what is so given with the memory-image it calls forth. Hence error involves both representation

and presentation—something given or presented and some representation or image which the presentation calls forth. The error consists in the failure to distinguish between the perceived fact and the memory-image, in the non-distinguishing (*akhyāti*) between the presentation and the representation. In the stock example of the rope-snake illusion, there is a given element, *viz.*, the presentation of the 'rope' as a generic 'this'. The generically given rope calls forth the image of the snake. The illusion consists in the non-distinction of the presented 'this' and the represented 'snake'. The non-distinction entails confusion and leads to the false judgment, 'this is a snake'. The two facts, the percept and the image, are thus confused as one and certain false expectations are aroused as a consequence which practical experience negatives. The error is thus a negative non-distinguishing of the two experiences, the failure to realise their distinction and numerical duality. Hence error is no positive experience : it is only negative non-distinction. Correction is the negation of this non-distinction : it is the assertion of the distinction through the cancellation of the confused non-distinction. As a matter of fact, there is no positive falsity in error anywhere. The cognition of the rope in its general outline as a 'this' is a fact, and is not sublated. The recollection of the 'snake' is also a fact, and correction does not deny its facthood. The contents of these experiences are also facts, and are not cancelled. The rope is not cancelled as a fact, nor is the reality of the elsewhere and

elsewhen snake which is recalled negated. What is rejected is the non-distinction, the negative non-distinguishing between the perceiving and the remembering, or between the perceived and the remembered facts.

The Prābhākaras thus insist on a *given* or objective starting-point of all false cognitions and in this respect go beyond the subjectivism of the *Ātmakhyātivādins* who reduce the false cognition to a mere subjective fact illegitimately objectified. They however refuse to recognise any positive element in error, error being according to them, only negative non-distinguishing between the presented object and the represented image.

The Naiyāyikas who profess the *Anyathākhyāti* view here join issue with the *Prābhākaras*. The *Naiyāyikas* urge, as against the *Prābhākaras*, the intrinsic positivity of error as distinct from negative non-distinguishing or *akhyāti*. Every error, the *Naiyāyikas* point out, is a *single* complex experience, not two psychoses falsely confused and merely non-distinguished as *Prābhākaras* say. In the 'snake-rope' illusion we are not aware of two experiences but of a single complex experience of a perceived 'this' appearing to be a 'snake'. Nor does correction cancel a negative non-distinction of two confused experiences. It rejects the single, composite experience in its entirety, the 'this snake' that was falsely perceived through the influence of the defects (of sense, media, etc.). The illusion is thus a unitary composite presentation of a this 'snake', the 'this' being presented



through the natural (*laukika*) contact of the visual sense and the object lying before it, and the 'snake' being also *presented* through the non-natural (*alaukika*) contact of the visual sense with the elsewhere-elsewhen perceived 'snake'. The resulting experience is thus a misrepresentation of the snake-form in the locus of the presented 'this': a misrepresentation of the 'this' externally presented in the form or character of the 'snake' extraordinarily presented. It is an error as being a unitary presentative experience of a presented 'this' in the form of an extraordinarily perceived 'snake' with which it is objectively unconnected. The snake which is perceived is a real, elsewhere snake, and the snake-character or feature inheres in this elsewhere snake, *i.e.*, not in the locus of the 'this' which is presented to the eye by natural contact but in the 'snake' that exists elsewhere (*e.g.*, in the jungle). The mistake or error thus consists in a complicated perception of the extraordinarily seen snake-character of the jungle-snake as inhering in the 'this' that is seen by the external sense, the eye by natural contact of sense and object.

The *Nyāya Anyathākhyāti* view thus differs from the *Akhyāti* view in the following respects :

(1) According to the *Akhyāti* view, an error is equivalent to two cognitions, while according to *Nyāya*, an error is a single composite experience.

(2) According to the *Akhyāti* view, the two cognitions involved in error are different in nature. One is a presentation, while the other is a representation with its memory-character lapsed or suppressed.

According to Nyāya, however, these two are only predisposing conditions of the resulting cognition which is a single, composite, presentative cognition. Further these predisposing factors are themselves both presentative, one of these being the *laukika* or natural presentation of the 'this' through the ordinary, natural contact of the eye and the 'rope' that lies before it, and the other being the *alaukika*, non-natural, *complicated* presentation or vision of the snake through a non-natural contact of the eye with the elsewhere and elsewhen perceived 'snake'.

(3) Lastly, according to *Akhyāti*, error is no positive experience but is only negative non-distinguishing between two cognitions which are not in themselves false. According to Nyāya, however, error is a positive experience being a positive false unification of two experiences, one of which is an extraordinary perception of a past and distant object and the other an ordinary perception of a present and proximate object.

Hence error according to the Naiyāyikas involves a positive, false element, the false element in error consisting in a false relation between the otherwise real presentative contents which are objectively unconnected. Thus it is the relation between the contents which is false and not the contents themselves which are wrongly related.

We shall now consider the Śāṅkara-Vedānta view of *Anirvacanīyakhvāti* which repudiates the Nyāya *Anyathā-khyāti* view though admitting the positivity of error. Error, according to Śāṅkarites, involves

more than the experience of a false relation : it is the experience of a unitary false content, not the experience of a false relation between real contents. The Naiyāyika's mistake consists, according to the Śāṅkarite, in making error consist in the apprehension of a false relation only. But the relation is one with the relata it relates : the 'this snake' is an indivisible unity of 'this' and 'snake', a unitary whole which the Naiyāyika falsely splits into a 'this', a 'snake-character' and 'a relation between the two.' We are not actually aware of any such plurality in the illusory cognition itself. Nor does the deliverance of the correcting experience point to any rejection of a false relation only. When we correct the illusion we reject the entire content, the 'this snake' in its indivisible unity, as a falsely perceived content. In other words, just as the illusion is the experience of a 'here and now' snake and not of 'an elsewhere, jungle' snake, so is the correction which follows on the discovery of the truth a rejection of the 'here and now' snake falsely perceived and not of a false connection only between a 'jungle' snake and the 'here and now' rope perceived as a 'this'. And the Śāṅkarites thus conclude that every error involves an unreal positivity or positive unreality. It is neither the cognition of sheer nought as *Asatkyātivā-dins* say, nor a cognition of an elsewhere reality as Naiyāyikas say. It is a positive experience and therefore is the experience of a positive content. A 'sheer nought,' the absolute *asat*, cannot be the content of a positive experience, while every error is a positive

experience. But it is also not the experience of an elsewhere reality, for an elsewhere reality has attachment to reality, while the erroneous content is excluded from reality altogether as the deliverance of correction shows. When I correct the error I reject the snake absolutely and unconditionally. I say that the rope that I perceived to be a snake, *never was*, *never is* and *never will be* the 'this snake' I took it to be, that, in other words, it was not even a 'this snake' when I perceived it as such. Correction is thus a *traikālika niṣedha*, a rejection for all the three periods of time. It amounts, in other words, to an absolute denial or negation, *i. e.*, the absolute exclusion of the perceived content from reality. Correction thus brings out the real character of the illusory experience : it shows forth the illusion as the cognition of an unreal object, of an objective unreality. The cognition would be no cognition without an object cognised (for surely the cognition does not cognise itself). And yet the cognition is further revealed (in the correction) as the cognition of an object without a location in reality anywhere. The illusory cognition is thus the experience of a logical indefinable, *i. e.*, of an objective or positive content which yet has no attachment to reality. Verily we may say that its *esse* is, and also is not, its *percipi* : as object of cognition it is other than the cognition which cognises it as object, and yet as cancelled and rejected it is revealed as lacking in any substantiality other than that of the cognition which reveals it. Here then we have something which is indescribable,

which is positive and yet unreal, and which is neither the subjective experience itself nor definable as anything different from it.

We shall now conclude with an analysis of the Rāmānujist *satkhyāti* view which rejects the *anirvacanīyākhyāti* of the Śāṅkarites and regards error as consisting in the apprehension of a partial truth as the whole truth. According to the *satkhyātivādins*, error is neither the apprehension of sheer nothingness nor of any indescribable object : it is simply the cognition of a partial feature as the only and the exclusive feature of an object. Thus when the rope is cognised as a snake, or a mother-of-pearl is taken to be a piece of silver, the cogniser perceives a real snake-feature in the rope lying before him or a real silver-character in the mother-of-pearl that shines before his eyes. He thus does not perceive nothing, nor does he perceive any elsewhere snake-character or silver-character, nor again any indescribable snake or indescribable silver. On the contrary, he perceives a real 'here and now' snake-character, or a real 'here and now' silver-feature, in the object lying before him 'here and now.' His mistake consists not in perceiving anything false or unreal, but in considering the snake or silver-character to be the only characteristic of the object lying before him and ignoring its other and more important aspects. This is why the cognition does not work in life and why the cogniser acting on the suggestion of such imperfect knowledge comes to grief in the practical affairs of life.

Comparing the above six views we note that while the *Asatkhyātivādin* makes error consist in the cognition of an absolute non-existent and the Naiyāyika makes it consist in that of the relatively non-existent, the Śāṅkara-Vedāntin makes it consist in the experience of a logical indefinable which is neither existent nor non-existent. Further we find that according to *Akhyāti* and *Satkhyāti* views, error is no real experience in the strict sense, according to *Akhyātivādins*, error is only negative non-distinguishing of two positive and real experiences, while according to *Satkhyātivādins*, the so-called error cognises a real fact in the object and thus cognises no falsity in the strict sense. Besides, according to the four views, *asat-*, *atn.a-*, *anyathā-*, and *anirvacanīyakhyāti* error always involves a false content which is rejected. It may also be noted that both *Satkhyātivādins* and *Anirvacanīyavādins* make error consist in the cognition of a transcendent object. In other words, according to both, the 'snake' is other than the cognition of the 'snake.' But, according to *Anirvacanīyavādins*, the transcendent object has *apparent* reality : it lasts as long as the subjective cognition lasts and is generated along with the latter as its object of reference. According to *Satkhyātivādins*, however, the transcendent object has *empirical* reality ; the snake-feature is generated in the rope along with the production of the rope and it continues even when the primary presentation merges into a fuller perception of the truth. In other words, the snake does not disappear when the perceiver cognises the rope in its character as a rope.

## THEORIES OF FALSE APPEARANCE IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY—II (A Critical Study)

In a previous paper we have considered six different Indian Theories of False Appearance, called *Asatkhyātivād*, *Atmakhyātivād*, *Akhyātivād*, *Anyathā-khyātibād*, *Satkhyātivād*, and *Anirvacanīyakhyātivād*. Our treatment of these theories has so far been descriptive and explanatory. We propose in the present paper to discuss the first five theories critically from the standpoint of *anirvacanīyakhyāti* which is the Śāṅkarite view of the nature of a false appearance. We may say at the outset that we consider the Śāṅkarite view to be the most adequate of the six different theories and that no account of false appearance can avoid the concept of the indescribable as the essence of a rejected content.

We have seen that the *Asatkhyātibādin* equates the false content to the simply unreal or *asat*. The false is what is not, what never, nowhere is. As the simply unreal, it is an absolute nought. A snake is or may be, but a snake which also is a rope is purely imaginary, an absurdity like a barren mother. It is thus not a fact at all, neither a subjective nor an objective fact, neither positive nor negative. The snake and its negation are facts, but the rope-snake

is not even a negative fact. To err is to cognise this no-fact, to cognise what is not. Error is thus a cognition without content—a cognition that cognises nothing.

The obvious objection to this view is that it does not agree with the deliverance of experience. The false appears and as such is a content of experience. But an absolute nought cannot be an experienced content. To say that language effects the miracle of a contentless experience is to deceive oneself with mere words. The absurd may be suggested by the trickery of language, but a suggestion to think is not a completed thought. The false appears and appears as a completed content. How can an absolute nought be a full-fledged content with a definite suggestion to the will? The snake is not a nebulous appearance, an appearance in the making. It is complete in itself and suggests a course of action. How can a complete content be yet something nothing? Further, the false content has causal efficiency. It produces effects on the cogniser. But a sheer nought cannot produce effects. Nor does correction lend support to the theory that the false is an absolute nought. A sheer nought can neither be affirmed nor denied, neither accepted nor rejected or negatived. But the false is false in so far as corrected, i.e., negatived and rejected. But a mere nothing cannot be rejected. Rejection is rejection of a positive content. To reject a nothing is like striking the empty air with a sword.

But how, it may be asked, may a rejected appearance be anything else than a mere nothing? Rejec-



tion is rejection for all time. When the snake is rejected, it is rejected for all time. We do not say that the rope was but now is no snake. We say on the contrary it never was and never can be a snake, that it was no snake even when it appeared as one. Therefore even when appearing, the rejected appearance is not. The appearance is the appearance of what is not. If the appearance proved any existent content, its rejection would not be unqualified and absolute. The content cannot both be and be negated when appearing.

The Śankarites in reply point out that objection rests on a confusion between positivity and reality. The appearance has positivity, but it lacks reality. The snake is a content of experience, it fills experience, but it is a content without reality, an unattached or floating appearance and as such indescribable. The unreality of the snake-appearance does not prove its absolute emptiness, its sheer nothingness. This is the puzzle of false appearance. It is a positivity without reality, an unreal objectivity, an unattached content. Without the concept of the indescribable, of unattached positivity, of a *bhāvarūpamithyā* false appearance is quite unintelligible. The *asatkhyātivādin's* mistake arises from his confounding the rejected appearance with the absolutely empty, with an absolute nought.

The *Atmakhyāti* view, the Śankarite points out is also equally unsatisfactory, even though free from defects of the *Asatkhyāti* view. The *Atmakhyātivādin* does not deny the content character of the false ap-

pearance, he merely rejects its objectivity, its extramentality. The false is not mere nothing. It is an experienced content, a cognitive fact. But it is a cognitive fact taken to be a transcognitive object, a mental event mistaken for an extramental reality.

The Śāṅkarīties point out that the *Ātmakhyātivādin*, makes the same mistake as the *Asatkhyātivādin*, though in a different way. He is right in recognising the content character of the false appearance, but he contradicts the evidence of consciousness in denying to it extramentality or transsubjectivity. The false does not appear as a mental content nor does rejection prove its subjectivity or internality. A pleasure or a pain appears as a subjective state and it appears as nothing else. But the false snake does not appear as a subjective state and it does not appear as anything else than a transsubjective object. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the false cannot be treated as a psychic fact. As a matter of fact, the false snake appears as one with the external 'this'. How can an internal state appear as the external 'this snake'? The man who withdraws in fear avoids an external fact. He does not withdraw from a snake inside himself. Nor can it be said that rejection establishes the subjectivity of the false. Rejection cancels the snake as a false appearance. It does not posit it as a subjective fact. The identity of the snake and the presented 'this' being negated, the false snake is simply detached from the presented locus. But it is not thereby attached to the subject as its internal state. In fact, if the snake were an internal state it would

not be overthrown by the cognition of the external rope. When we perceive the rope specifically as a rope, the snake-appearance is cancelled. But the rope is an objective fact. How can the perception of an objective fact negate a non-objective, subjective state?

The *Atmakhyātivādin* thus makes the same mistakes as the *Asatkhyātivādin*. He propounds a theory that contradicts the deliverance of experience. The false is not a sheer nought, nor is it a mere subjective fact. It presents itself as transsubjective and therefore must be taken as such. To deny the objectivity of the false appearance is to impugn the evidence of actual experience.

The Prābhākara-Mimāṃsaka theory of *Akhyāti* is also unsatisfactory according to the Śāṅkarites. There is no evidence in consciousness that the false appearance is negative non-distinction. The Prābhākaras are right in recognising a presentative basis of the false appearance. The snake is no mere subjective image objectified and projected. It has a presented basis in the rope perceived generically as the 'this'. But the mistake of the Prābhākaras consists in ignoring the unity of the false appearance. According to them, the false is really two experiences non-distinguished and so confused as one unitary experience. We have not merely a presented this but also a represented snake, but the two are not distinguished as two and the result is confusion. The error arises from a failure to distinguish, the failure to distinguish the perceiving from the remembering, the percept from the image. Hence error, according

to the Prābhakaras, is no positive experience, it is only negative non-distinguishing. There is no real falsity anywhere. The presented 'this' is a fact and so also is the presentation. The represented 'snake', is also a fact and so also is the recollection of it. The error is a name for their non-distinction and confusion. The confusion leads to chaos in life and so the experience is rejected as false.

The Prābhākara view, the Śāṅkarites point out, also runs counter to actual experience just as the two previous views. Actual experience does not show that the false appearance is mere negative non-distinguishing. Nor does experience bear out the Prābhākara contention that we have two experiences instead of one experience. If the false appearance were merely negative, it would not induce a positive practical reaction such as withdrawing in fear. The merely negative cannot have a positive practical effect. Nor can the false appearance be anything else than a unitary specific content. A generic perceived 'this' could not produce, a specific reaction like that of 'starting back'. If the specific reaction could be produced by a generic 'this', it could be produced by anything perceived as a mere 'this' such as a piece of wood or a stone. Nor can the specific reaction be explained by the recollection of the snake. The cogniser who starts back does not withdraw from a past snake. What he withdraws from is a snake cognised 'here and now', a snake cognised as one with the presented 'this.' The false appearance is thus not the 'snake' as such, nor the 'this' as such

It is the 'this' perceived as a 'snake.' It is the 'this false snake' that the cogniser withdraws from, not any elsewhere, elsewhen snake. The point to note is that the 'snake' is cognised in unity with the 'this' and sharing with the latter the reality of a perceived content. This could not be, if 'this' were perceived and the 'snake' were merely remembered. It is illegitimate to distinguish the 'this' and the 'snake' as perceived and imagined, when there is no actual evidence in experience to warrant such distinction. Nor can it be said that the 'snake' is a memory-image with its image character suppressed. A memory-image with its past reference suppressed is no longer a memory-image and in the absence of what constitutes its essence as a memory-image we have no right to characterise it as a content of memory. Moreover non-distinction means absence of distinction, and distinction means reciprocal negation or *bheda*. But reciprocal negation, according to the Prābhākaras, is nothing else than the negated contents. Hence where the contents are present, their reciprocal negation or distinction also must be, and therefore there cannot be any absence of distinction in such circumstances. In the present case, since the distinct contents, viz., perception and recollection are present, their distinction must also be present by necessary implication. Hence the assumption of an absence of distinction is precluded by the circumstances of the case. Again, according to the Prābhākaras, every cognition *qua* cognition illumines itself, Hence there is no experience which is unaware of

itself. This being the case, both the presentation and the representation must be aware of themselves as presentation and representation respectively. How then can the representation fail to appear to itself as a representation and thus fail to be distinguished from the presentation? Moreover, when the false appearance is cancelled, what is rejected or cancelled is a unitary positive content and not a mere negative non-distinction. Thus the experience of correction also proves a unitary positive object as the content of the corrected appearance.

While the Prābhākaras make the mistake of disrupting the unity of the false appearance and thus contradict the evidence of actual experience, the Naiyāyikas who advocate *Anyathākhyāti* acknowledge both the unity and the positivity of the false content. The false appearance, according to the Naiyāyikas, is a complex unity resulting jointly from perception and recollection. It is in fact a single presentative content consisting in the presented 'this' in the form of the elsewhere real snake. The falsity arises from a mispresentation, in the cognition of the here and now 'this' in the form of an elsewhere real object. The presentation of 'this' effects by a process of complication as it were a perception of it in the form of an object which is remote and distant.

The Śāṅkarites point out that the Naiyāyika is right in stressing the unity and the positivity of the false appearance. But his analysis of it as a perceived 'this' in the form of an *elsewhere* real thing is open to serious objections. The 'snake' that is perceived

as the 'this snake' is not apprehended as an *elsewhere* jungle snake magically translated before the cogniser. The actual testimony of consciousness does not bear out the Nyāya view of an elsewhere snake-form getting mysteriously attached to the 'this' appearing before the perceiver. We perceive the 'this' as a snake, i. e., as a particular fact possessing the specific character of a snake, and not as an individual fact appearing in the garment of another. The Nyāya contention that we have here some sort of extraordinary perception of an elsewhere, remote character in the locus of the 'this' that is apprehended by the eye, is untenable for the following reasons. The Naiyāyika holds that there is here in the first place an ordinary contact of the visual sense and the 'this' which produces an ordinary perception of the 'this'. But with it is also produced a recollection of an elsewhere snake and the recollection serving as a connecting-link between the visual sense in ordinary contact with the 'this' and the snake-form of the elsewhere snake revived by memory brings about, a *complicated* perception of the form of the elsewhere snake in the locus of the 'this'. And thus is produced a complex qualified perception 'This is a snake' the 'this' being perceived by ordinary perception and the snake-character being extraordinarily perceived in the 'this' by an extraordinary contact through the recollection of the snake as the connecting-link. But the difficulty in the Nyāya view is that the facts adduced in support of it do not bear out the Nyāya theory. In the case of the fragrant

sandal-wood, the fragrance, the Naiyāyika holds, is cognised by the eye through an extraordinary complicated perception through the contact of cognition or knowledge. The ordinary perception of the sandal-wood by the eye through contact with the visual sense revives the past experience of its fragrance, and this experience serving as the connecting-link between the eye and the fragrance produces a visual perception of the fragrance. This however is very far from being the actual case. Actual report of consciousness shows, the Śāṅkarite argues, that we are not aware of perceiving the fragrance. As a matter of fact we are conscious of perceiving the sandalwood and we are aware of being *reminded* thereby of the fragrance. Thus the Nyāya view does not square with the facts of experience. Moreover, the Nyāya theory, if accepted, will make inference psychologically impossible. Inference is knowledge mediated by the cognition of an invariable relation between a mark observed in a particular subject and something else of which it is a mark. The resulting knowledge is the cognition of this something else as the property of the particular subject in which the mark is observed. But if the perception of the mark were to produce a recollection of what it is a mark of, then this latter will at once connect itself with the observed locus of the mark through an extraordinary contact of cognition or knowledge. Thus we shall have an extraordinary *complicated perception* of the thing to be inferred through the contact of knowledge, and the appearance of the perception will prevent inferential cognition of



the thing. For example, in the inference of 'fire' in 'the mountain yonder' from the observation of 'smoke rising from the mountain yonder', the 'smoke' being perceived will produce the recollection of its invariable associate 'fire'. But 'fire' as so cognised will at once connect itself with the 'mountain' as the observed locus of the mark through the cognitive contact of recollection so that we shall have a *complicated* perception of 'fire' in the 'mountain yonder' instead of an inference of it. The appearance of the perception will make the appearance of the inference impossible, for where the conditions of perception and inference are both present, it is perception that arises and inference does not arise because of the appearance of the the perception.

It follows therefore that the presentation of the 'snake' is not due to any extraordinary contact of the eye with an elsewhere 'snake' through recollection or cognition as the connecting-link. The example of recognition cannot be given as a case in point. In recognition the perceived content is a sense-given fact. The past reference which qualifies the given fact is a matter of memory and not of perception. *Anuvyavasāya* or introspection in the Nyaya sense also cannot be cited as a case of extraordinary perception through the contact of knowledge. It is only Naiyāyikas who admit introspection in the sense of *anuvyavasāya*. As this is not admitted by other schools *pratyāsatti* in the sense of an extraordinary contact of sense with a remote and distant fact cannot be proved by the doubtful example of *anuvyavasāya*.

Further, cognition does not connect itself with a cognitum irrespective of its content. On the contrary its connection with the cognitum is subject to the context in which it was first cognised. But the snake that is perceived is perceived in the locus of the rope. The perceived snake is thus the 'here and now' snake and the 'here and now' snake, (the snake as located in the present rope) was never cognised as snch in the past. How then can a recollection of an elsewhere cognised snake serve as a connecting link with a snake cognised 'here and now' ?

Nor can the Naiyāyika say that the so-called extraordinary contact is only another name for the presence of certain defects. If *pratyāsatti* were a name for certain defects (*doṣas*), then the cognition resulting from such defects will be defective or false cognition. But the Naiyāyikas say that the perception of the snake is the perception of an *elsewhere real* snake and not the perception of anything unreal. The Naiyāyikas contend that though the snake is real, its qualifying the rope is an unreal qualifying of it. But if this be the case, then Naiyāyikas fail to show how real defects can produce an unreal qualification. Besides, defects presuppose their respective substrates in producing effects. Hence they can produce effects either in their substrates or in things which are in contact with their substrates. Defects therefore cannot have any efficiency in regard to objects unconnected with their substrates, i. e., with elsewhere objects with which neither the defects nor the substrates of the defects are in any way con-

nected. It cannot be said that the defects are themselves the connections that connect the substrates with the so-called unconnected objects. If this be the case, there will be no errors of inference, since on account of defects all remote and distant objects will get into our experiences through defects as the connecting-links and thus be perceived contents. Moreover, if defects be themselves contact of sense and object, then the errors of perception will be sense-produced and not defect-born and therefore cannot be called errors, strictly speaking.

There is also another difficulty in the Nyāya view of *Anyathākhyāti*. A cognition evokes practical reaction towards the object cognised by the cognition. If therefore the false experience were the cognition of a jungle snake, it would not induce practical reaction towards a 'here and now' snake, i. e., a snake cognised in the locus of the rope. Nor will it do to say that the rope and not the elsewhere snake is the objective ground of the snake-perception. For the object and that which is cognised as the object cannot be different from each other. The object which appears in the cognition is the object that is cognised by the cognition. Since it is the snake that appears in the cognition as object, it must be the object of the cognition. The rope does not appear in the cognition and the rope therefore cannot be the object presented in the case in question.

The Naiyāyika may say however that the facts are not as they are stated. It is not a fact that the rope does not appear in consciousness at all. It does

appear, as a matter of fact, as a generic 'this'. And the jungle snake also appears, but not in its total character as a jungle snake but as a bare 'snake-form' detached from its original substrate and attached to the rope appearing in consciousness as a bare 'this'. And thus we have the complex, qualified perception, "This is a snake", or, "This has the form of a snake". The resulting cognition is thus the cognition of the real rope in its generic character as 'this' as qualified by the real snake-feature of an elsewhere real snake. The only unreal element in the complex whole is the relation relating the real snake-form to the substrate of the rope appearing as 'this'.

The Naiyāyika thus assumes, the Śāṅkarite replies, an attributed relation between the 'snake-form' and the 'this'—an attribution which is without foundation in reality. But the actual testimony of consciousness does not bear out the Nyāya view. When we reject the false appearance, we do not reject only the relation between the 'this' and the snake-form. We reject the snake itself as a false or a merely apparent snake. Further we reject the snake as one with the 'this', i. e., as forming one indivisible unity with it. As a matter of fact, there is no distinction in consciousness (as long as the illusion lasts) between the 'this' and the snake, the illusion continuing in the form "This, a snake" or "This is a snake". And when we correct the illusion we do not reject a mere relation, but the snake itself in its individual completeness as an unreal appearance. If the rejection were the

rejection of an unreal relation, then it would be the rejection of nothing and would thus be without a positive content to be rejected.

The Nyāya view is also inconsistent with the nature of the practical reaction that follows in the wake of the illusion. When we perceive the snake, we withdraw from it in fear. This would never happen if the perception were of an abstract snake-character and not of a substantive snake. The perceiver reacts to what he cognises as a snake, and since the snake-form does not appear except as qualifying a snake it cannot be said that he perceives the rope as a snake. The snake-appearance thus proves the generation of an objective apparent snake in the locus of the rope.

That the snake-illusion cognises the rope in the character of an elsewhere snake is against the evidence of experience. There is no evidence to prove that the immediately apprehended snake is only the cognition of an elsewhere real snake-form of an elsewhere real thing. If defects could effect this miracle, why should they not effect the miracle of generating an objective apparent snake in the locus of the rope? Nor can it be said that the illusion cognises not the 'this' as a 'snake,' but the 'this' as non-different from 'a snake'. This is against the deliverance of consciousness. It also contradicts the experience of correction. We do not reject 'non-difference from a snake,' we reject the snake itself as a false and a merely apparent snake. And the same remarks apply to the contention that the illusion cognises an elsewhere real snake.

If this were so, correction would not reject the snake simply but would also posit it as real elsewhere.

The *satkhyāti* view of the Rāmānujists is also inconsistent with the actual deliverance of experience. The Rāmānujist holds that a false appearance is a real, partial feature in the object. But this partial feature is taken to be the whole truth about the object and this is why it is a false appearance. But the *satkhyāti* analysis misses the real point at issue. The partial feature is a real feature only as a partial element in the complex totality. It is however no real feature as the only and exclusive property of the object. Therefore as the only and exclusive feature of the object, the partial feature is no real fact at all. As a part which is also the whole, as partial and yet complete and exhaustive, it is thus a mere appearance which has no reality except as an object of the experience to which it appears.

Thus we arrive at last at the *anirvacanīya* or indescribable as the content of a false appearance. As appearing in consciousness, the false is other than the unreal (*asatvilakṣaṇa*). And yet as cancelled and sublated it is also other than the real (*satvilakṣaṇa*). It is thus other than the real and the unreal, i. e., the indescribable or the logically indefinable. The false, in other words, is what appears as eternally negated in the very substrate in which it appears. It may be added that the concept of the false is necessitated by the consciousness of rejection and the presumptive evidence which such rejection

implies. Without the concept of the false, correction as rejection for all time is inexplicable. Thus the fact of rejection creates presumptions in respect of objective false appearance. It may be further noted that the false appearance presupposes a substrate of reality so that the false never appears except in a substrate which is real. The false, in other words, is what depends on a substrate of reality for its appearance without at the same time possessing the same grade of reality as its substrate. This means that the negation of the false appearance does not entail also the negation of the substrate in which it appears. The false therefore is a dependent apparent fact within a substrate of a higher, more durable reality.

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## SCHOOLS OF VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY

The name Vedanta (literally the end or terminus of the Vedas) is commonly used with reference to the concluding portions of the Vedic literature called the Upaniṣads and the aphoristic formulations of the Upaniṣadic teachings called the Brahman Sūtras. The commentaries on the Upaniṣads and the Brahman Sūtras, i. e. interpretations of the Upaniṣadic teachings and their aphoristic formulations thus constitute what may be called the philosophy of the Vedanta. Despite however a common basis or foundation in the Upaniṣads and the Sūtras, it remains true that there are many widely divergent interpretations of the Vedanta teaching—a fact that proves the groundlessness of the charge that Vedanta is not a reasoned system of thought but only exegesis of Śāstric texts. The very fact that not merely the different schools of Vedanta but also Nyāya, Sāṅkhya and other schools appeal to the self-same Vedic authority proves clearly that the so-called Śāstric foundation of these schools is more nominal than real and that the systems have to be judged on their intrinsic merits as intelligible accounts of experience and not as correct or incorrect interpretations of the Śāstras.

There are several interpretations of the Brahman Sūtras and the best known amongst these are :—



(1) The Śāṅkarite interpretation known as *Kevalādvaitā* or Absolute Non-Dualism :

(2) The Ramanujist interpretation known as *Viśiṣṭādvaita* or Qualified Non-Dualism ;

(3) The Vallabhite interpretation known as *Suddhādvaita* or pure Non-Dualism ;

(4) Nimbārka's interpretation known as *Dvaitādvaita* or Non-Dualism in Dualism ;

(5) The Mādhva interpretation known as *Dvāita* or Dualism ;

(6) Baladeva's interpretation known as *Acintya-bhedābheda* or unthinkable Non-Difference-in-Difference.

(7) Vijñānabhikṣu's interpretation known as *Abibhagalakṣanādvaita* or Non-Dualism-of-the-Non-Differentiated.

It may be remarked that while the first six of these represent schools of thought, the last named is the view of an individual commentator who founded no school. It is also noteworthy that amongst the seven different interpretations of Vedānta above named, the Śāṅkarite and the Mādhva interpretations stand on a somewhat different footing from the rest. Thus while all other systems accept the reality of duality as well as non-duality and attempt a reconciliation of the opposed elements in a synthetic, inclusive view, the Śāṅkarites reject the reality of duality and the Mādhvas that of non-duality. A further point to be noted is that with the exception of the Śāṅkarites and Vijñānabhikṣu, every other school of Vedānta recognises the necessity of devotion or *Bhakti* in

addition to knowledge as a means to the attainment of *moksa* or freedom from bondage.

Sankarite Absolutism is known as *Kevaladvaita* on its positive side and as *Māyāvāda* on its negative side. It is a metaphysic of absolute non-dualism based on the conception of the sole reality of consciousness and the falseness of all that is other than consciousness. On the *śāstric* side it professes to be based on three different sets of Upaniṣadic texts, viz., (1) texts teaching non-dualism such as *Ekāmeva advitiyam* (one only without a second), (2) texts teaching the unreality of duality such as *nehanānākincana* (There is no real plurality anywhere), and (3) texts teaching the non-dual absolute to be the stuff of the universe: *yato va imāni bhūtāni jāyante* (From which all the elements, etc, have sprung forth). It may be remarked however that *śāstric* texts do not constitute the only proof of the Sankarite *advaita* the texts in fact being used only as an authoritative support to what is also arrived at by a logical criticism of experience. And this holds both of the negative and the positive side of Sankarite Absolutism. It is needless to say that as a metaphysic of absolute non-duality the Sankarite philosophy necessarily involves a negative metaphysic of duality. Since Brahman is the non-dual reality, the world with its plurality must be a false appearance. The world is thus the self-alienation of Brahman, an eternally negated objectification of the unobjective reality. Hence the world is an apparent modification of Brahman while it is a substantial transformation of the nescience inherent in Brahman ;

it is a *vivarta* of Brahman and a *parināma* of *māyā*.

The Ramanujist rejects the Sankarite doctrine of *māyā* and with it the conception of the world as a false and an eternally cancelled appearance. The unity of the Absolute, according to the Ramanujist, does not exclude the world and its plurality from itself. The Absolute in fact, is the substantive reality to which the world belongs as an adjectival determinaton, The relation of the Absolute to the world of things and beings is thus the relation of a substance to its attribute and not, as Sankarites say, the relation of a substrate of reality to an unattached, false appearance. The substance-attribute relation however is so wide as to include every other relation within it such as the relation of soul and body, of whole and part, of subject and object, etc. Hence we may speak of Brahman as the soul of which the world is the body, as the whole of which the world is the part, as the subject of which the world is the object, etc.

The Vallabhites (*Suddhādvaitins*) also reject *māyāvāda* and the Sankarite view of the falsity of the world-appearance. The Absolute unity, according to the Vallabhite, comprises the world and its plurality within it, and the relation between the Absolute and the world is the relation between a whole and a part. Thus the relation is neither the relation of a real substrate to a floating appearance, nor the relation of a substantive to an adjective qualifying the substantive. On the contrary, it is the relation of the unlimited to the limited, of the totality to a fragment

of the totality. The part is not an adjective of the whole ; it is the whole itself under a limit, one amongst other possibilities in which the whole realises itself. Hence it is consubstantial with the whole and not a mere attribute of it as Ramanujists think.

The *Dvaitādvaitins*—Nimbārka, Bhāṣka, etc.—also repudiate both Sankarite and Ramanujist *advaita*. The absolute Non-Duality comprises duality within it but it does not comprise the latter as an attribute distinguishing it. An attribute qualifying a substance distinguishes it from other substances. But the Absolute has no other outside itself from which it can be differentiated by its attribute of duality. Hence the relation of the Absolute to the duality within it cannot be the relation of a substance to an attribute qualifying it. On the contrary, the relation is a relation between the independent and the dependent, between an autonomous and a subservient being. Hence duality has dependent, subordinate reality within the independent, autonomous reality of the Absolute. Duality is thus different as well as non-different from the non-dual independent reality, different as possessing a dependent subordinate existence and non-different as possessing no independent existence.

The Mādhvas - followers of Madhvācāryya—go farther than the Ramanujists, the Vallabhites, etc—in their rejection of the non-dual reality of the Absolute. They are out-and-out *dvaitins* for whom duality is the reality and non-duality is a fiction of

the imagination. The hard real world cannot be done away with and true freedom comes only through right appreciation of its inherent distinctions. Thus the distinction between one thing and another, between a thing and an individual soul, between one individual soul and another, between an individual and God and between the material world and God are the five eternal distinctions that are inherent in the nature of reality. True freedom consists not in shutting one's eyes to these inherent distinctions but in a correct appraisal of their nature and significance. Through a right comprehension of these eternal distinctions supplemented by Bhakti or devotion one comes to know of one's true place in reality and is thereby liberated from the futile desires and longings of *samsāra*.

*Acintya-bhedābheda*. This view supposed to be the view of Sricaitanya is preached by the Nadia school founded by Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇ and his followers. It explains the relation between the Lord and the world as consisting in an unthinkable difference-in-non-difference. The Lord is endowed with three different *śaktis* or powers, viz., *jiva-śakti*, *māyāśakti* and *svarūpaśakti*. *Sivaśakti* in the Lord is the power in the Lord that manifests itself in the innumerable individual souls in the universe. *Māyāśakti* is the power in the Lord that manifests itself as the material cause of non-sentient nature. *Svarūpaśakti* is the power in the Lord that acts as the effecient cause directing and regulating the operations of the material cause towards the production of the effects

proper to it. The śakti of the Lord is the Lord's power of self-concretion—the power whereby the abstract universal becomes concretised into a world of space-time events (*ghaṭanā*). The power in the Lord is both different and non-different from the Lord and the relation between the Lord his creative śakti or power is an unthinkable difference-in-non-difference.

*Avibhāgalakṣana-advaita.* Amongst the commentators on Vedānta, the position of Vijnānabhikṣu is unique. Vijnānabhikṣu's aim is synthetic, conciliatory, his Commentary being an attempt not to establish vedānta absolutism by a refutation of other systems but to show the essential harmony of Vedānta with the doctrines of the other schools. He gives the name *avibhāga lakṣaṇa-advaita* to his own interpretation of the Vedānta teachings and he means by it a form of non-dualism which is not inconsistent with the dualism of experience as taught by Nyāya Sāṅkhya and other schools. Thus Vedānta absolutism, according to Vijnānabhikṣu, is non-dualism of the non-differentiated, i. e., the non-duality of non-empirical reality that appears as a differentiated plurality in its manifest forms in the experience of individuals. For example, the Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya in the transcendental state is an undifferentiated objective ground which as undifferenced and undivided may be regarded as a non-dual basis of the differentiated world of experience. And what holds of Prakṛti in the transcendental state applies *mutatis mutandis* to Prakṛti and Puruṣa in their reciprocal relation in the metempirical state prior to differentiation and

manifestation as a world of experience. Thus what is a duality or plurality from the empirical standpoint may itself be regarded as a non-dual, non-divided reality in the transcendental *avibhakta* state preceding experience and manifestation. Hence the *dvaita* or duality taught in Sāṅkhya and Nyāya is nothing but the differentiated, distinguished form of a monistic undifferenced reality which is the Brahman of the Vedantist.

## THE BHAGAVAT AND THE PANCARATRA IN RELATION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SRI CAITANYA

The Philosophy of *Srī Caitanya* is an out-growth of Mādvaita Dvaitavāda, though it deviates also in many essentials from strict dvaitism as preached by Mādhvācāryya and his School. No precise estimate of *Srī Caitanya's* Philosophy is possible without some idea of the standpoints of the principal Vaiṣṇavika Sects who had been preaching Vaiṣṇavika Philosophy and Religion in India from very early times. Among the different sects who have been preaching Vaiṣṇavika religion and the cult of devotion or Bhakti in India, we hear of the following four principal Schools :—

1. Śrī-Sect or Lakṣmī-sect which preached viśiṣṭādvaita or Qualified dualism. Rāmānuja was the authoritative exponent of the Śrī-School.

2. Another Sect—*Hamsasampradīya*—is supposed to be founded by *Catuhsana* ( Sonaka, Sananda, etc ). Nimbarka—its principal exponent—preached *Dvaitādvaita* or Dualism in Non-Dualism.

3. A third sect, called *Brahmasampradīya*, is supposed to be founded by Brahma. It preached Dvaitavāda or Dualism and Mādhvācāryya is its principal exponent.



4. The fourth Sect is called Rudra sampradāya. Its first teacher is said to be Rudra and its principal exponent is said to be Viṣṇusvāmī, and latterly Vallabhācāryya. The doctrine it preached is known as śuddhadvaita or Pure Non-Dualism.

All the four sects profess to derive their doctrines from the *Pancarītra* teachings.

Srī Caitanya founded no separate sect and the Gaudīya Vaiṣnavas who claimed him as their teacher called themselves a branch of the Mādhva-Sect. A survey of the list of successive spiritual preceptors also points to the same conclusion. Srī Caitanya's *Sannyasa-guru*, i. e., the preceptor who initiated him to the life of the renunciate was Keśava Bhāratī and Keśava Bhāratī was a sanyāsī or renunciate of the Mādhva Sect. Srī-Caitanya's *Dikṣā-guru*, i. e., the spiritual preceptor who initiated him to the religious code he practised,—was Iśvara Purī and both Iśvara Purī and Keśava Bhāratī were spiritual disciples of Srimān Mādhvendra Purī who was one of the teachers of the Mādhva Sect.\* It remains true however that despite this spiritual affiliation to the Mādhva Sect, the philosophical position of Srī Caitanya diverged considerably from that of Mādhvācāryya and his School.

Srī-Caitanya left very little in writing and what we know of him is through the exposition of his position by his followers, known otherwise as the

\* Cf. "Jaivadharmā" by Kedar Nath Bhaktibinode P. 224 (Gauriya Matha Pub, 6th Edition.)

Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas. Śrī Caitanya, in this respect, may be compared to Socrates amongst the Ancient Greek Philosophers. Just as we know of Socrates and his teachings not from his own writings but through the writings of his disciples like Plato, so also we know of Śrī-Caitanya's Philosophy principally through the writings of his spiritual disciples, i. e., the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas such as Kṛṣṇadas Gosvāmī, Rupa Gosvāmī, Jeeva Gosvāmī, Baladeva Vidyabhuṣaṇa, etc.

The Gauḍīya position may be traced to many sources, the principal, amongst these being Pāṇ-carātra Śāstra, Śākta-tantra and Mahayāna Bauddha religious *Praxis* or *Sādhanā*. All these are included in what is known as Agama as distinguished from the Vedas which pass as Nigama. The Gauḍīya position, in respect of its foundation and base, reflects the recognition of the authority of Agama. What precisely is the relation of Agama to Veda is a controversial question and for sometime controversies raged regarding the validity and the Vedic character of the Agamas. The Gauḍīyas like the other Vaiṣṇava sects preached their doctrine as the substance of the Vedic or Sruti teachings and tried to substantiate their contention by quotations from the Upaniṣads and the Purāṇas. Needless to say that the Smārta who constituted the orthodoxy repudiated the Vaiṣṇavite claims and held their doctrines like those of the Śaivas and Pāśu-patas to be non-vedic and devoid of the sanction of the revealed scriptures (Śruti).

That the Gaudīyas preached the Pāncarātra views goes without question, but the Pāncarātra sect must be regarded as also including the Bhāgavat sect within itself. In the early stages there were no doubt differences between the Bhagavatas and the Pāncarātras, but it remains true that after sometime the two sects merged into one.\* The Bhagavata sect was specially founded on the Śrīmadbhāgavat and Śrīmajjīva Gosvāmī in his comment on the above and also in his work called "Sātsandharbha" has tried to show the essential agreement or unity of the Bhāgavat and the pāncarātra viewpoints.†

The religion of the pāncarātra and Bhāgavat is distinguished by its special emphasis on Devotion and Love (*Bhakti*). In this respect it is in striking

\* In Adhyāya 350, Santiparva, Mokṣadharmā Narāṇīya khanda of the Mahābhārata there is reference to the Pāncarātra doctrine. Here the speaker is Nārāyaṇa and the listener is Nārada. Like the Pāsupata Sāṅkhya-Yoga, etc. many believe to be un-Vedic. In the Harsacarita there is separate mention of the Pāncarātra and Bhāgavata sects. According to Sankara Brahmasutras 2,2,42-43 are a refutation of the Bhāgavat view-point. According to Rāmānuja however the particular section admits of being recast into conformity to the Pāncarātra views. Rāmānuja considers Pāncarātra to be not un-vedic as is contended by the Smārtas. Before Rāmānuja Yamunācāryya tried to establish the vedic character of the Pāncarātra in his "Agama-Prāmāṇya". According to the Narayaniya of the Mahābhārata the Pāncarātra represents the religion of the Sāttvatas and is therefore sometimes called Sāttvata-Dharma

† Mm. Pdt. Gopinath Kaviraj holds that Bopadeva cannot be the author of the Bhāgavat as an examination of a manuscript copy of the Bhāgavat preserved in the Benares Sanskrit college Library shows that its likely date must be put down somewhere in the 12th century A.D.—a surmise which is also, he says, held to be near the mark by the French scholar Sylvan Levi.

contrast with the vedic religion and cult where Bhakti is very little stressed and is almost ignored. Though vedic worship may be said to be not incompatible with Bhakti-cult in a sense, yet it cannot be said to be devotional, strictly speaking, as the constitutive elements of *Bhakti* or Devotion are not to be found in the vedic methods of worship through works (Karma) and knowledge or intellectual intuition (*gñāna*). *Bhakti* no doubt is definable from various standpoints but it cannot be denied that at its highest it is a condition of emotional fervour or exaltation. Just as in Nyāya and other orthodox schools of Indian Philosophy, the emotions, moods and sentiments go unnoticed, so also in the vedic forms of worship *Bhakti* as a method of 'worship' is simply overlooked. \*

Sāṇḍilya and Nārada are the authors of the Bhakti sūtras and the Pāncarātra viewpoint has a strong affinity to the teachings of both of these. Tradition has it that Sāṇḍilya found consolation in the

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\* The *bhāvas* or emotions find no place in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika enumerations of the *viśeṣa-guṇas* or specific qualities of the self. *Jñāna* cognition, *sukha-duḥkha*, pleasure-pain, *rāga-dveṣa* attraction & aversion, etc are recognised, but *rāga* & *dveṣa* are conative impulses rather than emotions proper and pleasure and pain are not emotions, strictly speaking; though they may enter as elements in emotions and emotional compounds. In *Alaṅkāra Śāstra* there are elaborate analysis of the *bhāvas* or emotions, but *Alaṅkāra Śāstra* or Rhetoric is based on *Agama* and not on *Veda*. Hence there is hardly any place for an emotional *praxis* as a method of worship in vedic religion and it is quite possible that it is ignored as being *vāsanātmaka* or passionate in character and therefore being inconsistent with the dispassion and detachment necessary for an intellectual intuition of the Absolute which is liberation according to the vedic intellectual standpoint.

Pāncarātra after fruitless quest of the summum bonum in the four Vedas. In many old texts Pāncarātra Samhita is referred to as Sāndilya Samhitā. An examination of the Narayaniya upākhyāna and of the Nārada Pāncarātra shows that Narada was also a believer in and follower of the Pāncarātra cult. The Nārada Sanatkumar discourse of the Chāndogya-upaniṣad also shows that Narada was opposed to the cult of worship through recitations of *mantras*, etc. Just as believers in works believe works to be the effective means to the attainment of the highest good, so also believers in knowledge believe intellectual intuition to be a necessary condition of the attainment of liberation or mokṣa. Nyaya vaiśeṣikas and other orthodox schools believe in works or knowledge or both as the indispensable means to liberation or the highest good. Though knowledge or intuition has been variously conceived and also the liberation which results therefrom, yet almost all orthodox systems agree in holding that there is no liberation or mokṣa without knowledge or intuition. It is otherwise however with Bhakti-Śāstra and the systems founded thereon. They all emphasise the superior virtue of *Bhakti*, devotion & love as a method of worship. Some even go so far as to make Bhakti an end-in-itself—a Pancama puruṣārtha, a Fifth end or good which is higher than mukti or liberation which is the fourth and the highest end according to orthodox schools. In the works of Sāndilya and Nārada, the primacy of Bhakti or devotional worship is constantly stressed, Bhakti

being sometimes spoken of as the effective means to the realisation of liberation and sometimes as being its own end, i. e., Bhakti both as *sādhana* or the means and Bhakti as the *Sādhya* or the end to be accomplished by the means; mokṣa or salvation being regarded as a side-issue of the process of Bhakti-sāadhanā that does not deserve to be deliberately aimed at or specially stressed.

The source-books of the Pāncarātra Śāstra are the Agama-literature called Somhitā or Tantra. The Pāncarātra Samhitas are ordinarily held to be 108 in number, but the researches of Dr. Shrader have shown that the total number is not below 210 and may be even higher if we consider the fact that one comes across many different Samhitas bearing the same name or title and also the fact that one also comes across samhitas bearing unfamiliar names in works of great antiquity.

It is therefore too much to expect that such a vast literature will not disclose differences despite a certain common measure of agreement. And so just as in the Kasmir Agamas, one comes across both dualistic and non-dualistic doctrines, so also one meets with *dvaita* as well as *advaita* view points in the Pāncarātras. But the *advaita* or non-dualism of the Pāncarātras, it should be noted, is very different from the *nirviśeṣa advaita* or the indeterminate non-dualism propounded by Śankara. It is not an abstract colourless non-duality but rather a balanced duality or unity-in-duality that is taught by the Pāncarātra just as we have in *spanda* and *Pratyabhi-*

jñadarśana, a unity. in other words, which is, the equilibrium, as it were, of the Lord and his Śakti. When the ultimate Energy or Lakṣmi becomes merged or latent in the Lord, then it is the state of dissolution, the inactive state of the ultimate Energy. This state is described as the state of non-duality. For the Śankarite Śakti or Energy is an unreal appearance lacking in ultimate reality. It is an imaginary fiction (*tuccha*) from the absolute viewpoint (*pāramārthadr̥ṣṭi*), a false appearance (*mithyā*) or a logical indefinable (*anirvacanīya*) from the logical viewpoint (*vicāradr̥ṣṭi*) and is real for all practical purposes from the worldly or empirical standpoint (*vyavahārika dr̥ṣṭi*). As ultimate reality belongs to Brahman alone, there is no room for *Śakti* or energy as an element of reality in Sankarite non-dualism. And the denial of the ultimate reality of *Śakti* has landed the Śankarite into discounting both the finite self and the world as false appearances and therefore into consequent rejection of works, worship and devotion as possessing any real significance or value for the spirit and finally into the repudiation of relations and relational consciousness as a figment of nescience. Needless to say the reality of *Śakti* is an indispensable article of faith quite as much for the Saivas and the Śaktas as for Vaiṣṇavas and their way of devotion and love. Repudiation of *Śakti* in its pure and unalloyed state in the Lord's essence or *Svarupa* will reduce the relation between the Lord, the individual self and the world to an unreal fiction and will render un-

availing and futile not merely *Bhakti* but also compassion, work etc., as a preparation for the life of the spirit. The non-dualism which is preached in the Vaisnava, śaiva and śākta Agama is then not incompatible with *Bhakti* as a discipline of the spirit or with enjoyment of divine life through emotional moods and sentiments. In fact, non-dualism in their case is not a consequence of the negative attitude of denial and renunciation *in toto* but is based on the positive attitude of appropriation, attainment or achievement of the *Sakti* that is beyond oneself and is to be found in the Lord. In this respect Vaisnavism presents a close affinity to Mahāyān Buddhism where the foundation is laid for the doctrine of Bodhisattva by the recognition of the reality of *Prajñāpāramitā*. In the Pāncarātra the unity or advaita which is preached is the interpenetrative unity of energy or *śakti* and the energising principle. The Vaisnava teachers accept the inherence of the one in the other, i.e., their inseparable unity despite mutual distinction and emphasise the reality of the inherent energy even when it is in inactive slumber and remains non-manifest and latent, in the energising principle.

It is through the Lord's will that the dormant or latent energy in the Lord becomes astir or awakened and begins to function actively. The event is likened to a streak of *lightening* flashing over an over-cast sky. In spite of a real difference between energy and the energising principle the difference is not manifest or apprehended in the non-manifest state.



Such a state may be conceived as motionless, dead rest or *nirvāṇa*. The Lord's will or Act which causes the first stir in the dormant primal energy may be regarded as the Lord's spontaneous or free Act which is otherwise unaccountable. No other reason can be assigned for it excepting that it is his nature or *svabhāva* to will it. In this primary stage when *Śakti* or Energy is first aroused from slumber as it were, what happens is a stir in an insignificant portion of the primal Energy, the rest, i.e., the major portion remaining latent or inactive as before. The manifest or activated Energy is described as being two-fold—being of one kind in respect of its *Kriyā* or activity and of another kind in respect of its *bhūti* or becoming, *Kriyāśakti* is described in *Ahīrbudhnyasamhitā* as *Sudarśana Kalā*. It is *niskala*, successionless, or indivisible, and *prānītmaka*, life animated or of the nature of life. *Bhūti-Śakti* is manifold and is characterised by differences of various sorts. *Bhūti-Śakti* is insignificant as compared with *Kriyā-śakti*. It is *Kriyā-śakti* that transmits, at the time of creation, the power of evolution and transformation to the primordial matter or *Prakṛti*, the power of temporal flow and successive to *Kāla* or Time and the capacity of experience and enjoyment to the individual self or *Atmā*. At the time of dissolution it retracts all their to itself.

The expansion and retraction of *Śakti* take place in rhythmic order or succession and this accounts for the cyclic rotation of creation after dissolution and dissolution after creation as a fixed rule of nature.

Three kinds of creation (*sr̥ṣṭi*) are recognised in Vaiṣṇava literature—pure, mixed and impure. Pure creation (*Suddhasr̥ṣṭi*) may be otherwise described as a state of *guṇonmeṣa* or budding forth of the *guṇas*. At this state the six *aprakṛta* or immaterial qualities of the Lord make their appearance. On account of these attributes or *guṇas* the Lord is qualified by qualities despite his being dissociated from Physical qualities or the *guṇas* or *Prakṛti* and his being *nirguṇa* or qualitless in that sense. The six immaterial qualities that appear at this stage are :—

Intelligence (*Jñāna*), Divine Sovereignty as Irresistible will-Power (*Aiśvarya*), *Sakti* as the Primordial matter and energy or material and efficient cause of the world, Indefatigable energy or Strenght ( *Bala* ), Inexhaustible creative Activity (*Viryya*) \*, Autonomy in creative Activity ( *Tejas* ) † Of these *gnāna* or Intelligence is both essence ( *svarūpa* ) and attribute ( *Dharma* ) of the Lord. The other five are attributes ( *Dharma* ) only and do not constitute the Lord's *Svarūpa* or essence. Of these *Jñāna*, *aiśvarya* and *Sakti* are said to constitute the "Stages of rest" of the Lord ( *viśrāma bhāmi* ) while *Bala*, *Viryya* and *Tejas* are said to constitute the "Stages of effort" ( *sramabhāmi* ). All these

\* The Lord creates without suffering change. The milk changes into curd, not so the Lord when he creates. This is his *Viryya*, his inexhaustible creative power.

† The Lord does not depend on anything outside himself in creating. This is his *Tejas*, his autonomons creative activity.

attributes in combination constitute the form of the Lord and Lakṣmī. The denizens of Paravyoma or Vaikunt'ha always have a vision of this form.

The Lord or Bhagavān as characterised by the six attributes and yet separated from Śakti is Vāsudeva. From Vāsudeva emanate three other Vyuhās or Subheads, viz., Śankarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. The emanation of one Vyuha out of another is compared to lightening one lamp by another. Of these each Vyuha has two of the six qualities as dominant characters ( *pradhāna* ) and the other four as Subservient ( *gṇuṇa* ) to these. Thus Jñāna ( Intelligence ) and Bala ( Strength ) are predominant in Śankarṣaṇa and the other four latent or subservient. Similarly Śakti ( Energy ) and Tejas ( Autonomous Creative Activity ) are the predominant characters or attribute of Aniruddha, and Aiśvayya ( Irresistible will Power ) and Viryya ( Inexhaustible creative activity ) are the distinguishing attributes of Pradyumna. The successive emanation of the three Vyuhās from Śankarṣaṇa to Aniruddha is regarded as the time of Pure creation ( Śuddha-sṛṣṭi ). The time of dissolution of Pure creation is to be conceived contrarywise as the successive dissolution from Aniruddha to Śankarṣaṇa in the original ground which is Vāsudeva. It is said that the whole world remains on an insignificant portion of Śankarṣaṇas body in the form of a mole. Śankarṣaṇa as the source or receptacle of innumerable worlds has the form of Baladeva. Out of Pradyumna appears the duality of Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Pradyumna is said

to effect, the creation of Manus ( *mānavasarga* ) and the creation of the Vidyas ( *vaidyasarga* ) by the application of his Irresistible will Power ( *Guṇa Aisvaryya* ), i.e., both the Group soul, Primordial Matter and subtle time ( *Sūkṣma kāla* ) are emanations or offshoots of this Vyūha. Aniruddha thereafter takes over the creation of Pradyumna and evolves out of it the manifested world, gross or sensible time and the mixed creation of souls. He thus becomes the regulator by his own Śakti of all the worlds and their constituent objects.

As regards the ultimate character or form of the Lord or Bhagavān it has been already noted that *śrī* or *Lakṣmi* is his Sakti or Energy. In some Samhitās ( eg. the Ahirbudhnya Samhitā ) the ultimate Energy is supposed to have this one form only. In some other Samhitās however two *śaktis* are mentioned, viz., *śrī* and *bhū* \* According to Viṣṇu and some other samhitās however *śakti* is of three kinds—*śrī*, *bhū* and *līlā* ( or *nīlā* ).

According to the Samhitās that hold the *śaktis* to be three in number, *śrī* stands for *Kalyāṇa* ( good luck ) and is *Icchāśakti*, will power or spontaneity, *bhū* is *Kriyāśaktirūpā*, energy as activating principle and is of the nature of *prabhāva*, might or overpowering force while *līlā* is *sākṣātśaktirūpā*, i.e., *śakti* or energy in its immediacy and is of the nature of the sun, the moon and fire.

In the Highest Heaven ( *Parama vyoman* ) there are two kinds of finite selves ( *jīvas* ), viz., *nitya*

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\* *Pāṇmatantra*, *Parameśvarasāhita* etc.

or eternal denizens of *Para Vyoma*, and the *mukta* the liberated who have attained freedom from bondage and have thereby become its denizens. The *nityas* are eternally free and had never any touch of mundane life. They are spoken of in Vedic literature as the angels (*sūri*). They are omniscient and are the eternal servants of the Lord. Their respective duties have been fixed for them by the Lord since beginningless time in according with the Lord's will or pleasures. Of these Canda, Pracanda, Bhadra, Subhadra, etc., are the gate-keeper of Vaikuntha or Para Vyoma, Kumud, Kumudakṣa, Pundarika, Vāmana, etc. are the police and the magistracy (*naṣarapāla*), Ananta or Śeṣa is the Lord's bed of rest, Garuḍa is his carrier and Viṣva-kṣena is his minister and adviser. The Lord's courtiers (*pārsada*) all belong to the group of *nityajīvas* or angels. The *muktajīvas* or liberated souls are of the essence of blissful consciousness and move about in Paravyoma like molecules dazzling in emanating light-rays of untold number. They constitute a separate class different from the class of the angels who are the Lord's attendants and courtiers. They have no physical body, but they can move to any place in the world by assuming an immaterial body. They are however debarred from interfering with the course of the world and their only aim is the service of the Lord.

Amongst the Vaiṣṇavika Schools, the Śrī and Brahma sects have adopted the names Lakṣmi and Viṣṇu as representing the ultimate Sakti or Energy

and the reality which owns and functions through the Energy. The Nimbarka sect is the worshipper of these as Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa and so also is the Rudra sect of Viṣṇuśvāmī and Vallabhācāryya. Though Śrī Caitanya regarded himself as a disciple of a Mādhvaguru, he also like Viṣṇuśvāmī and Nimbarka sects preached the worship of the Lord and his Sakti in the form of Rādhā Kṛṣṇa. In the Pañcarātra however the emphasis is on worship of Viṣṇu and Lakṣmī though the spiritual value of Rādhā-kṛṣṇa cult and of Bṛndābanlīlā does not go altogether unnoticed. In Narada Pañcarātra there is mention of Rādhā, but both Dr. Bhandarkar and Dr. Shrader are sceptical about the antiquity of the Narada Pañcarātra and are disposed to treat the Rādhā-kṛṣṇa cult as a later accretion not intrinsic to the Pañcarātra views. Mm. Pdt. Gopinath however holds that there is no good reason to believe either that the Nārada Pañcarātra is very recent or that the cult of Rādhākṛṣṇa is foreign to the Pañcarātra view point and in support of his position he mentions the Sanatkumar Samhitā which is preserved in manuscript in the Benaras Sanskrit Library in which is expounded Rādhākṛṣṇatattva. Whatever the merits or otherwise of the controversy, it remains true that with the substitution of RādhāKṛṣṇa for the concept of Lakṣmī and Viṣṇu, was introduced a new approach to the problem of devotion and worship the spiritual significance rather than its chronology really matters in a philosophical evaluation of the concepts. In the Philosophy of Śrī Caitanya which will now follow will be indicated the difference of the two concepts and their significance from the standpoints of comparative religion and Philosophy.

## THE PHILOSOPHY OF SUDDHĀDVAITA

The present paper proposes to be an exposition of the philosophy of Vallabhācāryya and his school, known as the Philosophy of Śuddhādvaita. The Śuddhādvaita philosophy is of interest not merely as an *advaita* interpretation of Vedānta opposed to Śāṅkarite *māyāvāda* and its world-denial, but also as the philosophy of one of the principal Vaisnavika Schools distinct from Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaitādvaita as well as Acintyabhedābheda.

The real founder of the School of Vallabhācāryya is supposed to be an ancient *ācāryya*, called Viṣṇu-svāmī. According to tradition Viṣṇusvāmī was the son of a Dravidian king who was a vassal of the emperor of Delhi. The exact time of Viṣṇusvāmī is difficult to determine, but if Nāvājī's *Bhakti mālā* can be relied on, Sādhū Jñānadeva belonged to his sect and was an immediate successor to him. If this Jñānadeva be the identical person who translated the *Srīmadbhagavadgītā* in Mahārāstri language, Viṣṇusvāmī must be placed somewhere near 1250 A.D., i.e., about forty years before Jñānadeva who flourished in 1290 A.D. Grierson's contention<sup>1</sup> that Vallabha's father, Lakṣaṇa, was a disciple of Viṣṇusvāmī and Viṣṇusvāmī must have flourished in the 14th century A.D. is refuted by the fact that the way in which

1. Encyclopaedia of Religion & Ethics, Vol. II

Mādhavācāryya mentions in his *Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha* the sect founded by Viṣṇusvāmī proves beyond doubt that Viṣṇusvāmī must have flourished long before Mādhavācāryya himself.

The followers of Viṣṇusvāmī were believed to be worshippers of Viṣṇu in the Incarnation of Nṛsimha or the Lion-man. For a long time the sect remained all but extinct and it was Vallabhācāryya who resurrected it and gave it a fresh lease of life. Vallabhācāryya was a contemporary of Śrīcaitanya,

The *anubhāsyā* by Vallabhācāryya on the *Brahmasūtras* is the principal authoritative philosophical treatise of the Śuddhādvaita School. Vallabha was a prolific writer and his writings include the *Subhodinī tīkā* on the *Srīmadbhāgavata*, the *Tattvārthadīpa* or *Tattvārthapanibandha*, the *Puṣṭipravāhamaryādābheda*, the *Kṛṣṇapremāmṛta*, the *Siddhāntarahasya*, etc. all which are read, discussed and cherished with reverence by the followers of the school. Vallabha's son, Viṭṭhalanātha Dikṣita or Viṭṭhaleśvara Dikṣita, was also the author of several works, the principal amongst them being the *Vidvanamaṇḍana* (referred to in Vallabha's *anubhāsyā* 4-4 sūtra 14), the *Premāmṛtatīkā*, the *Puṣṭipravāhamaryādābheda-tīkā*, the *Bhaktihamsa*, *Vallabhāṣṭaka*, etc. Viṭṭhalanātha's fifth son, Raghunātha wrote a commentary on the *Bhaktihamsa* called *Bhaktitarāṅgiṇī* and also another *tīkā* on *Vallabhāṣṭaka*. Mention may also be made here of the *Suddhādvaitamārtanda*—an important work of the school by Śrī Giridharajee Mahārāja, a



commentary thereon called *suddhādvaitamārtan-  
daprakāśa* by Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa and the *Prame-  
yaratnārnava* by Bālakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa. The *Vāda-  
kathā* by Kalyāṇa Raya, a disciple of Viṭṭhala and  
the *Bhaktimārtanda* by Gopeśvarji Mahārāja also  
deserve mention amongst the works of the school.  
Another disciple of Viṭṭhalanātha called Pitāmba-  
bara, was the author of the *Avaraṇabhaṅga* (which  
was a ṭīka on Vabllabha's *Tattvadīpanibandhapra-  
kāśā*), the *Puṣṭipravāhamaryyādāvivaraṇa*, etc.  
Puruṣottama, the son of Pitāmbara, wrote the ṭīka  
on the *anubhāsyā* called *Prakāśa* as also the *Vid-  
vanmāṇdanatikā*, the *Bhaktihamṣaviveka*, the *Bhakti-  
taraṅginitikā*, the *Vallabhāstakavivṛtiprakāśa*,  
etc. For an acquaintance with the philosophy of the  
school, the perusal of the "*suddhādvaitamārtanda*",  
the "*Prameyaratnārnava*", Hari Raya's *Brahmavēda*,  
Gopal Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa's *Brahmavāda-vivaraṇa*, etc.  
is essential. To the same category belong also  
the "*Prasthānaratnākara*" by Śrī Puruṣottamaji  
Mahārāja.

The literature of the Vallabhite School will not  
compare with that of the Rāmānujists or the  
Mādhva School either in erudition or depth. There  
is no Vallabhite writer who will compare with  
Vedantadeśika or Vyāsarājasvāmī either in learning  
or subtlety of thinking and philosophical analysis.

Vallabhācāryya was the son of a Telugu Brahmin  
called Lakṣaṇa Bhaṭṭa. Lakṣaṇa Bhaṭṭa started  
on a pilgrimage to Kāśī with his wife. On the way,  
his wife gave birth to a son. It was this son of his

who subsequently became famous as Vallabhācāryya. Vallabha's time of appearance was 1439 A.D. (1535 Vikramābda). Vallabha spent some time at Mathurā and Brīḍāban. It is said that at that time Gopālakṛṣṇa under the name of Devadamana or Śrinātha made his appearance to him over the hill called Govardhana. It is also said that at that time the Lord also revealed himself to him in a dream and directed him to build a temple for himself and spread the cult of Puṣṭibhakti.

According to Vallabha, the finite self ( *Jiva* ) is monadic ( *anu* ), is a fraction ( *amśa* ) of Brahma and is non-different ( *abhinna* ) from Brahma. Like sparks from a big fire do monadic *Jivas* shoot forth or emanate from the infinite, inexhaustible and immutable Brahman which is their material cause. *Jivas* are thus of the essence of intelligence and felicity like their material cause, Brahman, but with the emanation of the *Jivas* from Brahman, the inherent property of *suddhasattva* in Brahman becomes divided ( *amśabhūta* ) and attached in infinitesimal quantities to the monadic *Jivas*, and becoming predominant at the will of the Lord, causes the *tirodhāna* or suspension of the element of joy or felicity in the *Jivas*. Hence *Jivas*, creature, or finite being is that monadic of Brahman in which intelligence is preponderant while joy or felicity is in abeyance or arrest. ( *Tadā nirupādhiko-anurūpo akṣarāṁśaścitpradhānastichitānandaḥ jivaśabdavācya bhavati.*—“*Prameyaratnārnava*”, p. 7. Chowkhambasans. Ser. ). In other words, *Jiva* is the name of an

infinitesimal fraction of Brahman with intelligence only as its manifest property. From the time of creation, the element of joy or felicity is in abeyance in the *Jiva*, while *aiśvarayya*, i.e. the lordly powers of omniscience, omnipotence, etc. as also other excellences that belong to it as fractions of the divine powers and excellences become *tirohita* or suspended subsequently (Ibid., p. 7). Though the *Jiva* is monadic, infinitesimal (*anu*), yet, inspired and filled by the Lord, it manifests the qualities of infinitude and all-pervasiveness that belong to the Lord himself. But this does not establish the intrinsic infinitude or pervasiveness of the *Jiva* for just as the heat generated in an iron-bar through contact with fire is not intrinsic to the iron-bar itself so also the pervasiveness that manifests itself in the Lord-inspired fractional intelligence called *Jiva* is not intrinsic to the *Jiva* but is due to its contact with the element of joy or felicity in the Lord.

Though Vallabhites speak of the creation of *Jivas*, yet they do not consider them to be *anitya* or beginning in time. Though *Jivas* are *nitya* and therefore without beginning, yet their creation (*śṛṭi*) is conceivable in the sense of emanation (*nishṛṭi*) which means their *udgama*, *vyuccarāṇa* or shooting up (like sparks) and not their beginning to be (*utpatti*). The all pervasiveness of Brahman does not preclude effluxes or emanations from the Lord (like sparks from a blazing fire). In fact, Brahman is not merely the cause but also the effect, not

merely the *upādāna*, primordial matter or stuff but also the *upādeya* or final product, the *vyāpāra* or cause operation and the *adhikaraṇa* or seat of the final effect.

*Jīvas* are *śuddha*, pure, or *samsārī*, unfree, or *mukta*, liberated. The state of the fractional, monadic intelligence immediately after its efflux from Brahman, with the element of joy or felicity in complete suspension, is *śuddhajīvabhāva* or pure creaturehood of the finite being. It is a state of unalloyed (*śuddha*) intelligence. After this state, when the *Jīva* contacts *avidyā* and comes under its influence, the condition of pure creaturehood is superseded by one of bondage and entanglement in *samsāra* and the vicissitudes of mundane life. At this stage, at the will of the Lord, the lordly powers (*aiśvarya*) and other excellences, which continue in the *Jīva* in the *śuddha* state in fractional forms, become also suspended. And so the *Jīvas* become *buddha*, unfree and limited by an alien world (*parādhina*). Amongst these unfree *Jīvas*, some are godly or angelic in nature, while others are endowed with a demoniac or wicked nature. Angelic nature (*daivatva*) consists in subtile *vāsanās* or predispositions towards a higher spiritual life which qualify their possessors for *mukti* or liberation. The creatures whom, the Lord desires to be his associates in his dramatic disports, he endows with these higher spiritual aspiration so as to enable them to qualify for liberation. In other words, the *Jīvas* whom the Lord chooses as his elect or consorts are godly *Jīvas* while the *Jīvas*

who are espoused or won by *māyā* are the demoniac *Jīvas*. The Lord and the godly *Jīvas* never forsake one another and the same is true of *māyā* and the demoniac natures elected by *maya*. And in both cases the ultimate cause is the will of the Lord which divides *Jīvas* into good and evil spirits for the enactment of the world-drama. The demoniac natures cannot become one with the Lord, for in them on account of the *moha* or confusion created by *māyā*, the two lordly powers of *Jñāna* or enlightenment and *Bhakti* or devotion become inoperative and so at-one-ment or *sāyuyya* with the Lord becomes impossible for these *māyā*-dominated demoniac beings. In fact, though *māyā* works both in demoniac and godly beings, in the former it is *mīyā* that dominates and eclipses the *Jīva*'s real nature while in the latter it never succeeds in getting the upper hand and completely obliterating the *Jīvas* self-possession and self-command, i.e., in the one case it is *mīyā* that is the ruling principle, in the other case the ruling principle is the *Jīva* himself. And so in demoniac natures dominated by *mīyā* at-one-ment with the Lord in the sense of *sāyuyya* or entering the Lord's person is a forlorn hope. In the *Brahma-vēdav'varaṇa* (pp. 30-31) the prospect of entering the Lord's Person for a demoniac nature is compared to that of the semen of the male, once discharged into a female womb, re-entering the male body again.

It is no doubt true that *Prakṛti* as the *śakti* of Brahman is non-different from Brahman, *śakti* being *abhinna* or non-different from the *śaktimat*. There-

fore *Prakṛti* as part and parcel of Brahman must also consist of the felicity or joy which is the essence of Brahman. But this in no way improves matters for the demoniac natures, for they have not the remotest experience of the felicity that is Brahman's essence for the reason that the Lord does not reveal his joyous nature before the demoniac *Jīvas*. *Daivī mīyā* and *āsurī mīyā* differ from each other even though the work of *mīyā* is confusion or *moha* in each case, for *daivī mīyā* subserves the end of liberation in the angelic natures while *āsurī mīyā* works only towards the entanglement of the ungodly beings in the toils of mundane life. When *Prakṛti* becomes dissolved in the Lord and with it the demoniac beings are also reabsorbed in the Lord, even then, despite indirect unity with the Lord through *Prakṛti*, these demoniac being have no experience of the felicity in the Lord because of the presence of barriers. These barriers demarcate dissolution from liberation. In liberation there is experience by the *Jīvas* of the inherent felicity in the Lord as part and parcel of the Lord Himself, but dissolution is mere resting in the Lord and the consciousness of this in oneself without any experience of the Lord's essential joy or felicity. The experience of this inherent divine felicity is attainable through devotion only (*Bhaktimātra-sādhya*) and such devotion is of the nature of affectionate love (*sneharūpā*). The experience of this joy arises in the liberated state. Then the devotee rests in the heart of the Lord as Lakṣmī or His Beloved Consort. In *pralaya* or dissolution there

is no experience of positive felicity, there being then only negative cessation from pain as in sleep or drowsiness. Though all *Jivas* are intrinsically partial elements (*svāmśa*) of the Divine Personality, yet the division into godly and ungodly beings is there, at the Lord's will, for His dramatic disport<sup>2</sup>. When the *Jivas* heart is inspired by higher spiritual aspirations, it does so at the will of the Lord. Contrarywise when the *Jiva* gives way to low and evil desires and becoming filled with wicked tendencies acquires a demoniac nature, that also happens at the will of the Lord. The demoniac *Jivas* live disreputable lives in their coarse, corrupt bodies and on account of their misdeeds become degraded more and more in their rebirths, becoming reborn into ever lower forms of life. Thus they become slaves of their carnal desires and are enthralled by the mundane life. It is only the Lord's will that can lift them out of their degradation and till the Lord wills their salvation, they cannot escape from *avidya* and its effects. But when the Lord pleases to take them back to himself as his consorts their *avidya* and the *samsāra* and its toils that result from it forthwith cease at the Lord's will. Then the *Jiva* does not require to go through the discipline of *praxis* or *sādhana* for his salvation but becomes purified through the Lord's grace and realises at-one-ment or unity with him.

*Mukta* or liberated *Jivas* are of two classes—*Jivanmukta* and *Paramamukta*. *Jivanmukti* com-

mences with the cessation of *avidyā*. Of the class of *Jīvanmuktas* are Sanaka and several other sages. Theirs is the *mukti* of *kaivalya*, the freedom which is dispassion or detachment, the freedom which comes through enlightenment or *Jñāna* and is possible in the embodied state. Those who live in the Infinite ( *vyāpaka* ) *Vaikuṇṭha* or in other realms of the Lord barring *Paramavyoma* are *mukta* or liberated *Jīvas*. Thereafter when through a special grace ( *viśiṣṭakṛpā* ) of the Lord they enter *Paramavyoma*, there is *parāmukti* which is pure Brahmahood. Amongst the godly beings some become participators in the Lord's eternal disports ( *nityalīlā* ) through disinterested, self-contained, ( *svatantrā* ) *Bhakti*. Such *Bhakti* is awakened by hearing, etc., in those in whom spiritual aspirations have been generated through associations with pious and devout people.

According to Vallabhites, Para-Brahman is Kṛṣṇa himself as signified by the word Puruṣottama. He is the subject of all sorts of *apṛīkṛta* or immaterial excellences and virtues and has a nature of everlasting joy or felicity. All his dramatic disports are eternal, and all supernatural qualities are ever manifest in him. When Para-Brahma desires to be many, then there arises in Him a change of *rūpa* or form. The Form which thus arises in him is the cause of all causes and is *Akṣara* or Immutable Brahman. In the *Akṣara* state owing to the preponderance of *sattva* the element of felicity or *Ananda* becomes dormant. *Akṣara Brahman* is differently apprehended by the *Jñāni* and the *Bhakta* respectively.



(1) To the *Bhakta* or the devout lover he appears as the Form of the pervasive *Vaikuṇṭha* and other realms ( *lokas* ) of the spirit. In the immutable Form as it presents itself to the perception of the *Bhakta* some excellences appear manifest while other qualities remain non-manifest, though all qualities continue in being. The appearance or manifestation and the disappearance or vanishing from sight are nothing but the Lord's special powers ( *śaktiviśeṣa* ). When qualities become imperative or defunct they are said to have passed over into the non-manifest or *aprākṛta* state. This disappearance is not the work of *māyā*. The *tirobhāva* which is caused by *māyā* is not objective but subjective ; *māyā* does not cause the disappearance of the object but only of our knowledge of the object. *Māyā* operates in unfree beings and causes *pratiti-obhava* or non-apprehension in respect to *sadviśaya* or things that are or exist. But the disappearance caused by the Lord is an objective transition into the *aprākṛta* state.

(2) To the *Jnāni* or enlightened, however, *Akṣara Brahman* appears as reality, intelligence and joy, as beyond space and time, as self-luminous, and as beyond all qualities or determinations. In the appearance in this form what remains manifest in Brahman is the power of *tirodhāna* or suspension while all other qualities remain non-manifest. Hence the *Akṣara* or Immutable Brahman of the enlightened or *Jnānin* is described as *nirdharmaka*, featureless or indeterminate. In reality, however, He is not

featureless. If He were really featureless then the unreal would have to come into being. Vallabhites say, what is called *abhāva* or non-existence is only *tirobhāva* or non-manifest existence, and production or coming into being and destruction or ceasing to be have no intelligible meaning except as becoming manifest and ceasing to be manifest. Since *duhkha*, suffering, misery, etc. are figments of *māyā* and therefore false appearances, therefore the cessation or absence of *duhkha*, etc. must also be a false appearance. Hence assertions of the absence of *duhkhādi* in Brahman amount to the assertion of the falsity of *duhkhādi*. It follows therefore that the Form of Brahman as conceived by the *Jnāni* or enlightened reduces to a featureless being with all powers abstracted therefrom and therefore beyond description in judgments for practical purpose (*sarvavyāvaharatita*).

One particular form of Puruṣottama which is noticeable in the *Sūryamaṇḍa* is his form as *antaryyāmi* or inner controller. This *antaryyāmi* is called Puruṣa or Nārāyaṇa. Three kinds of Puruṣa may be noted in this connection—(1) *Puruṣa* as creator of Mahat, (2) *Puruṣa* as immanent in the world-embryo (*Brahmāṇḍasamsthita*), and (3) *Puruṣa* as indwelling presence in all *bhūta*s or beings (*sarvabhūtastha*). Out of *Puruṣa* come forth the Incarnations of the Lord's Līlā or dramatic sport in the forms of the Great Fish, the Great Tortoise, etc. The *antaryyāmins* that come out of the *Akṣara* or Immutable are all parts or partial forms (*aṃśa*) of this Principal *Antaryāmi*. They are all marked

by their joyous natures, are numerically different, like *Jivas*, in different corporeal forms and are the inner controlling agents of the *Jivas* in which they dwell. In short, the *antaryyāmins* of sentient beings and non-sentient things are all partial modes or manifestations of the Primary or Principal *Antaryyāmi*—a part or fraction of the Principal *Antaryyāmi* being manifest in every individual *antaryyāmi* in a sentient being or a non-sentient thing.

According to Vallabhites, just as there is *viśuddha* or pure *sattva* other than *prākṛta sattva* or *sattvā* as the matter or stuff of the world, so also there are *aprākṛta rajas* and *aprākṛta tamas* besides *prākṛta rajas* and *tamas* that constitute the world-stuff or material cause of the world. *Aprākṛta* or Immaterial *Sattva* after creating the form of fish, etc, appears therein after the manner of fire in an iron-ball and carries on their functions. In such forms consisting of pure *sattva* the Lord enters with a view to maintaining the world. The Lord as informing such *Viśuddha-Sattva*-forms for the purpose of world-maintenance and the like is called *Viṣṇu*. In the same way the Lord as inspiring *aprākṛta* or Immaterial *Rajas*-forms is called *Brahma*, and as informing Immaterial *Tamas Vighrahas* is called *Śiva*. Though they are all *aprākṛta vighrahas* or immaterial forms, yet as also controlling and directing the material or *Prākṛta guṇas* they are to be regarded as *Saguṇa* or related to be *guṇas*. That they have been described in the *Purāṇas* as *Para Brahman* is due to there being no real difference between them and the

Lord. Though Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva are all Incarnations or Forms of *aprākṛta guṇas*, yet the form of Viṣṇu is to be regarded as the highest amongst the three on account of the presence in it of the distinctive qualities of the Lord in a special manner.

The Lord has an infinite multitude of Forms. Every form of the Lord is Brahman in its completeness. This explains the fact why on the path of enlightenment there is no difference between *praxis* (*sādhana*) and its consequence (*phala*). It is otherwise however with the way of *Bhakti* or devotion. Just as the Lord creates the world for the purpose of dramatic disport, so also he has chalked out a separate path of *Bhakti* for those who desire to realise Him through loving devotion. In the Forms of the Lord's *Vibhūti* or powers, both the *praxis* and the end achieved thereby are limited, relative and circumscribed. The highest and most complete result cannot be achieved through these works, such result being attainable not through the worship of the *Vibhūtirūpas* but of the *Svayamrūpa* or Intrinsic Form of the Lord which is the Form of Kṛṣṇa. The highest end or result is *śāyuyya* and *śāyuyva*, according to Vallabhites, is not identity with Brahman but direct connection (*yoga*) with Brahman. Such connection or intimate relation is attainable not by enlightenment but through single-minded devotion to and service of Lord Kṛṣṇa. There is no worship unless the Lord presents himself externally to the worshipper as the object of devotion. That is why *Bhajanī* or worship must be

the worship of the Lord in his manifestation as external to oneself.

Liberation (*mukti*) is of two kinds—*saguṇa mukti* and *nirguṇa mukti*. The primary result of of the worship of any deity is *sīyuyya* or direct union with the deity. Where the deity is *saguṇa* the resulting union is *saguna mukti* or liberation within the *guṇas*. In other cases, *mukti* is *nirguṇa* or liberation beyond the *guṇas*. All deities barring Lord Kṛṣṇa himself are *saguṇa*. Hence *nirguṇa mukti* or liberation beyond the *guṇas* is intimate union with Kṛṣṇa (*Kṛṣṇa-sīyuyya*). There is no *nirguṇa mukti* on the path of enlightenment. The Immutable (*Akṣara, Kū'astha*), though transcending the *guṇas*, also consists with the *guṇas*. Enlightenment is the realisation of the *Akṣara* (as immanent in *guṇas*) through *śravaṇa*, *manana*, etc. The liberation which results therefrom is *Kaivalya*, *Detachment*, or *Jivanmukti*, freedom in embodied being. *Kaivalya* is *sāttvikajñāna* or enlightenment arising from *sāttvaguna*. Therefore it is *sāttvikamukti* or liberation in *sāttvaguna*. The enlightened turns away from the world scared by the miseries of *samsāra* and takes to the way of freedom through knowledge. It is a condition within the *gunas* and not one beyond the *gunas*. With knowledge or enlightenment comes liberation in the embodied state. In that state illusory identification with *prakṛti* (*adhyāsa*) ceases and consequently attachment to the material world and its modes falls off. Such liberation in embodied life is liberation within the

*gunas*, for in that state creature-hood or creature-consciousness as under the sway of *Vidyā* and *Avidyā* continues. *Bhakti* makes its appearance subsequently to the realisation *Brahmabhīva*—one then reaches beyond the *gunas*. If *Bhakti* does not awaken after *Brahmabhāva*, one then has to continue in the *Jivanmukta* state of embodied freedom. Such was the condition of Sanaka and the like : theirs was a state ( of freedom ) in the *gunas*, not one beyond the *gunas*. Till *Bhakti* is reached, one continues within the *gunas* : with the awakening of *Bhakti* one gets beyond the *gunas*. The first is a condition of enlightenment as such the second one of *Bhakti* conditioned by enlightenment. The first is illustrated in Sanaka, etc., the second is illustrated in Śuka and others.

The *praxis* or *sādhana* by *Bhakti* laid down by Vallabhites is called the way of *puṣṭi* ( *puṣṭimārga* ). *Puṣṭi* means the Grace ( *krpā* ) of the Lord. It is an attribute of the Lord and is counteractive of time. Its effects are manifold—both natural and supernatural. *Puṣṭi* is inferred from its effects. *Mahāpuṣṭi* is Grace *Par Excellence* and consists in effecting the attainment of one's real status in the teeth of powerful obstacles. The great obstacles are the resistance of one's own nature or *svabhāva* and the resistance caused by one's works. *Puṣṭi* accomplishes all the four *puruṣārthas* or ends of life, viz., *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*. The *puṣṭi* which realises these four ends is *sāminyapuṣṭi* or grace of the common or ordinary sort. There is however a special grace

(*viśiṣṭāpuṣṭi*) from which results *Bhakti* culminating in the realisation of the Lord's *svarūpa* or intrinsic nature. The *Bhakti* which results from such special grace is called *puṣṭibhakti*. *Puṣṭibhakti* arises from the Lord's favour alone and not from anything else. (*Puṣṭimārgo-anugrahaikasādhyaḥ pramāṇamārgāt vilakṣaṇah—"Anubhāṣya", 8-8-9*).

Every kind of *Bhakti* depends on the Lord's favour. But the *Bhakti* that arises from the Lord's ordinary favour is called *Maryyādābhakti*. The *Bhakti* that is kindled by the Lord's special grace is technically called *puṣṭi-bhakti*. In *puṣṭibhakti* the only object sought is the Lord himself and there is no desire for anything other than the Lord. Even *mukti* or liberation appears trivial in the eye of the devotee who has attained to *puṣṭibhakti*.

According to Vallabhites there are four kinds of *puṣṭibhakti*, viz. :—

1. *Pravāḥapūṣṭi*. *Pravāḥa* means the stream of *samsāra* or world-life consisting in the consciousness of the "I" and the "mine" in relation to things. And the *puṣṭibhakti* which arises in association with this *samsāra*-consciousness is characterised by *karmaruci* or the liking for works. In other words, in *puṣṭibhakti* bound up with *samsārapravāḥa* there are works suited to the nature of the Lord.

2. *Maryyādīpuṣṭi*. In the condition of *maryyādā*, there is cessation from the pursuit of objects arising from attraction or attachment so that the *Jiva* turns to the way of *nivṛtti* or world-denial and its consequent practices or duties. In the *Bhakti* that arises

in this state or condition, the *Jīva* conquers his lust for objects and acquires a zest for hearing, etc., of discourses on the Lord and His nature.

3. *Puṣṭibhakti*. Those who attain to this third type of *puṣṭibhakti* are *puṣṭibhaktas* who, owing to another favour of the Lord conducive to the awakening of the enlightenment that is suited to His worship, become omniscient or all-knowing. Such *bhaktas* know all about the Lord, the Lord's personal attendants and courtiers, His dramatic sports, the world, etc.

4. *Suddhapuṣṭibhakti*. Those who are *bhaktas* of this fourth type are inspired by love and intrinsic affection. They serve the Lord and sing his praise out of pure affection and love. Theirs is a devotion that is very rare indeed.

Hari Raya has described this *Suddhapuṣṭibhakti* in twenty-one verses (*vide Paramieyaratnāraṇava*, pp. 19-24), the substance whereof is as follows :—

In the way of *Suddhapuṣṭibhakti*, the *phala*, consequence or end achieved is *Bhagavatprāpti*, attainment of the Lord, but for the realisation of this end, no *sādhana* or prescribed course of discipline is necessary. In other words, the method or means here is the absence of any prescribed means or method. Or, one may say, the end (i.e., the Lord himself) is here the means. *Siddhi* or fruition is dependent on the Lord's favour and not on individual efforts. In fact, individual effort hinders instead of furthering the realisation of the end. The Lord elects *Jīvas* out of Free Grace irrespective of their worthiness or unworthiness (according to



human standards). And the devotee also does not try to judge the rightness or otherwise of the Lord's act of Grace but simply feels and recognises its super-excellence. For such a *Bhakta* there is neither a sense of frailty or weakness in such acts of the Lord Kṛṣṇa as shedding tears when chastised by His mother Jāśodā, plundering the storeroom, etc., nor a sense of the uncommon or extraordinary when overpowering and subduing the Snake-king Kāliya or extinguishing the conflagration, etc. For him all acts point to the Lord or Master as their end and no special direction, Vedic or otherwise, is necessary to discover the intrinsic import and end of all our efforts. The Lord elects *Jīvas* unto himself out of free Grace—His favour is *ahetuka*, not measurable in terms of human reason. And this is the reason why the end which the disciplined and much-practised man fails to achieve by his strenuous spiritual efforts is easily attained by a man who may appear to be comparatively unworthy of him. Even at the time of separation from the Lord, such a *bhakta* has experience of the Divine felicity, for such *Bhakti* is autonomous in respect of its joy-producing virtue and does not depend on the presence of the Lord's Person for producing the felicity that arises from it. As in *Bhakti* in this form the consciousness of the Lord overshadows every other experience, the fear of this as well as the other world vanishes so that the *bhakta* feels the Lord's Presence in himself as obliterating all sense of time, all consciousness of moral obligations as well as all ideas of himself and

of the qualities intrinsic to himself. On the way of *Śuddhapuṣṭibhakti*, the means is union, physical and mental, of the finite being with the Lord, and the end is the union of all the senses with the Lord. And the union takes place at the will of the Lord. The consequence of it is the consciousness of the Lord in all that is allied to the Lord, a feeling of repugnance to all things that are inimical to the Lord and a sense of indifference to all that is neither allied nor inimically related to Him. The *Bhakta* in this state is prompted to the preservation of the body not from a feeling of personal ownership in it but from the consciousness of its being God-given and therefore belonging to the Lord. And even at the time of separation from the Lord it is preserved in the hope of a future reunion with the Lord. In the path of *śuddhapuṣṭi*, worship does not consist in the rendering of any service to the Lord, and the Lord also does not insult the devotion of the worshippers by bequeathing rewards for their worship. *Śuddhapuṣṭi*, in other words, is *Śuddha* or pure *bhakti* for its own sake—it is love for love's sake—i.e., man's love of God out of pure zest for such love as also God's love of man for pure love's sake. In separation one tastes greater felicity in such *Bhakti* than in union, because, separated, one has inward realisation of a new aspect of the Lord's *līlā* or self-display at every new moment. In the path of *Śuddhapuṣṭibhakti*, the means and the end exchange positions so that the means is also the end and the end the means. Thus the means which is here *bhakti* or love of God

for its own sake is also the end which it aims at and in which it culminates. Similarly the end which is *Bhagavatprāpti* or attainment of the Lord is also the means inasmuch as such attainment or realisation comes only as a Gift of the Lord Himself who is to be attained or realised. The *dainya* or consciousness of nullity and insignificance which is not dependent on anything else is the cause of the appearance of the Lord, i.e., when the *Jīva* feels his own insignificance or nullity, the Lord reveals Himself. Hence such *dainya* must be distinguished from the sense of emptiness (*dainya*) that arises from separation, this latter being an effect or *phala* (of the separation) and not a cause. In *śuddhāpusti* the *dainya* is intrinsic, *anyanirapekṣa* non-dependent on anything else and this brings on the revelation of the Lord. *śuddhāpusti* brings on complete renunciation of all worldly objects and surrender of everything including the body, but while as worldly they are renounced, as gifts of the Lord they are again accepted. In short, in *śuddhāpusti*—the consciousness of “I” disappears, and the will, not as “my will” but as “Thy will” or the Lord’s will, prevails. In this state the *Jīva* realises the hand of providence in everything.

According to *śuddhādvaitins*, the *Jīva* is consubstantial with Brahman but only as a partial element thereof and not as Brahman in all-completeness and fullness. Therefore worship is necessary for restoration or recovery of the *Jīva*’s real status as a partial element within the All-Inclusive Brahman. Wor-

ship, in other words, is necessary for overcoming *avidyā* which is responsible for the *Jīvas* self-forgetting and consequent fall into *saṃsāra* or the stream of mundane life. Worship effects his reinstatement as a *Bhakta*, i.e., his restoration as a partial element within Brahman and in necessary intimate relation of love and unity with the whole. With the cessation of egoism and its powers or *aiśvarya* and the *nivṛtti* or overcoming of *avidyā*, one attains to unity with the Lord. Even then however differences amongst *Jīvas* continue.<sup>3</sup> Though the *bhakta* attains to sameness with the Lord in respect of person, personal beauty, etc., yet, as without difference there is no real commerce of spirit, differences continue at the stage. It may be asked, as *avidyā* ceases in the pure *puṣṭimārga* so as to make one fit for devotion or *bhajanā*, what use is *bhajanā* or worship in this *suddhapuṣṭi* stage? The Vallabhīe answer is : for the purpose of *līla* or dramatic sport—the separated *Jīva* reunites with the Lord through *bhajanā* and thereby tastes the joy of the reunion. But since *bhajanā* in the *suddhapuṣṭi mārga* does not consist in works but is *bhāvātma* or an emotional realisation, therefore it is *phalarūpā* in spite of its being of the nature of *sādhana* or a preparatory means. Hence such *bhajanā* never loses its character as *suddhapuṣṭi* for *puṣṭimārga* is the way in which the end is itself the means to the end ( *puṣṭimārgaḥ sa eva yatra phalam svayameva sādhanam* ).<sup>4</sup>

3. Cf. *Brahmayādvavivaraṇa*, p. 20.      4. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

## CORRIGENDA

<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>Incorrect</i>	<i>Correct</i>
23	20	of	of a
38	8	form	from
45	20	oretical	theoretical
60	19	national	natural
84	31	esitate hto	hesitate to
98	31	woh	how-
102	27	such	as such
103	22	means	means of
104	17	more	a more
115	23	from its	from
116	4	or	and
116	23	evidence	evidenced
120	17	as	is
120	22	far	far as
122	3	all other	all
124	17	which builds	who builds
126	6	<i>Sakartrkatva</i>	<i>Sakartṛkatva</i>
"	29	Mimāṃsakas	Mīmāṃsakas
131	30, 31	paksa	pakṣa
136	17	sence	instance
140	13	<i>viśeṣānu-</i>	<i>viśeṣānu-</i>
"	19	<i>tanmūlarrāgadveṣau</i>	<i>tanmūlarrāgadveṣau</i>
"	28	<i>tajjāyorapi</i>	<i>tajjāyorapi</i>
141	7	kriyāśakti	kriyāśakti
144	12	savajna	sarvajña
154	10	are	are not
155 ft. no. li. 2		utpādayamanu	utpadyamānamanubhuyate
158	2	detum	datum
158 foot. li. 2		vabhedona	vabhedena
158 " " 6		pramāṇasvabhāvam	pramāṇasvabhāvam
158 " " 9		prāmam	prāmāṇ
158 " " 10		sv at	svat
159 ft. no. li. 6		apeṣeta	apekṣeta
159 " " 7		ya va	yava
159 " " 11		ma pa	mapa

<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>Incorrect</i>	<i>Correct</i>
159	ft. no. li. 11	jena	yena
164	15	between	between the
165	12	is	is a
166	11	visiyatā	viśayitā
167	7	intelligence	intelligent
192	24	metempirical	metaempirical
198	13	of the	of
198	14	of	of a
214	22	<i>e. g.</i>	<i>c. f.</i>
215	3	Purusa's fulfil- ment of	Puruṣa's fulfil- ment in
217	15	oharacters	characters
229	12	subtile	subtle
237	3	<i>Ātmakhyāti</i>	<i>Ātmakhyāti</i>
246	10	indeserible	indescribable
248	3-4	<i>vād, bād</i>	<i>vāda</i>
250	12	that	that the
250	30	defects	the defects
252	30	form	from
256	4	cut	out
258	15	the the	the
265	15	exigesis	exegesis
266	6	<i>suddhādvaita</i>	<i>śuddhādvaita</i>
267	10	ekāmeva	ekameva
267	12	neh nānā- kincana	nehanānāsti- kincana
270	18	sricaitanya	Śrīcaitanya
270	24	sivaśakti	jīvaśakti
271	6	Lord	Lord and
273	title	The Bhagavat and the Pancaratra	The Bhāgavat and the Pañcarātra
275	15	Agama	Āgama
277	9	gnāna	jñāna
277	ft. no. li. 7	analysis	analyses
277	" " 13	intellectualisd	intellectualist
278	18	ben	been

<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>Incorrect</i>	<i>Correct</i>
279	10	somhitā	Samhitā
280	1	jñadarśana	jñādarśana
280	26	śaktas	Śaktas
282	17	life animal	life-animated
282	24	successive	successiveness
282	27	their	these
282	31	fixed	fixed
283	10	or Prakṛti	of Prakṛti
283	16	Strenght	Strength
284	18	creative acti- vity	Creative Acti- vity
285	4	soul	Soul
285	27	immedicy	immediacy
286	10	pleasures	pleasure
286	11	gate-keeper	gate-keepers
287	11	Bṛndābanlīla	Bṛndābanalīlā
287	29	worship	worship and
287	35	Philosophy	Philosophy*
288	17	Jñānadeva	Jñānadeva
289	24	āśya	āśya
291	26	monadic	monadic fraction
291	29	tirohitānanda	tirohitānanda
293	3	cause	causal
293	19	buddha	baddha
294	25	vādaravaraṇa	vādavivarana
298	17	pratiti-cbhava	pratiti-abhava
298	10	imperative	inoperative
298	18	to	of
300	7	of	or
300	24	Brahma	Brahmā
300	29	be	the
301	4	est	st
301	23	sāyujya	sāyujya
302	5	of the	the
302	20	sāttvikajñāna	sāttvikajñāna

\* History of Philosophy, Eastern & Western—The Philosophy of Śrī Caitanya.











